TY - JOUR TI - Engaging the disengaged? : Explaining the participation of Eurosceptic MEPs in trilogue negotiations AU - Ripoll Servent, Ariadna AU - Panning, Lara PY - 2025 SP - 72-92 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/109784 LA - eng AB - With higher levels of polarization in the European Parliament (EP), mainstream groups increasingly face the trade-off between engaging and dismissing Eurosceptic challenger parties. Therefore, this article proposes a model to understand the strategies of mainstream and Eurosceptic groups in legislative work. It uses content analysis of legislative amendments to explain under what conditions these two sets of actors decide to engage with or disengage from each other. We compare two legislative packages, the more technical Circular Economy Package with the highly politicized Asylum Reform Package to assess how the choices of mainstream and Eurosceptic groups influence the survival of amendments and the success of the EP in trilogues. The comparison shows that politicization leads to more polarization and, subsequently, increases the chances that mainstream groups will collaborate with and copy soft-Eurosceptics along a left-right divide. At the same time, we also demonstrate that disengagement from Eurosceptic groups is closely related to their small size and limited resources. Finally, although the cordon sanitaire is systematically used to exclude hard Eurosceptics, it is not effective when it comes to isolating radical populist amendments proposed by soft-Eurosceptics and mainstream groups. KW - Euroscepticism KW - European Parliament KW - legislative amendments KW - party competition KW - trilogues ER - TY - JOUR TI - Why Defend Something I Don’t Agree with? : Conflicts within the Commission and Legislative Amendments in Trilogues AU - Laloux, Thomas AU - Panning, Lara PY - 2025 SP - 40-51 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/109710 LA - eng AB - This article aims to examine the effect of intra-institutional conflicts in the European Commission on the extent of changes made to legislative proposals in trilogue negotiations. We develop and test three hypotheses related to how conflicts within the Commission, namely that intra-institutional disagreements during policy formulation (h1), and potential conflicts with previous (h2) or subsequent (h3) colleges of commissioners, increase the number of amendments to the Commission’s proposal adopted in trilogues. To test our hypotheses, we use a new dataset measuring the number of changes between Commission proposals and adopted legislation for 216 legislative acts negotiated between 2012 and 2019 by means of text-mining techniques. It is important to note that we control for differences between the Commission’s proposals and the co-legislators’ positions in order to distinguish between an effect on preferences anticipation and on the negotiations proper. Our results indicate that intra-institutional conflicts affect the Commission’s anticipation of the co-legislators’ positions. The effect on its behaviour in trilogues, that is, after the legislative proposal has been tabled, is less clear. Regarding the latter, only the number of Directorates-General involved is significantly linked with the number of amendments tabled. These findings suggest that while intra-institutional disagreements affect the Commission’s role in trilogues, the range of preferences is more important than the intensity of conflicts. KW - bargaining success KW - college KW - delegation KW - European Commission KW - intra-institutional conflicts KW - legislative decision-making KW - text-mining KW - trilogues ER - TY - JOUR TI - Eurosceptics in trilogue settings: interest formation and contestation in the European Parliament AU - Ripoll Servent, Ariadna AU - Panning, Lara PY - 2022 SP - 755-775 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/53805 LA - eng AB - Trilogues have been studied as sites of secluded inter-institutional decision making that gather the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament (EP) and the European Commission. Trilogues, however, are not exempt from formal and informal party-political dynamics that affect intra- and inter-institutional contestation. The increase in Eurosceptics in the 2014 EP elections offers an opportunity to investigate their efforts to shape the position and behaviour of the EP negotiating team in trilogues. Therefore, this article investigates to what extent Eurosceptic party groups participate in trilogue negotiations and how mainstream groups deal with their presence. The analysis shows that the opportunities to participate in trilogues and shape the EP’s position are higher for those perceived as soft Eurosceptic MEPs, while mainstream groups apply a ‘cordon sanitaire’ to those perceived as being part of hard Eurosceptic groups – which reduces the chances of MEPs from those groups being willing to participate in parliamentary work. KW - European politics KW - political contestation KW - political contestation KW - informality KW - European Parliament ER - TY - JOUR TI - Engaging the disengaged? : Explaining the participation of Eurosceptic MEPs in trilogue negotiations AU - Ripoll Servent, Ariadna AU - Panning, Lara PY - 2021 JO - Journal of European public policy VL - 28 IS - 1 SP - 72-92 PB - Taylor & Francis CY - Abingdon, Oxfordshire SN - 1350-1763 DO - 10.1080/13501763.2020.1859596 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/109783 LA - eng AB - With higher levels of polarization in the European Parliament (EP), mainstream groups increasingly face the trade-off between engaging and dismissing Eurosceptic challenger parties. Therefore, this article proposes a model to understand the strategies of mainstream and Eurosceptic groups in legislative work. It uses content analysis of legislative amendments to explain under what conditions these two sets of actors decide to engage with or disengage from each other. We compare two legislative packages, the more technical Circular Economy Package with the highly politicized Asylum Reform Package to assess how the choices of mainstream and Eurosceptic groups influence the survival of amendments and the success of the EP in trilogues. The comparison shows that politicization leads to more polarization and, subsequently, increases the chances that mainstream groups will collaborate with and copy soft-Eurosceptics along a left-right divide. At the same time, we also demonstrate that disengagement from Eurosceptic groups is closely related to their small size and limited resources. Finally, although the cordon sanitaire is systematically used to exclude hard Eurosceptics, it is not effective when it comes to isolating radical populist amendments proposed by soft-Eurosceptics and mainstream groups. KW - Euroscepticism KW - European Parliament KW - legislative amendments KW - party competition KW - trilogues ER - TY - JOUR TI - Why Defend Something I Don’t Agree with? : Conflicts within the Commission and Legislative Amendments in Trilogues AU - Laloux, Thomas AU - Panning, Lara PY - 2021 JO - Politics and governance VL - 9 IS - 3 SP - 40-51 PB - Cogitatio Press CY - Lisbon SN - 2183-2463 DO - 10.17645/pag.v9i3.4154 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/109708 LA - eng AB - This article aims to examine the effect of intra-institutional conflicts in the European Commission on the extent of changes made to legislative proposals in trilogue negotiations. We develop and test three hypotheses related to how conflicts within the Commission, namely that intra-institutional disagreements during policy formulation (h1), and potential conflicts with previous (h2) or subsequent (h3) colleges of commissioners, increase the number of amendments to the Commission’s proposal adopted in trilogues. To test our hypotheses, we use a new dataset measuring the number of changes between Commission proposals and adopted legislation for 216 legislative acts negotiated between 2012 and 2019 by means of text-mining techniques. It is important to note that we control for differences between the Commission’s proposals and the co-legislators’ positions in order to distinguish between an effect on preferences anticipation and on the negotiations proper. Our results indicate that intra-institutional conflicts affect the Commission’s anticipation of the co-legislators’ positions. The effect on its behaviour in trilogues, that is, after the legislative proposal has been tabled, is less clear. Regarding the latter, only the number of Directorates-General involved is significantly linked with the number of amendments tabled. These findings suggest that while intra-institutional disagreements affect the Commission’s role in trilogues, the range of preferences is more important than the intensity of conflicts. KW - bargaining success KW - college KW - delegation KW - European Commission KW - intra-institutional conflicts KW - legislative decision-making KW - text-mining KW - trilogues ER - TY - JOUR TI - Building and managing the European Commission’s position for trilogue negotiations AU - Panning, Lara PY - 2020 JO - Journal of European public policy VL - 28 IS - 1 SP - 32-52 PB - Routledge CY - London SN - 1350-1763 DO - 10.1080/13501763.2020.1859597 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/111313 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Preparatory Bodies as Mediators of Political Conflict in Trilogues : The European Parliament’s Shadows Meetings AU - Ripoll Servent, Ariadna AU - Panning, Lara PY - 2019 JO - Politics and governance VL - 7 IS - 3 SP - 303-315 PB - Cogitatio Press CY - Lissabon SN - 2183-2463 DO - 10.17645/pag.v7i3.2197 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/57939 LA - eng AB - Trilogues have become ‘normal’ structures in European Union (EU) decision-making but their functioning, based on secluded decision-making, makes it difficult to understand how institutional positions are formed and managed and which actors are better positioned to influence policy outputs. These are, however, important questions because, first, a coherent position in trilogues (one that withstands the scrutiny of the Council) enhances the European Parliament’s (EP) chances of achieving a favourable outcome following negotiation; second, because it has become more complicated to find a common position within the EP due to increased levels of politicisation and polarisation (especially in the form of Euroscepticism) in EU policy-making. Therefore, this article focuses on preparatory bodies preceding trilogues and the role they play in building Parliament’s positions. With the shift of political conflict from plenary to committees and now to shadows meetings, the latter have become de facto decision-making bodies. Not only do they serve to mediate intra-institutional conflict but also to anticipate Council and Commission positions. This article compares the use of shadows meetings in politicised and non-politicised issues. With the use of ethnographic data provided by participant observation and elite interviews, we aim to provide explanations on how these new instruments serve to informally manage politicisation, focusing in particular on the advantages of insularity in highly publicised negotiations. KW - committees KW - Common European Asylum System KW - European Parliament KW - European Union political parties KW - politicisation KW - shadows meetings KW - trilogues ER - TY - JOUR TI - Eurosceptics in trilogue settings: interest formation and contestation in the European Parliament AU - Ripoll Servent, Ariadna AU - Panning, Lara PY - 2019 JO - West European Politics VL - 42 IS - 4 SP - 755-775 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis CY - Basingstoke [u.a.] SN - 1743-9655 DO - 10.1080/01402382.2019.1575639 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54182 LA - eng AB - Trilogues have been studied as sites of secluded inter-institutional decision making that gather the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament (EP) and the European Commission. Trilogues, however, are not exempt from formal and informal party-political dynamics that affect intra- and inter-institutional contestation. The increase in Eurosceptics in the 2014 EP elections offers an opportunity to investigate their efforts to shape the position and behaviour of the EP negotiating team in trilogues. Therefore, this article investigates to what extent Eurosceptic party groups participate in trilogue negotiations and how mainstream groups deal with their presence. The analysis shows that the opportunities to participate in trilogues and shape the EP’s position are higher for those perceived as soft Eurosceptic MEPs, while mainstream groups apply a ‘cordon sanitaire’ to those perceived as being part of hard Eurosceptic groups – which reduces the chances of MEPs from those groups being willing to participate in parliamentary work. KW - European politics KW - political contestation KW - political contestation KW - informality KW - European Parliament ER - TY - JOUR TI - Preparatory Bodies as Mediators of Political Conflict in Trilogues : The European Parliament’s Shadows Meetings AU - Ripoll Servent, Ariadna AU - Panning, Lara PY - 2019 VL - 7 IS - 3 SP - 303-315 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/49603 LA - eng AB - Trilogues have become ‘normal’ structures in European Union (EU) decision-making but their functioning, based on secluded decision-making, makes it difficult to understand how institutional positions are formed and managed and which actors are better positioned to influence policy outputs. These are, however, important questions because, first, a coherent position in trilogues (one that withstands the scrutiny of the Council) enhances the European Parliament’s (EP) chances of achieving a favourable outcome following negotiation; second, because it has become more complicated to find a common position within the EP due to increased levels of politicisation and polarisation (especially in the form of Euroscepticism) in EU policy-making. Therefore, this article focuses on preparatory bodies preceding trilogues and the role they play in building Parliament’s positions. With the shift of political conflict from plenary to committees and now to shadows meetings, the latter have become de facto decision-making bodies. Not only do they serve to mediate intra-institutional conflict but also to anticipate Council and Commission positions. This article compares the use of shadows meetings in politicised and non-politicised issues. With the use of ethnographic data provided by participant observation and elite interviews, we aim to provide explanations on how these new instruments serve to informally manage politicisation, focusing in particular on the advantages of insularity in highly publicised negotiations. KW - committees KW - Common European Asylum System KW - European Parliament KW - European Union political parties KW - politicisation KW - shadows meetings KW - trilogues ER -