@article{schulz2025_93210,
  title = {Being a believer : social identity in post-truth political discourse},
  author = {Schulz, Moritz A. and Scheller, Simon},
  year = {2025},
  pages = {1-24},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-932101},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/93210},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Analyses of so-called ‘post-truth’ discourse in populist politics have so far largely focussed on sorting it into cases of lying, bullshitting, bubble-like epistemic constraints, or alternative epistemic norms flouting objective truth. We review these proposals and point out problems with each. Some scholars, however, have recently drawn attention to how apparent assertions of facts in these contexts seem to be functionally entangled with expressing or affirming social identities. To get a clearer picture of what such an explanation might amount to, we differentiate four different ways in which social identities might be connected to apparently assertive discourse: signalling, expressive affirmation, dissonance reduction, and identity grounding. Distinguishing and deciding among these will matter not only for providing an accurate analysis of post-truth discourse, but also for determining the exact grounds on which it merits criticism and for what might be done about it.},
  keywords = {post-truth, alternative facts, social identity, signalling, expressives}
}

@techreport{mayerhoffer2025_108470,
  title = {Networks of Polarisation : A Generative Mechanism},
  author = {Mayerhoffer, Daniel M. and Schulz, Moritz A. and Scheller, Simon and Schulz, Jan},
  year = {2025},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {Bamberger Beiträge zur Modernen Politischen Theorie},
  doi = {10.20378/irb-108470},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-108470x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/108470},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {This paper presents a generative algorithm for simulating network polarisation based on attitudinal homophily, i.e., the tendency to connect to others with similar attitudes as oneself. To do so, it applies the notion of preferential attachment to node properties other than degree, aiding intuitive communication within and beyond the network science community. The algorithm works with one or more flexibly weighted attitude dimensions, heterogeneous populations.
The generated networks commonly share features of real-world social networks such as (weak) small-worldiness. They can contribute to how-possibly explanations of stylised empirical facts, especially when empirical network data is missing. An example on polarisation in Germany on migration attitudes is used to illustrate this. We find that homophily is sufficient to create empirically observed polarisation as well as patterns of individual perception, such as viewing one’s own opinion as moderate, over-estimating the actual level of societal, and dwindling open-mindedness towards others with different attitudes.},
  keywords = {polarisation, network, homophily, perceptions, migration, bimodality}
}

@book{schulz2024_103901,
  title = {Methoden der Politischen Theorie : eine anwendungsorientierte Einführung},
  author = {Schulz, Moritz and Hofmann, Benjamin and Marx, Johannes and Mayerhoffer, Daniel M.},
  year = {2024},
  publisher = {UTB},
  address = {Paderborn},
  isbn = {9783838561820},
  doi = {10.36198/9783838561820},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/103901},
  language = {deu}
}

@article{schulz2024_94387,
  title = {Being a believer : social identity in post-truth political discourse},
  author = {Schulz, Moritz A. and Scheller, Simon},
  year = {2024},
  journal = {Inquiry : an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy},
  number = {Online First},
  pages = {1-29},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis},
  address = {Abindgon},
  issn = {1502-3923},
  doi = {10.1080/0020174x.2024.2312201},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/94387},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Analyses of so-called ‘post-truth’ discourse in populist politics have so far largely focussed on sorting it into cases of lying, bullshitting, bubble-like epistemic constraints, or alternative epistemic norms flouting objective truth. We review these proposals and point out problems with each. Some scholars, however, have recently drawn attention to how apparent assertions of facts in these contexts seem to be functionally entangled with expressing or affirming social identities. To get a clearer picture of what such an explanation might amount to, we differentiate four different ways in which social identities might be connected to apparently assertive discourse: signalling, expressive affirmation, dissonance reduction, and identity grounding. Distinguishing and deciding among these will matter not only for providing an accurate analysis of post-truth discourse, but also for determining the exact grounds on which it merits criticism and for what might be done about it.},
  keywords = {post-truth, alternative facts, social identity, signalling, expressives}
}

@article{schulz2023_59969,
  title = {So What's My Part? : Collective Duties, Individual Contributions, and Distributive Justice},
  author = {Schulz, Moritz},
  year = {2023},
  pages = {1-31},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-599690},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59969},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Problems in normative ethics paradigmatically concern what it is obligatory or permissible for an individual to do. Yet sometimes, each of us ought to do something individually in virtue of what we ought to do together. Unfortunately, traversing these two different levels at which a moral obligation can arise – individual and collective – is fraught with difficulties that easily lure us into conclusions muddying our understanding of collective obligations. This paper seeks to clearly lay out a systematic problem central to the relation between collective and individual duties in view of alleviating some such confusion and facilitating more concerted attempts at resolving it: Collective duties require individuals to act in order for the collective duty to be fulfilled. Yet typically, a collective duty does not entail any one set of individual duties that would prescribe such contributory actions: The work we need to do in order to fulfil a duty can be allocated differently to the individuals collectively bearing it. Much like in matters of distributive justice, then, deriving individual duties from a collective one requires us to employ a distributive scheme, which raises separate normative concerns that have rarely taken centre stage in the debate so far.},
  keywords = {collective obligations, collective duties, distributive justice}
}

@article{schulz2023_59917,
  title = {So What's My Part? : Collective Duties, Individual Contributions, and Distributive Justice},
  author = {Schulz, Moritz},
  year = {2023},
  journal = {Historical Social Research},
  volume = {48},
  number = {3},
  pages = {320-349},
  address = {Mannheim},
  issn = {0172-6404},
  doi = {10.12759/hsr.48.2023.36},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59917},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Problems in normative ethics paradigmatically concern what it is obligatory or permissible for an individual to do. Yet sometimes, each of us ought to do something individually in virtue of what we ought to do together. Unfortunately, traversing these two different levels at which a moral obligation can arise – individual and collective – is fraught with difficulties that easily lure us into conclusions muddying our understanding of collective obligations. This paper seeks to clearly lay out a systematic problem central to the relation between collective and individual duties in view of alleviating some such confusion and facilitating more concerted attempts at resolving it: Collective duties require individuals to act in order for the collective duty to be fulfilled. Yet typically, a collective duty does not entail any one set of individual duties that would prescribe such contributory actions: The work we need to do in order to fulfil a duty can be allocated differently to the individuals collectively bearing it. Much like in matters of distributive justice, then, deriving individual duties from a collective one requires us to employ a distributive scheme, which raises separate normative concerns that have rarely taken centre stage in the debate so far.},
  keywords = {collective obligations, collective duties, distributive justice}
}

@mastersthesis{schulz2018_49156,
  title = {Aufführungen von Demokratie},
  author = {Schulz, Moritz},
  year = {2018},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/49156},
  language = {deu},
  school = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg}
}

