TY - RPRT TI - Environmental Awards in a Duopoly with Green Consumers AU - Heidelmeier, Lisa Isabel AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2025 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series on government and growth DO - 10.20378/irb-108373 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/108373 LA - eng AB - We investigate the impact of an environmental award in a Bertrand duopoly with green consumers considering a three-stage game. First, the regulator designs the environmental contest. Second, firms choose their green investments, and the winner of the contest is awarded. Third, firms compete in prices, and consumption takes place. We illustrate that the award not only incentivizes green investments and may thus reduce environmental externalities. As consumers perceive the product of the awarded firm to be of superior quality, it also gives rise to vertical product differentiation. This induces market power, and thus anti-competitive effects: Rents shift from consumers to producers, and consumer surplus may decrease, particularly if marginal investment costs in green technologies are high compared to the strength of environmental damage. KW - Bertrand Competition KW - Contests KW - Environmental Award KW - Green Consumer KW - Product Differentiation ER - TY - RPRT TI - Awards vs. Labels : Incentivizing Investments in Environmental Quality AU - Heidelmeier, Lisa Isabel AU - Schmitt, Stefanie Y. PY - 2025 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series on government and growth DO - 10.20378/irb-108375 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/108375 LA - eng AB - Although consumers often care about environmental quality, limited attention impairs consumers’ perception of environmental quality. Environmental awards and labels make environmental quality salient and attract consumers’ attention. We analyze how awards and labels affect firms’ investments in environmental quality and social welfare. We show that, with an award, both firms invest in environmental quality; with a label, only one firm invests. Under awards, investments depend positively on salience. Under labels, investments depend non-monotonically on salience. A welfare-maximizing social planner prefers awards over labels if and only if marginal damage and salience are sufficiently high such that consumers overestimate the environmental quality of the goods. KW - Awards KW - Environmental Quality KW - Labels KW - Limited Attention KW - Salience ER -