@article{lauber2026_115974,
  title = {Three-player round-robin tournaments in the lab : Lottery contests vs. all-pay auctions},
  author = {Lauber, Arne and March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2026},
  pages = {1-26},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-115974x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/115974},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare the fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players, a single prize, and two alternative match formats. Matches are either organized as lottery contests or all-pay auctions. Contrary to theory, we find no significant differences in intensity and fairness between the two match formats. The main reason is the behavior of the player acting in the final two matches in APA-tournaments. Rather than being severely discouraged when having to compete first against the loser of the first match, subjects try to exploit a perceived negative psychological momentum in such situations. This leads them into a dissipation trap: an effort-intense, final-like last match which significantly reduces their payoffs, but also levels the playing field for the other two players and thus enhances the fairness of APA-tournaments.},
  keywords = {All-pay auction, Discouragement effect, Dissipation trap, Laboratory experiment, Lottery contest, Sequential round-robin tournament}
}

@article{lauber2026_115973,
  title = {Three-player round-robin tournaments in the lab : Lottery contests vs. all-pay auctions},
  author = {Lauber, Arne and March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2026},
  journal = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  volume = {124},
  number = {102605},
  pages = {1-26},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {2214-8051},
  doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2026.102605},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/115973},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare the fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players, a single prize, and two alternative match formats. Matches are either organized as lottery contests or all-pay auctions. Contrary to theory, we find no significant differences in intensity and fairness between the two match formats. The main reason is the behavior of the player acting in the final two matches in APA-tournaments. Rather than being severely discouraged when having to compete first against the loser of the first match, subjects try to exploit a perceived negative psychological momentum in such situations. This leads them into a dissipation trap: an effort-intense, final-like last match which significantly reduces their payoffs, but also levels the playing field for the other two players and thus enhances the fairness of APA-tournaments.},
  keywords = {All-pay auction, Discouragement effect, Dissipation trap, Laboratory experiment, Lottery contest, Sequential round-robin tournament}
}

@article{march2025_110508,
  title = {The perks of being in the smaller team : incentives in overlapping contests},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2025},
  pages = {585-610},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-110508x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/110508},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We investigate overlapping contests in multi-divisional organizations in which an individual’s effort simultaneously determines the outcome of several contests on different hierarchical levels. We show that individuals in smaller units are advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important consequences for the provision of incentives in organizations and the design of sports competitions.},
  keywords = {Contest, Rent-seeking, Hierarchy, Teams, Experiment}
}

@techreport{lauber2025_108079,
  title = {Round-Robin Tournaments in the Lab : Lottery Contests vs. All-Pay Auctions},
  author = {Lauber, Arne and March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2025},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series on government and growth},
  isbn = {978-3-949224-22-5},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/108079},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{march2025_91892,
  title = {The perks of being in the smaller team : incentives in overlapping contests},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2025},
  journal = {Review of economic design},
  volume = {29},
  number = {3},
  pages = {585-610},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address = {Berlin ; Heidelberg},
  issn = {1434-4750},
  doi = {10.1007/s10058-023-00331-z},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91892},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We investigate overlapping contests in multi-divisional organizations in which an individual’s effort simultaneously determines the outcome of several contests on different hierarchical levels. We show that individuals in smaller units are advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important consequences for the provision of incentives in organizations and the design of sports competitions.},
  keywords = {Contest, Rent-seeking, Hierarchy, Teams, Experiment}
}

@article{daske2024_105420,
  title = {Efficient incentives with social preferences},
  author = {Daske, Thomas and March, Christoph},
  year = {2024},
  pages = {975-999},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-1054207},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/105420},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of \textit\{at least three\} agents: Any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient.},
  keywords = {Mechanism design, social preferences, Bayesian implementation, participation constraints, participation stimulation, money pump}
}

@article{daske2024_105419,
  title = {Efficient incentives with social preferences},
  author = {Daske, Thomas and March, Christoph},
  year = {2024},
  journal = {Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory},
  volume = {19},
  number = {3},
  pages = {975-999},
  publisher = {The Econometric Society},
  address = {Toronto},
  issn = {1555-7561},
  doi = {10.3982/te5335},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/105419},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of \textit\{at least three\} agents: Any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient.},
  keywords = {Mechanism design, social preferences, Bayesian implementation, participation constraints, participation stimulation, money pump}
}

@article{schieferdecker2024_94676,
  title = {Digitale Innovationen und Technologiesouveränität},
  author = {Schieferdecker, Ina and March, Christoph},
  year = {2024},
  pages = {30-35},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-946763},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/94676},
  language = {deu},
  abstract = {Digitale Innovationen verändern zunehmend Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Es ist Aufgabe der Politik, diese Veränderungen im Dialog mit der Gesellschaft und im Einklang mit unseren Werten zu gestalten. Technologiesouveränität ist dafür eine wichtige Voraussetzung. Dabei geht es nicht um die Abschottung von internationalen Märkten, sondern um die Fähigkeit, Anforderungen an Technologien zu formulieren und diese am Markt durchzusetzen. Einer integrierten Forschungs- und Innovationspolitik, die die Förderung von Technologieentwicklung, Technologietransfer und Zukunftskompetenzen gleichermaßen in den Blick nimmt und auf europäische Zusammenarbeit setzt, kommt dabei eine zentrale Rolle zu.},
  keywords = {Digitale Innovationen, Technologiesouveränität}
}

@article{lauber2023_91890,
  title = {Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments : Experimental evidence},
  author = {Lauber, Arne and March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2023},
  journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
  volume = {141},
  pages = {30-51},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {1090-2473},
  doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.011},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91890},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{march2023_91887,
  title = {Technological Sovereignty as Ability, Not Autarky},
  author = {March, Christoph and Schieferdecker, Ina},
  year = {2023},
  journal = {International Studies Review},
  pages = {1-28},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  address = {Oxford},
  issn = {1468-2486},
  doi = {10.1093/isr/viad012},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91887},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{daske2022_107975,
  title = {Efficient Incentives with Social Preferences},
  author = {Daske, Thomas and March, Christoph},
  year = {2022},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series on government and growth},
  isbn = {978-3-949224-01-0},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/107975},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{daske2022_91889,
  title = {Efficient Incentives with Social Preferences},
  author = {Daske, Thomas and March, Christoph},
  year = {2022},
  journal = {CESifo Working Paper},
  pages = {1-20},
  address = {München},
  issn = {2364-1428},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91889},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{march2022_53798,
  title = {Coordinating intergenerational redistribution and the repayment of public debt: an experimental test of Tabellini (1991)},
  author = {March, Christoph and Weizsäcker, Robert K. von},
  year = {2022},
  pages = {301-323},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-537983},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/53798},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Is there a link between public debt and wealth inequality? Could government bondholders use intra-generational redistribution strategically to make the repayment of debt politically viable? We reconsider the model of Tabellini (J Polit Econ 99:335–357, 1991) and expose the role of coordination and divide-and-conquer. By coordinating their bond investments, the old generation splits up the young generation and secures a majority favoring debt repayment. Coordination therefore mediates the impact of wealth inequality on public debt. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and find that subjects often coordinate to exploit the link between inter- and intragenerational redistribution. Hence, coordination plays an important role in the strategic creation and exploitation of minorities, and thus in the accumulation of public debt.},
  keywords = {public debt, wealth inequality, generation split, bond investment, redistribution}
}

@techreport{lauber2022_54032,
  title = {Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: experimental evidence},
  author = {Lauber, Arne and March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2022},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-97-2},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54032},
  language = {deu}
}

@article{march2021_91891,
  title = {Parochial Altruism and the Absence of the Group Size Paradox in Inter-group Conflicts},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Economics bulletin : EB},
  volume = {41},
  pages = {361-373},
  publisher = {Univ. of Illinois},
  address = {Champaign-Urbana, Ill.},
  issn = {1545-2921},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91891},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{march2021_54407,
  title = {Technological Sovereignty as Ability, Not Autarky},
  author = {March, Christoph and Schieferdecker, Ina},
  year = {2021},
  address = {München},
  series = {CESifo Working Papers},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54407},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{march2021_54406,
  title = {Parochial altruism and the absence of the group size paradox in inter-group conflicts},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Economics Bulletin},
  volume = {41},
  number = {2},
  publisher = {Univ. of Illinois},
  address = {Champaign-Urbana, Ill.},
  issn = {1545-2921},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54406},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{march2021_54405,
  title = {Strategic interactions between humans and artificial intelligence : Lessons from experiments with computer players},
  author = {March, Christoph},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology},
  volume = {87},
  number = {December},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {0167-4870},
  doi = {10.1016/j.joep.2021.102426},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54405},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{schieferdecker2020_91888,
  title = {Digitale Innovationen und Technologiesouveränität},
  author = {Schieferdecker, Ina and March, Christoph},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Wirtschaftsdienst : Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik},
  volume = {100},
  number = {1, supplement},
  pages = {30–35},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address = {Berlin ; Heidelberg [u.a.]},
  issn = {0043-6275},
  doi = {10.1007/s10273-020-2612-8},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91888},
  language = {deu},
  abstract = {Digitale Innovationen verändern zunehmend Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Es ist Aufgabe der Politik, diese Veränderungen im Dialog mit der Gesellschaft und im Einklang mit unseren Werten zu gestalten. Technologiesouveränität ist dafür eine wichtige Voraussetzung. Dabei geht es nicht um die Abschottung von internationalen Märkten, sondern um die Fähigkeit, Anforderungen an Technologien zu formulieren und diese am Markt durchzusetzen. Einer integrierten Forschungs- und Innovationspolitik, die die Förderung von Technologieentwicklung, Technologietransfer und Zukunftskompetenzen gleichermaßen in den Blick nimmt und auf europäische Zusammenarbeit setzt, kommt dabei eine zentrale Rolle zu.},
  keywords = {Digitale Innovationen, Technologiesouveränität}
}

@article{march2020_54404,
  title = {Altruistic observational learning},
  author = {March, Christoph and Ziegelmeyer, Anthony},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Journal of economic theory : JET},
  volume = {190},
  number = {November},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {0022-0531},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2020.105123},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54404},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{march2020_53447,
  title = {Coordinating intergenerational redistribution and the repayment of public debt: an experimental test of Tabellini (1991)},
  author = {March, Christoph and Weizsäcker, Robert K. von},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Social Choice and Welfare},
  volume = {55},
  number = {2},
  pages = {301-323},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address = {Berlin ; Heidelberg},
  issn = {1432-217X},
  doi = {10.1007/s00355-020-01242-6},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/53447},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Is there a link between public debt and wealth inequality? Could government bondholders use intra-generational redistribution strategically to make the repayment of debt politically viable? We reconsider the model of Tabellini (J Polit Econ 99:335–357, 1991) and expose the role of coordination and divide-and-conquer. By coordinating their bond investments, the old generation splits up the young generation and secures a majority favoring debt repayment. Coordination therefore mediates the impact of wealth inequality on public debt. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and find that subjects often coordinate to exploit the link between inter- and intragenerational redistribution. Hence, coordination plays an important role in the strategic creation and exploitation of minorities, and thus in the accumulation of public debt.},
  keywords = {public debt, wealth inequality, generation split, bond investment, redistribution}
}

@techreport{march2019_47322,
  title = {The perks of being in the smaller team : incentives in overlapping contests},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2019},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-76-7},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47322},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{march2019_47321,
  title = {The behavioral economics of artificial intelligence: Lessons from experiments with computer players},
  author = {March, Christoph},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2019},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-75-0},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47321},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{march2018_44052,
  title = {Contests as selection mechanisms: The impact of risk aversion},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
  volume = {150},
  pages = {114-131},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {0167-2681},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.020},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44052},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We investigate how individual risk preferences affect the likelihood of selecting the more able contestant within a two-player Tullock contest. Our theoretical model yields two main predictions: First, an increase in the risk aversion of a player worsens her odds unless she already has a sufficiently large advantage. Second, if the prize money is sufficiently large, a less able but less risk averse contestant can achieve an equal or even higher probability of winning than a more able but more risk averse opponent. In a laboratory experiment we confirm both, the non-monotonic impact and the compensating effect of risk aversion on winning probabilities. Our results suggest a novel explanation for the gender gap and the optimality of limited monetary incentives in selection contests.},
  keywords = {Selection contest, Risk aversion, Competitive balance, Gender gap}
}

@article{march2017_44053,
  title = {Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Economics Letters},
  volume = {151},
  pages = {23-27},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {0165-1765},
  doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.032},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44053},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We provide new experimental evidence which suggests an asymmetric discouragement effect in lottery contests with heterogeneous abilities. Compared to a symmetric contest, subjects invest less effort when facing a stronger opponent, but they invest the same when facing a weaker opponent. Our results can be explained by a simple model of disappointment aversion.},
  keywords = {Asymmetric contest, Discouragement effect, Disappointment aversion, Laboratory experiment}
}

@techreport{march2017_42517,
  title = {Contests as selection mechanisms: the impact of risk aversion},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2017},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-47-7},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42517},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{march2016_42518,
  title = {Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2016},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-36-1},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42518},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{march2013_54403,
  title = {Do We Follow Others when We Should? A Simple Test of Rational Expectations: Comment},
  author = {March, Christoph and Ziegelmeyer, Anthony and Krügel, Sebastian},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {103},
  number = {6},
  pages = {2633-2642},
  publisher = {American Economic Association},
  issn = {0002-8282},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.103.6.2633},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54403},
  language = {deu}
}

