TY - JOUR TI - Three-player round-robin tournaments in the lab : Lottery contests vs. all-pay auctions AU - Lauber, Arne AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2026 SP - 1-26 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/115974 LA - eng AB - We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare the fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players, a single prize, and two alternative match formats. Matches are either organized as lottery contests or all-pay auctions. Contrary to theory, we find no significant differences in intensity and fairness between the two match formats. The main reason is the behavior of the player acting in the final two matches in APA-tournaments. Rather than being severely discouraged when having to compete first against the loser of the first match, subjects try to exploit a perceived negative psychological momentum in such situations. This leads them into a dissipation trap: an effort-intense, final-like last match which significantly reduces their payoffs, but also levels the playing field for the other two players and thus enhances the fairness of APA-tournaments. KW - All-pay auction KW - Discouragement effect KW - Dissipation trap KW - Laboratory experiment KW - Lottery contest KW - Sequential round-robin tournament ER - TY - JOUR TI - Three-player round-robin tournaments in the lab : Lottery contests vs. all-pay auctions AU - Lauber, Arne AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2026 JO - Journal of behavioral and experimental economics VL - 124 IS - 102605 SP - 1-26 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam [u.a.] SN - 2214-8051 DO - 10.1016/j.socec.2026.102605 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/115973 LA - eng AB - We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare the fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players, a single prize, and two alternative match formats. Matches are either organized as lottery contests or all-pay auctions. Contrary to theory, we find no significant differences in intensity and fairness between the two match formats. The main reason is the behavior of the player acting in the final two matches in APA-tournaments. Rather than being severely discouraged when having to compete first against the loser of the first match, subjects try to exploit a perceived negative psychological momentum in such situations. This leads them into a dissipation trap: an effort-intense, final-like last match which significantly reduces their payoffs, but also levels the playing field for the other two players and thus enhances the fairness of APA-tournaments. KW - All-pay auction KW - Discouragement effect KW - Dissipation trap KW - Laboratory experiment KW - Lottery contest KW - Sequential round-robin tournament ER - TY - JOUR TI - The perks of being in the smaller team : incentives in overlapping contests AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2025 SP - 585-610 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/110508 LA - eng AB - We investigate overlapping contests in multi-divisional organizations in which an individual’s effort simultaneously determines the outcome of several contests on different hierarchical levels. We show that individuals in smaller units are advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important consequences for the provision of incentives in organizations and the design of sports competitions. KW - Contest KW - Rent-seeking KW - Hierarchy KW - Teams KW - Experiment ER - TY - RPRT TI - Round-Robin Tournaments in the Lab : Lottery Contests vs. All-Pay Auctions AU - Lauber, Arne AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2025 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series on government and growth SN - 978-3-949224-22-5 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/108079 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - The perks of being in the smaller team : incentives in overlapping contests AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2025 JO - Review of economic design VL - 29 IS - 3 SP - 585-610 PB - Springer CY - Berlin ; Heidelberg SN - 1434-4750 DO - 10.1007/s10058-023-00331-z UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91892 LA - eng AB - We investigate overlapping contests in multi-divisional organizations in which an individual’s effort simultaneously determines the outcome of several contests on different hierarchical levels. We show that individuals in smaller units are advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important consequences for the provision of incentives in organizations and the design of sports competitions. KW - Contest KW - Rent-seeking KW - Hierarchy KW - Teams KW - Experiment ER - TY - JOUR TI - Efficient incentives with social preferences AU - Daske, Thomas AU - March, Christoph PY - 2024 SP - 975-999 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/105420 LA - eng AB - We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of \textit{at least three} agents: Any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient. KW - Mechanism design KW - social preferences KW - Bayesian implementation KW - participation constraints KW - participation stimulation KW - money pump ER - TY - JOUR TI - Efficient incentives with social preferences AU - Daske, Thomas AU - March, Christoph PY - 2024 JO - Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory VL - 19 IS - 3 SP - 975-999 PB - The Econometric Society CY - Toronto SN - 1555-7561 DO - 10.3982/te5335 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/105419 LA - eng AB - We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of \textit{at least three} agents: Any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient. KW - Mechanism design KW - social preferences KW - Bayesian implementation KW - participation constraints KW - participation stimulation KW - money pump ER - TY - JOUR TI - Digitale Innovationen und Technologiesouveränität AU - Schieferdecker, Ina AU - March, Christoph PY - 2024 SP - 30-35 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/94676 LA - deu AB - Digitale Innovationen verändern zunehmend Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Es ist Aufgabe der Politik, diese Veränderungen im Dialog mit der Gesellschaft und im Einklang mit unseren Werten zu gestalten. Technologiesouveränität ist dafür eine wichtige Voraussetzung. Dabei geht es nicht um die Abschottung von internationalen Märkten, sondern um die Fähigkeit, Anforderungen an Technologien zu formulieren und diese am Markt durchzusetzen. Einer integrierten Forschungs- und Innovationspolitik, die die Förderung von Technologieentwicklung, Technologietransfer und Zukunftskompetenzen gleichermaßen in den Blick nimmt und auf europäische Zusammenarbeit setzt, kommt dabei eine zentrale Rolle zu. KW - Digitale Innovationen KW - Technologiesouveränität ER - TY - JOUR TI - Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments : Experimental evidence AU - Lauber, Arne AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2023 JO - Games and Economic Behavior VL - 141 SP - 30-51 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam [u.a.] SN - 1090-2473 DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.011 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91890 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Technological Sovereignty as Ability, Not Autarky AU - March, Christoph AU - Schieferdecker, Ina PY - 2023 JO - International Studies Review SP - 1-28 PB - Oxford University Press CY - Oxford SN - 1468-2486 DO - 10.1093/isr/viad012 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91887 LA - eng ER - TY - RPRT TI - Efficient Incentives with Social Preferences AU - Daske, Thomas AU - March, Christoph PY - 2022 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series on government and growth SN - 978-3-949224-01-0 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/107975 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Efficient Incentives with Social Preferences AU - Daske, Thomas AU - March, Christoph PY - 2022 JO - CESifo Working Paper SP - 1-20 CY - München SN - 2364-1428 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91889 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Coordinating intergenerational redistribution and the repayment of public debt: an experimental test of Tabellini (1991) AU - March, Christoph AU - Weizsäcker, Robert K. von PY - 2022 SP - 301-323 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/53798 LA - eng AB - Is there a link between public debt and wealth inequality? Could government bondholders use intra-generational redistribution strategically to make the repayment of debt politically viable? We reconsider the model of Tabellini (J Polit Econ 99:335–357, 1991) and expose the role of coordination and divide-and-conquer. By coordinating their bond investments, the old generation splits up the young generation and secures a majority favoring debt repayment. Coordination therefore mediates the impact of wealth inequality on public debt. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and find that subjects often coordinate to exploit the link between inter- and intragenerational redistribution. Hence, coordination plays an important role in the strategic creation and exploitation of minorities, and thus in the accumulation of public debt. KW - public debt KW - wealth inequality KW - generation split KW - bond investment KW - redistribution ER - TY - RPRT TI - Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: experimental evidence AU - Lauber, Arne AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2022 PB - Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series SN - 978-3-943153-97-2 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54032 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Parochial Altruism and the Absence of the Group Size Paradox in Inter-group Conflicts AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2021 JO - Economics bulletin : EB VL - 41 SP - 361-373 PB - Univ. of Illinois CY - Champaign-Urbana, Ill. SN - 1545-2921 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91891 LA - eng ER - TY - RPRT TI - Technological Sovereignty as Ability, Not Autarky AU - March, Christoph AU - Schieferdecker, Ina PY - 2021 CY - München T3 - CESifo Working Papers UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54407 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Parochial altruism and the absence of the group size paradox in inter-group conflicts AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2021 JO - Economics Bulletin VL - 41 IS - 2 PB - Univ. of Illinois CY - Champaign-Urbana, Ill. SN - 1545-2921 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54406 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Strategic interactions between humans and artificial intelligence : Lessons from experiments with computer players AU - March, Christoph PY - 2021 JO - Journal of Economic Psychology VL - 87 IS - December PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam [u.a.] SN - 0167-4870 DO - 10.1016/j.joep.2021.102426 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54405 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Digitale Innovationen und Technologiesouveränität AU - Schieferdecker, Ina AU - March, Christoph PY - 2020 JO - Wirtschaftsdienst : Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik VL - 100 IS - 1, supplement SP - 30–35 PB - Springer CY - Berlin ; Heidelberg [u.a.] SN - 0043-6275 DO - 10.1007/s10273-020-2612-8 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91888 LA - deu AB - Digitale Innovationen verändern zunehmend Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Es ist Aufgabe der Politik, diese Veränderungen im Dialog mit der Gesellschaft und im Einklang mit unseren Werten zu gestalten. Technologiesouveränität ist dafür eine wichtige Voraussetzung. Dabei geht es nicht um die Abschottung von internationalen Märkten, sondern um die Fähigkeit, Anforderungen an Technologien zu formulieren und diese am Markt durchzusetzen. Einer integrierten Forschungs- und Innovationspolitik, die die Förderung von Technologieentwicklung, Technologietransfer und Zukunftskompetenzen gleichermaßen in den Blick nimmt und auf europäische Zusammenarbeit setzt, kommt dabei eine zentrale Rolle zu. KW - Digitale Innovationen KW - Technologiesouveränität ER - TY - JOUR TI - Altruistic observational learning AU - March, Christoph AU - Ziegelmeyer, Anthony PY - 2020 JO - Journal of economic theory : JET VL - 190 IS - November PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam [u.a.] SN - 0022-0531 DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105123 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54404 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Coordinating intergenerational redistribution and the repayment of public debt: an experimental test of Tabellini (1991) AU - March, Christoph AU - Weizsäcker, Robert K. von PY - 2020 JO - Social Choice and Welfare VL - 55 IS - 2 SP - 301-323 PB - Springer CY - Berlin ; Heidelberg SN - 1432-217X DO - 10.1007/s00355-020-01242-6 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/53447 LA - eng AB - Is there a link between public debt and wealth inequality? Could government bondholders use intra-generational redistribution strategically to make the repayment of debt politically viable? We reconsider the model of Tabellini (J Polit Econ 99:335–357, 1991) and expose the role of coordination and divide-and-conquer. By coordinating their bond investments, the old generation splits up the young generation and secures a majority favoring debt repayment. Coordination therefore mediates the impact of wealth inequality on public debt. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and find that subjects often coordinate to exploit the link between inter- and intragenerational redistribution. Hence, coordination plays an important role in the strategic creation and exploitation of minorities, and thus in the accumulation of public debt. KW - public debt KW - wealth inequality KW - generation split KW - bond investment KW - redistribution ER - TY - RPRT TI - The perks of being in the smaller team : incentives in overlapping contests AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco ED - Stübben, Felix PY - 2019 PB - Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series SN - 978-3-943153-76-7 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47322 LA - eng ER - TY - RPRT TI - The behavioral economics of artificial intelligence: Lessons from experiments with computer players AU - March, Christoph ED - Stübben, Felix PY - 2019 PB - Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series SN - 978-3-943153-75-0 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47321 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Contests as selection mechanisms: The impact of risk aversion AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2018 JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization VL - 150 SP - 114-131 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam [u.a.] SN - 0167-2681 DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.020 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44052 LA - eng AB - We investigate how individual risk preferences affect the likelihood of selecting the more able contestant within a two-player Tullock contest. Our theoretical model yields two main predictions: First, an increase in the risk aversion of a player worsens her odds unless she already has a sufficiently large advantage. Second, if the prize money is sufficiently large, a less able but less risk averse contestant can achieve an equal or even higher probability of winning than a more able but more risk averse opponent. In a laboratory experiment we confirm both, the non-monotonic impact and the compensating effect of risk aversion on winning probabilities. Our results suggest a novel explanation for the gender gap and the optimality of limited monetary incentives in selection contests. KW - Selection contest KW - Risk aversion KW - Competitive balance KW - Gender gap ER - TY - JOUR TI - Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2017 JO - Economics Letters VL - 151 SP - 23-27 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam [u.a.] SN - 0165-1765 DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.032 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44053 LA - eng AB - We provide new experimental evidence which suggests an asymmetric discouragement effect in lottery contests with heterogeneous abilities. Compared to a symmetric contest, subjects invest less effort when facing a stronger opponent, but they invest the same when facing a weaker opponent. Our results can be explained by a simple model of disappointment aversion. KW - Asymmetric contest KW - Discouragement effect KW - Disappointment aversion KW - Laboratory experiment ER - TY - RPRT TI - Contests as selection mechanisms: the impact of risk aversion AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco ED - Stübben, Felix PY - 2017 PB - Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series SN - 978-3-943153-47-7 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42517 LA - eng ER - TY - RPRT TI - Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco ED - Stübben, Felix PY - 2016 PB - Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series SN - 978-3-943153-36-1 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42518 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Do We Follow Others when We Should? A Simple Test of Rational Expectations: Comment AU - March, Christoph AU - Ziegelmeyer, Anthony AU - Krügel, Sebastian PY - 2013 JO - American Economic Review VL - 103 IS - 6 SP - 2633-2642 PB - American Economic Association SN - 0002-8282 DO - 10.1257/aer.103.6.2633 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54403 LA - deu ER -