@article{lauber2026_115974,
  title = {Three-player round-robin tournaments in the lab : Lottery contests vs. all-pay auctions},
  author = {Lauber, Arne and March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2026},
  pages = {1-26},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-115974x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/115974},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare the fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players, a single prize, and two alternative match formats. Matches are either organized as lottery contests or all-pay auctions. Contrary to theory, we find no significant differences in intensity and fairness between the two match formats. The main reason is the behavior of the player acting in the final two matches in APA-tournaments. Rather than being severely discouraged when having to compete first against the loser of the first match, subjects try to exploit a perceived negative psychological momentum in such situations. This leads them into a dissipation trap: an effort-intense, final-like last match which significantly reduces their payoffs, but also levels the playing field for the other two players and thus enhances the fairness of APA-tournaments.},
  keywords = {All-pay auction, Discouragement effect, Dissipation trap, Laboratory experiment, Lottery contest, Sequential round-robin tournament}
}

@article{lauber2026_115973,
  title = {Three-player round-robin tournaments in the lab : Lottery contests vs. all-pay auctions},
  author = {Lauber, Arne and March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2026},
  journal = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  volume = {124},
  number = {102605},
  pages = {1-26},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {2214-8051},
  doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2026.102605},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/115973},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare the fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players, a single prize, and two alternative match formats. Matches are either organized as lottery contests or all-pay auctions. Contrary to theory, we find no significant differences in intensity and fairness between the two match formats. The main reason is the behavior of the player acting in the final two matches in APA-tournaments. Rather than being severely discouraged when having to compete first against the loser of the first match, subjects try to exploit a perceived negative psychological momentum in such situations. This leads them into a dissipation trap: an effort-intense, final-like last match which significantly reduces their payoffs, but also levels the playing field for the other two players and thus enhances the fairness of APA-tournaments.},
  keywords = {All-pay auction, Discouragement effect, Dissipation trap, Laboratory experiment, Lottery contest, Sequential round-robin tournament}
}

@article{march2025_110508,
  title = {The perks of being in the smaller team : incentives in overlapping contests},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2025},
  pages = {585-610},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-110508x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/110508},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We investigate overlapping contests in multi-divisional organizations in which an individual’s effort simultaneously determines the outcome of several contests on different hierarchical levels. We show that individuals in smaller units are advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important consequences for the provision of incentives in organizations and the design of sports competitions.},
  keywords = {Contest, Rent-seeking, Hierarchy, Teams, Experiment}
}

@techreport{heidelmeier2025_108373,
  title = {Environmental Awards in a Duopoly with Green Consumers},
  author = {Heidelmeier, Lisa Isabel and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2025},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series on government and growth},
  doi = {10.20378/irb-108373},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-1083731},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/108373},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We investigate the impact of an environmental award in a Bertrand duopoly with green consumers considering a three-stage game. First, the regulator designs the environmental contest. Second, firms choose their green investments, and the winner of the contest is awarded. Third, firms compete in prices, and consumption takes place. We illustrate that the award not only incentivizes green investments and may thus reduce environmental externalities. As consumers perceive the product of the awarded firm to be of superior quality, it also gives rise to vertical product differentiation. This induces market power, and thus anti-competitive effects: Rents shift from consumers to producers, and consumer surplus may decrease, particularly if marginal investment costs in green technologies are high compared to the strength of environmental damage.},
  keywords = {Bertrand Competition, Contests, Environmental Award, Green Consumer, Product Differentiation}
}

@techreport{heidelmeier2025_108375,
  title = {Awards vs. Labels : Incentivizing Investments in Environmental Quality},
  author = {Heidelmeier, Lisa Isabel and Schmitt, Stefanie Y.},
  year = {2025},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series on government and growth},
  doi = {10.20378/irb-108375},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-1083757},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/108375},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Although consumers often care about environmental quality, limited attention impairs consumers’ perception of environmental quality. Environmental awards and labels make environmental quality salient and attract consumers’ attention. We analyze how awards and labels affect firms’ investments in environmental quality and social welfare. We show that, with an award, both firms invest in environmental quality; with a label, only one firm invests. Under awards, investments depend positively on salience. Under labels, investments depend non-monotonically on salience. A welfare-maximizing social planner prefers awards over labels if and only if marginal damage and salience are sufficiently high such that consumers overestimate the environmental quality of the goods.},
  keywords = {Awards, Environmental Quality, Labels, Limited Attention, Salience}
}

@article{deutscher2025_106894,
  title = {Strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests with heterogeneous players},
  author = {Deutscher, Christian and Sahm, Marco and Schneemann, Sandra and Sonnabend, Hendrik},
  year = {2025},
  pages = {281-317},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-1068941},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/106894},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {When heterogeneous players make strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests, they might conserve resources in a current contest to spend more in a subsequent contest, if the degree of heterogeneity in the current (subsequent) contest is sufficiently large (small). We confirm these predictions using data from German professional soccer, in which players are subject to a one-match ban if they accumulate five yellow cards. Players with four yellow cards facing the risk of being suspended for the next match are (i) less likely to be fielded when the heterogeneity in the current match increases and (ii) more likely to receive a fifth yellow card in the current match when heterogeneity in the next match increases or heterogeneity in the next match but one (when they return from their ban) decreases.},
  keywords = {Tournaments, Multi-stage contests, Heterogeneity, Anticipating behaviour, Shadow effects}
}

@techreport{lauber2025_108079,
  title = {Round-Robin Tournaments in the Lab : Lottery Contests vs. All-Pay Auctions},
  author = {Lauber, Arne and March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2025},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series on government and growth},
  isbn = {978-3-949224-22-5},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/108079},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{march2025_91892,
  title = {The perks of being in the smaller team : incentives in overlapping contests},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2025},
  journal = {Review of economic design},
  volume = {29},
  number = {3},
  pages = {585-610},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address = {Berlin ; Heidelberg},
  issn = {1434-4750},
  doi = {10.1007/s10058-023-00331-z},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91892},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We investigate overlapping contests in multi-divisional organizations in which an individual’s effort simultaneously determines the outcome of several contests on different hierarchical levels. We show that individuals in smaller units are advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important consequences for the provision of incentives in organizations and the design of sports competitions.},
  keywords = {Contest, Rent-seeking, Hierarchy, Teams, Experiment}
}

@techreport{bruckner2024_108063,
  title = {Party Politics : A Contest Perspective},
  author = {Bruckner, Dominik and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2024},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series on government and growth},
  isbn = {978-3-949224-18-8},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/108063},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{dietz2024_108057,
  title = {Fairness in Round-Robin Tournaments with Four Players and Endogenous Sequences},
  author = {Dietz, Fabian and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2024},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series on government and growth},
  isbn = {978-3-949224-14-0},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/108057},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{daske2024_105420,
  title = {Efficient incentives with social preferences},
  author = {Daske, Thomas and March, Christoph},
  year = {2024},
  pages = {975-999},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-1054207},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/105420},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of \textit\{at least three\} agents: Any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient.},
  keywords = {Mechanism design, social preferences, Bayesian implementation, participation constraints, participation stimulation, money pump}
}

@article{daske2024_105419,
  title = {Efficient incentives with social preferences},
  author = {Daske, Thomas and March, Christoph},
  year = {2024},
  journal = {Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory},
  volume = {19},
  number = {3},
  pages = {975-999},
  publisher = {The Econometric Society},
  address = {Toronto},
  issn = {1555-7561},
  doi = {10.3982/te5335},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/105419},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of \textit\{at least three\} agents: Any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient.},
  keywords = {Mechanism design, social preferences, Bayesian implementation, participation constraints, participation stimulation, money pump}
}

@article{schieferdecker2024_94676,
  title = {Digitale Innovationen und Technologiesouveränität},
  author = {Schieferdecker, Ina and March, Christoph},
  year = {2024},
  pages = {30-35},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-946763},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/94676},
  language = {deu},
  abstract = {Digitale Innovationen verändern zunehmend Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Es ist Aufgabe der Politik, diese Veränderungen im Dialog mit der Gesellschaft und im Einklang mit unseren Werten zu gestalten. Technologiesouveränität ist dafür eine wichtige Voraussetzung. Dabei geht es nicht um die Abschottung von internationalen Märkten, sondern um die Fähigkeit, Anforderungen an Technologien zu formulieren und diese am Markt durchzusetzen. Einer integrierten Forschungs- und Innovationspolitik, die die Förderung von Technologieentwicklung, Technologietransfer und Zukunftskompetenzen gleichermaßen in den Blick nimmt und auf europäische Zusammenarbeit setzt, kommt dabei eine zentrale Rolle zu.},
  keywords = {Digitale Innovationen, Technologiesouveränität}
}

@article{lauber2023_91890,
  title = {Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments : Experimental evidence},
  author = {Lauber, Arne and March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2023},
  journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
  volume = {141},
  pages = {30-51},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {1090-2473},
  doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.011},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91890},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{march2023_91887,
  title = {Technological Sovereignty as Ability, Not Autarky},
  author = {March, Christoph and Schieferdecker, Ina},
  year = {2023},
  journal = {International Studies Review},
  pages = {1-28},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  address = {Oxford},
  issn = {1468-2486},
  doi = {10.1093/isr/viad012},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91887},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{daske2022_107975,
  title = {Efficient Incentives with Social Preferences},
  author = {Daske, Thomas and March, Christoph},
  year = {2022},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series on government and growth},
  isbn = {978-3-949224-01-0},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/107975},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{sahm2022_107972,
  title = {Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2022},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series on government and growth},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-96-5},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/107972},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{daske2022_91889,
  title = {Efficient Incentives with Social Preferences},
  author = {Daske, Thomas and March, Christoph},
  year = {2022},
  journal = {CESifo Working Paper},
  pages = {1-20},
  address = {München},
  issn = {2364-1428},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91889},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sahm2022_56203,
  title = {Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2022},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-562031},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/56203},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (r≥2). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or the winner’s expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level r<2 decreases in the players’ heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum (maximum) effort will never choose a contest with a semi-mixed equilibrium.},
  keywords = {Tullock contest, heterogeneous valuations, accuracy, discrimination, optimal design, all-pay auction}
}

@article{sahm2022_56202,
  title = {Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2022},
  journal = {Games},
  volume = {13},
  number = {2},
  address = {Basel},
  issn = {2073-4336},
  doi = {10.3390/g13020024},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/56202},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (r≥2). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or the winner’s expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level r<2 decreases in the players’ heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum (maximum) effort will never choose a contest with a semi-mixed equilibrium.},
  keywords = {Tullock contest, heterogeneous valuations, accuracy, discrimination, optimal design, all-pay auction}
}

@article{planerfriedrich2022_53941,
  title = {Strategic CSR in Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly},
  author = {Planer-Friedrich, Lisa and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2022},
  pages = {33-42},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-539411},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/53941},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We examine the strategic use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Cournot competition between two firms that differ in their marginal costs of production. The level of CSR determines the weight a firm puts on consumer surplus in its objective function before it decides upon supply. We show that the more efficient firm chooses a higher CSR level, reinforcing its dominant position. If there are sufficiently large fixed costs of CSR, only the more efficient firm will engage in CSR.},
  keywords = {corporate social responsibility, cournot duopoly, asymmetric costs, heterogenous firms}
}

@article{march2022_53798,
  title = {Coordinating intergenerational redistribution and the repayment of public debt: an experimental test of Tabellini (1991)},
  author = {March, Christoph and Weizsäcker, Robert K. von},
  year = {2022},
  pages = {301-323},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-537983},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/53798},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Is there a link between public debt and wealth inequality? Could government bondholders use intra-generational redistribution strategically to make the repayment of debt politically viable? We reconsider the model of Tabellini (J Polit Econ 99:335–357, 1991) and expose the role of coordination and divide-and-conquer. By coordinating their bond investments, the old generation splits up the young generation and secures a majority favoring debt repayment. Coordination therefore mediates the impact of wealth inequality on public debt. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and find that subjects often coordinate to exploit the link between inter- and intragenerational redistribution. Hence, coordination plays an important role in the strategic creation and exploitation of minorities, and thus in the accumulation of public debt.},
  keywords = {public debt, wealth inequality, generation split, bond investment, redistribution}
}

@techreport{lauber2022_54032,
  title = {Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: experimental evidence},
  author = {Lauber, Arne and March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2022},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-97-2},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54032},
  language = {deu}
}

@phdthesis{lauber2022_52473,
  title = {Essays in Applied Contest Theory: Round-Robin Tournaments and Innovation Competition},
  author = {Lauber, Arne},
  year = {2022},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  doi = {10.20378/irb-52473},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-524731},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/52473},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {A contest is an interaction in which players provide costly and irretrievable effort to win some prize. Many contests are embedded in larger games with manifold dynamic structures where multiple decisions are made by the same player in sequential stages rather than making only one decision in a single stage. This dissertation focuses on the strategic interactions in two distinct dynamic fields: Round-Robin Tournaments and Innovation Competition.

Round-robin tournaments are dynamic contests that are sparsely investigated, despite their frequent use in practice. In a round-robin tournament the players are sequentially matched in pair-wise contests and every player meets every other player in turn. Eventually, the players are ranked and awarded according to the number of  matches won. Contest designers, particularly in sports, heavily rely on round-robin tournaments in all kinds and sizes, e.g., for organizing team events like the major European soccer leagues with up to 20 teams, or the group stages of Basketball Olympics and FIFA Soccer World Cups with down to three teams.

Innovation competition is often considered as a dynamic game. It describes firms' R\&D activity within the scope of markets. In other words, there is interdependence between the firms' incentives to innovate and competition. A dynamic game occurs when firms, subsequent to a R\&D-Contest, reap their rewards of a successful innovation in terms of a competitive advantage on the product market.

In Chapter 2, Christoph Laica, Marco Sahm and I examine the fairness and intensity of sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes and heterogeneous players. A tournament is called fair if the winning probabilities in each match depend only on the player's characteristics but not on the sequence of matches. We show that a tournament with three players is fair in every match if and only if the second prize is valued half of the first prize (with the third prize normalized to zero). For three symmetric players, the fair tournament also maximizes the players' aggregate expected effort if the randomness in the single matches is sufficiently small. Otherwise, the optimal prize structure may be subject to a trade-off between fairness and intensity. For tournaments with more than three players and an exogenously fixed sequence of matches there exists no fair prize structure. Our analysis suggests that almost all major sports events that deploy round-robin tournaments are inherently unfair.

In Chapter 3, Marco Sahm and I experimentally reassess our theoretical results on fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players by comparing two alternative match formats: while the all-pay auction is perfectly discriminating (no randomness) and always awards the prize to the player with the highest effort, the lottery contest awards the prize randomly such that the probability of winning is given by the ratio between a player's own effort and the aggregate effort of all players. Irrespective of the randomness, we do not find any significant discrimination with respect to overall winning probabilities. This is in line with the equilibrium predictions for lottery contests, but at odds with those of all-pay auctions. Instead of the predicted discouragement effect in tournaments with all-pay auctions, we observe a dissipation-trap: players end up in an effort-intense, final-like last match which significantly reduces payoffs of the late-mover. While we observe over-dissipation, this may explain why intensity in both tournaments does not differ significantly.

In Chapter 4, Marco Sahm and I experimentally explore how the prize structure affects intensity, fairness, and dynamic behavior in three-player round-robin tournaments where single matches are organized as all-pay auctions. We compare tournaments with a second prize equal to either 0\%, 50\%, or 100\% of the first prize. We find that aggregate effort is highest in the 0\%-tournament while theory predicts the 50\%-treatment (0\%-treatment) to be the most (least) intense. The main reason is the absence of the predicted discouragement effect of the late-mover in the 0\%-tournament. As predicted by theory, we ascertain a fair ranking induced by the 50\%-treatment and find support for the late mover disadvantage (advantage) in the 0\%-treatment (100\%-treatment). In line with theoretical results, players' dynamic behavior is characterized by momentum effects. In particular, we identify a strategic (reverse) momentum: a player increases (decreases) effort after winning (losing) the first match of the 0\%-treatment (100\%-treatment). A reverse momentum is also detected in the 50\%-treatment. However, mixed-strategy equilibrium play can only partly explain this behavior. Our comprehensive analysis suggests that dynamic behavior is also subject to a reverse psychological momentum.

In Chapter 5, I examine the effects of a horizontal merger between two firms on the incentives to innovate and on welfare in oligopolistic markets. I develop a dynamic model with innovation competition that shapes subsequent Cournot competition on the product market. I use a lottery contest that allows for a draw to model the innovation competition as a R\&D-Contest with a difficulty to successfully innovate that possibly prevents an innovational breakthrough. In the presence (absence) of this difficulty, a successful innovation is uncertain (certain) and innovation effort is considered as (un-)productive. I show that there is a robust domain where mergers enhance the effciency of R\&D activity and, thus, total welfare. When effort is unproductive, a merger can reduce undesired duplicative R\&D expenses. When effort is productive, a merger with suffciently large R\&D synergies in triopolistic markets provides additional ncentives to innovate and increases the probability of a successful innovation.},
  keywords = {Contests; Round-Robin Tournaments; Tournament Design; Mergers and Innovation, Tullock Contest; All-pay auction; Fairness; Intensity; Momentum; Discouragement Effect; Lean-Back Effect; Dissipation Trap; Experiment},
  school = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg}
}

@article{laica2021_115817,
  title = {Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes},
  author = {Laica, Christoph and Lauber, Arne and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
  volume = {129},
  pages = {421-448},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {0899-8256},
  doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.012},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/115817},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{deutscher2021_104074,
  title = {Strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests with heterogeneous players},
  author = {Deutscher, Christian and Sahm, Marco and Schneemann, Sandra and Sonnabend, Hendrik},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Theory and Decision},
  volume = {93},
  number = {2},
  pages = {281-317},
  publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
  address = {Dordrecht [u.a.]},
  issn = {1573-7187},
  doi = {10.1007/s11238-021-09845-w},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/104074},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {When heterogeneous players make strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests, they might conserve resources in a current contest to spend more in a subsequent contest, if the degree of heterogeneity in the current (subsequent) contest is sufficiently large (small). We confirm these predictions using data from German professional soccer, in which players are subject to a one-match ban if they accumulate five yellow cards. Players with four yellow cards facing the risk of being suspended for the next match are (i) less likely to be fielded when the heterogeneity in the current match increases and (ii) more likely to receive a fifth yellow card in the current match when heterogeneity in the next match increases or heterogeneity in the next match but one (when they return from their ban) decreases.},
  keywords = {Tournaments, Multi-stage contests, Heterogeneity, Anticipating behaviour, Shadow effects}
}

@article{march2021_91891,
  title = {Parochial Altruism and the Absence of the Group Size Paradox in Inter-group Conflicts},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Economics bulletin : EB},
  volume = {41},
  pages = {361-373},
  publisher = {Univ. of Illinois},
  address = {Champaign-Urbana, Ill.},
  issn = {1545-2921},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91891},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{march2021_54407,
  title = {Technological Sovereignty as Ability, Not Autarky},
  author = {March, Christoph and Schieferdecker, Ina},
  year = {2021},
  address = {München},
  series = {CESifo Working Papers},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54407},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{march2021_54406,
  title = {Parochial altruism and the absence of the group size paradox in inter-group conflicts},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Economics Bulletin},
  volume = {41},
  number = {2},
  publisher = {Univ. of Illinois},
  address = {Champaign-Urbana, Ill.},
  issn = {1545-2921},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54406},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{march2021_54405,
  title = {Strategic interactions between humans and artificial intelligence : Lessons from experiments with computer players},
  author = {March, Christoph},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology},
  volume = {87},
  number = {December},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {0167-4870},
  doi = {10.1016/j.joep.2021.102426},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54405},
  language = {eng}
}

@phdthesis{planerfriedrich2021_49593,
  title = {Strategic (Corporate) Social Responsibility},
  author = {Planer-Friedrich, Lisa},
  year = {2021},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  doi = {10.20378/irb-49593},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-495934},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/49593},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has become a common concern for many firms as well as their customers. The term refers to all social and environmentally friendly activities of a firm beyond its legal requirements. This dissertation focuses on the strategic use of (corporate) social responsibility by firms and individuals and its economic implications.

In chapters 2,3, and 4, Marco Sahm and I investigate CSR in a theoretical framework. We model CSR as a weight on consumer surplus in firms' objective function. The general decision structure is the same in all three chapters. A firm first strategically chooses the CSR level which maximizes its profit and then it maximizes the resulting objective function in order to choose its output quantity. We solve by backward induction.

In chapter 2, we examine the strategic use of CSR in imperfectly competitive markets. First, we consider Cournot competition and show that the endogenous level of CSR is positive for any given number of firms. However, positive CSR levels imply smaller equilibrium profits. Second, we find that an incumbent monopolist can use CSR as an entry deterrent. Both results indicate that CSR may increase market concentration. Finally, we show that CSR levels decrease as the degree of product heterogeneity increases in Cournot competition and are zero in Bertrand Competition.

In chapter 3, we examine Cournot competition between two firms that differ in their marginal costs of production. We show that the more efficient firm chooses a higher CSR level, reinforcing its dominant position. If there are sufficiently large fixed costs of CSR, only the more efficient firm will engage in CSR.

In chapter 4, we compare the strategic potential of CSR and Customer Orientation (CO) as commitments to larger quantities in Cournot competition, modeled as a multi-stage game. First, in addition to profits, firms can choose to care for the surplus of either all consumers (CSR) or their own customers only (CO). Second, they decide upon the weight of this additional objective. We find that firms prefer to care for all consumers, choosing positive levels of CSR. This result provides an explanation for the recent shift in corporate culture from CO to CSR.

Chapter 5 aims at identifying the strategic social responsibility of individuals. I conduct a laboratory experiment with three treatments: a regular ultimatum game (Baseline treatment) and two three-party ultimatum games with an NGO (NGO treatment) and a third person (TP treatment) as third party, respectively. I find that proposers in the three-party treatments allocate positive amounts to the third party. I show that proposers do not exclusively follow social preferences, but also strategic motives play a role when giving to the third party. In addition, responders are more willing to accept a proposal the higher the proposed share for the third party suggesting potential for strategic social responsibility. Proposers in the TP treatment can improve their relative payoffs compared to payoffs in the Baseline treatment by behaving strategically socially towards the third
person.},
  keywords = {Corporate Social Responsibility, Strategic Delegation, Cournot Competition, Entry Deterrence, Customer Orientation, Ultimatum Game, Experiment},
  school = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg}
}

@article{schieferdecker2020_91888,
  title = {Digitale Innovationen und Technologiesouveränität},
  author = {Schieferdecker, Ina and March, Christoph},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Wirtschaftsdienst : Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik},
  volume = {100},
  number = {1, supplement},
  pages = {30–35},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address = {Berlin ; Heidelberg [u.a.]},
  issn = {0043-6275},
  doi = {10.1007/s10273-020-2612-8},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91888},
  language = {deu},
  abstract = {Digitale Innovationen verändern zunehmend Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Es ist Aufgabe der Politik, diese Veränderungen im Dialog mit der Gesellschaft und im Einklang mit unseren Werten zu gestalten. Technologiesouveränität ist dafür eine wichtige Voraussetzung. Dabei geht es nicht um die Abschottung von internationalen Märkten, sondern um die Fähigkeit, Anforderungen an Technologien zu formulieren und diese am Markt durchzusetzen. Einer integrierten Forschungs- und Innovationspolitik, die die Förderung von Technologieentwicklung, Technologietransfer und Zukunftskompetenzen gleichermaßen in den Blick nimmt und auf europäische Zusammenarbeit setzt, kommt dabei eine zentrale Rolle zu.},
  keywords = {Digitale Innovationen, Technologiesouveränität}
}

@article{march2020_54404,
  title = {Altruistic observational learning},
  author = {March, Christoph and Ziegelmeyer, Anthony},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Journal of economic theory : JET},
  volume = {190},
  number = {November},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {0022-0531},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2020.105123},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54404},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{planerfriedrich2020_53454,
  title = {Strategic CSR in Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly},
  author = {Planer-Friedrich, Lisa and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade},
  volume = {21},
  number = {1},
  pages = {33-42},
  publisher = {Springer Science + Business Media B.V},
  address = {Dordrecht [u.a.]},
  issn = {1573-7012},
  doi = {10.1007/s10842-020-00335-3},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/53454},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We examine the strategic use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Cournot competition between two firms that differ in their marginal costs of production. The level of CSR determines the weight a firm puts on consumer surplus in its objective function before it decides upon supply. We show that the more efficient firm chooses a higher CSR level, reinforcing its dominant position. If there are sufficiently large fixed costs of CSR, only the more efficient firm will engage in CSR.},
  keywords = {corporate social responsibility, cournot duopoly, asymmetric costs, heterogenous firms}
}

@article{march2020_53447,
  title = {Coordinating intergenerational redistribution and the repayment of public debt: an experimental test of Tabellini (1991)},
  author = {March, Christoph and Weizsäcker, Robert K. von},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Social Choice and Welfare},
  volume = {55},
  number = {2},
  pages = {301-323},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address = {Berlin ; Heidelberg},
  issn = {1432-217X},
  doi = {10.1007/s00355-020-01242-6},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/53447},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Is there a link between public debt and wealth inequality? Could government bondholders use intra-generational redistribution strategically to make the repayment of debt politically viable? We reconsider the model of Tabellini (J Polit Econ 99:335–357, 1991) and expose the role of coordination and divide-and-conquer. By coordinating their bond investments, the old generation splits up the young generation and secures a majority favoring debt repayment. Coordination therefore mediates the impact of wealth inequality on public debt. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and find that subjects often coordinate to exploit the link between inter- and intragenerational redistribution. Hence, coordination plays an important role in the strategic creation and exploitation of minorities, and thus in the accumulation of public debt.},
  keywords = {public debt, wealth inequality, generation split, bond investment, redistribution}
}

@article{planerfriedrich2019_112743,
  title = {Strategic corporate social responsibility, imperfect competition, and market concentration},
  author = {Planer-Friedrich, Lisa and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Journal of Economics},
  volume = {129},
  number = {1},
  pages = {79-101},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address = {Wien ; New York, NY},
  issn = {1617-7134},
  doi = {10.1007/s00712-019-00663-x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/112743},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sahm2019_53456,
  title = {Advance-Purchase Financing of Projects with Few Buyers},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Review of Industrial Organization},
  volume = {57},
  number = {4},
  pages = {909-933},
  publisher = {Springer Science + Business Media B.V.},
  address = {Dordrecht [u.a.]},
  issn = {1573-7160},
  doi = {10.1007/s11151-019-09742-1},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/53456},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{march2019_47322,
  title = {The perks of being in the smaller team : incentives in overlapping contests},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2019},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-76-7},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47322},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{march2019_47321,
  title = {The behavioral economics of artificial intelligence: Lessons from experiments with computer players},
  author = {March, Christoph},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2019},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-75-0},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47321},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{march2018_44052,
  title = {Contests as selection mechanisms: The impact of risk aversion},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
  volume = {150},
  pages = {114-131},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {0167-2681},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.020},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44052},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We investigate how individual risk preferences affect the likelihood of selecting the more able contestant within a two-player Tullock contest. Our theoretical model yields two main predictions: First, an increase in the risk aversion of a player worsens her odds unless she already has a sufficiently large advantage. Second, if the prize money is sufficiently large, a less able but less risk averse contestant can achieve an equal or even higher probability of winning than a more able but more risk averse opponent. In a laboratory experiment we confirm both, the non-monotonic impact and the compensating effect of risk aversion on winning probabilities. Our results suggest a novel explanation for the gender gap and the optimality of limited monetary incentives in selection contests.},
  keywords = {Selection contest, Risk aversion, Competitive balance, Gender gap}
}

@article{sahm2018_44035,
  title = {Are sequential round‐robin tournaments discriminatory?},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address = {Oxford},
  issn = {1467-9779},
  doi = {10.1111/jpet.12308},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44035},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {I examine sequential round‐robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players. Each player is matched once with each other player and each match is organized as a Tullock contest. A single prize is allocated to the player with the most matches won. I show that, depending on the position of their matches in the sequence of the tournament, the players' ex ante winning probabilities and expected payoffs differ. Compared to tournaments with matches organized as all‐pay auctions, however, discrimination is weaker and partially reversed. Moreover, aggregate effort in tournaments with suitable Tullock contests is larger than in tournaments with all‐pay auctions. The fairness of round‐robin tournaments may be improved by an endogenous sequence of matches or the requirement that players fix their effort ex ante.}
}

@article{greiner2018_43925,
  title = {How effective are advertising bans? On the demand for quality in two-sided media markets},
  author = {Greiner, Tanja and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Information Economics and Policy},
  volume = {43},
  pages = {48-60},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam},
  issn = {0167-6245},
  doi = {10.1016/j.infoecopol.2018.01.003},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43925},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We study a two-sided markets model of two competing television broadcasters that offer content of differentiated quality to ad-averse consumers and advertising space to firms. As all consumers prefer high over low quality content, competition for viewers is vertical. By contrast, competition for advertisers is horizontal, taking into account the firms’ targeted advertising motive. Analyzing the impact of an advertising ban on the high quality medium, we derive the following results: (i) total advertising volumes decrease; (ii) the viewer market share of the high-quality broadcaster and thus the equilibrium reception of high quality content decreases; (iii) welfare decreases; (iv) the low-quality broadcaster’s profits will increase if and only if ad nuisance is small compared to ad effectiveness.},
  keywords = {Two-sided market, Advertising ban, Platform competition, Indirect network effect, Horizontal and vertical product differentiation}
}

@article{march2017_44053,
  title = {Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Economics Letters},
  volume = {151},
  pages = {23-27},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {0165-1765},
  doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.032},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44053},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We provide new experimental evidence which suggests an asymmetric discouragement effect in lottery contests with heterogeneous abilities. Compared to a symmetric contest, subjects invest less effort when facing a stronger opponent, but they invest the same when facing a weaker opponent. Our results can be explained by a simple model of disappointment aversion.},
  keywords = {Asymmetric contest, Discouragement effect, Disappointment aversion, Laboratory experiment}
}

@article{sahm2017_44021,
  title = {Risk aversion and prudence in contests},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Economics Bulletin},
  volume = {37},
  number = {2},
  pages = {1122-1132},
  publisher = {Univ. of Illinois},
  address = {Champaign-Urbana, Ill.},
  issn = {1545-2921},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44021},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {I examine the impact of risk preferences on efforts and winning probabilities in generalized Tullock contests between two players. The theoretical analysis yields two ma in results. First, in symmetric contests, a higher common level of the agents ́ risk aversion will lead to lower aggregate effort if it comes along with an increase in downside risk aversion. Second, in many asymmetric contests, higher risk-aversion will be a disadvantage if the agent is also more downside risk-averse}
}

@techreport{laica2017_43003,
  title = {Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments with Multiple Prizes},
  author = {Laica, Christoph and Lauber, Arne and Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2017},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-50-7},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43003},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{sahm2017_42520,
  title = {Are sequential round-robin tournaments discriminatory?},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2017},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-40-8},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42520},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{march2017_42517,
  title = {Contests as selection mechanisms: the impact of risk aversion},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2017},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-47-7},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42517},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{planerfriedrich2017_42514,
  title = {Strategic corporate social responsibility},
  author = {Planer-Friedrich, Lisa and Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2017},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-44-6},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42514},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{sahm2017_42501,
  title = {Risk aversion and prudence in contests},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2017},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-39-2},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42501},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{march2016_42518,
  title = {Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2016},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-36-1},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42518},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{sahm2016_42494,
  title = {Advance-purchase financing of projects with few buyers},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2016},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-37-8},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42494},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{planerfriedrich2016_42483,
  title = {Why firms should care for all consumers},
  author = {Planer-Friedrich, Lisa and Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2016},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-35-4},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42483},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sahm2015_21682,
  title = {Reason, Intuition, and Time},
  author = {Sahm, Marco and Weizsäcker, Robert K. von},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Managerial and decision economics : MDE ; the international journal of research and progress in management economics},
  volume = {37},
  number = {3},
  pages = {195-207},
  publisher = {Wiley},
  address = {Chichester [u.a.]},
  issn = {1099-1468},
  doi = {10.1002/mde.2711},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/21682},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sahm2014_21708,
  title = {Corrigendum to "Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd"},
  author = {Sahm, Marco and Belleflamme, Paul and Lambert, Thomas and Schwienbacher, Armin},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Journal of Business Venturing},
  volume = {29},
  number = {5},
  pages = {610-611},
  publisher = {Elsevier Science Publ.},
  address = {New York, NY},
  issn = {0883-9026},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/21708},
  language = {eng}
}

