@article{lauber2026_115974,
  title = {Three-player round-robin tournaments in the lab : Lottery contests vs. all-pay auctions},
  author = {Lauber, Arne and March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2026},
  pages = {1-26},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-115974x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/115974},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare the fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players, a single prize, and two alternative match formats. Matches are either organized as lottery contests or all-pay auctions. Contrary to theory, we find no significant differences in intensity and fairness between the two match formats. The main reason is the behavior of the player acting in the final two matches in APA-tournaments. Rather than being severely discouraged when having to compete first against the loser of the first match, subjects try to exploit a perceived negative psychological momentum in such situations. This leads them into a dissipation trap: an effort-intense, final-like last match which significantly reduces their payoffs, but also levels the playing field for the other two players and thus enhances the fairness of APA-tournaments.},
  keywords = {All-pay auction, Discouragement effect, Dissipation trap, Laboratory experiment, Lottery contest, Sequential round-robin tournament}
}

@article{lauber2026_115973,
  title = {Three-player round-robin tournaments in the lab : Lottery contests vs. all-pay auctions},
  author = {Lauber, Arne and March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2026},
  journal = {Journal of behavioral and experimental economics},
  volume = {124},
  number = {102605},
  pages = {1-26},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {2214-8051},
  doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2026.102605},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/115973},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare the fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players, a single prize, and two alternative match formats. Matches are either organized as lottery contests or all-pay auctions. Contrary to theory, we find no significant differences in intensity and fairness between the two match formats. The main reason is the behavior of the player acting in the final two matches in APA-tournaments. Rather than being severely discouraged when having to compete first against the loser of the first match, subjects try to exploit a perceived negative psychological momentum in such situations. This leads them into a dissipation trap: an effort-intense, final-like last match which significantly reduces their payoffs, but also levels the playing field for the other two players and thus enhances the fairness of APA-tournaments.},
  keywords = {All-pay auction, Discouragement effect, Dissipation trap, Laboratory experiment, Lottery contest, Sequential round-robin tournament}
}

@article{march2025_110508,
  title = {The perks of being in the smaller team : incentives in overlapping contests},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2025},
  pages = {585-610},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-110508x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/110508},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We investigate overlapping contests in multi-divisional organizations in which an individual’s effort simultaneously determines the outcome of several contests on different hierarchical levels. We show that individuals in smaller units are advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important consequences for the provision of incentives in organizations and the design of sports competitions.},
  keywords = {Contest, Rent-seeking, Hierarchy, Teams, Experiment}
}

@techreport{heidelmeier2025_108373,
  title = {Environmental Awards in a Duopoly with Green Consumers},
  author = {Heidelmeier, Lisa Isabel and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2025},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series on government and growth},
  doi = {10.20378/irb-108373},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-1083731},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/108373},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We investigate the impact of an environmental award in a Bertrand duopoly with green consumers considering a three-stage game. First, the regulator designs the environmental contest. Second, firms choose their green investments, and the winner of the contest is awarded. Third, firms compete in prices, and consumption takes place. We illustrate that the award not only incentivizes green investments and may thus reduce environmental externalities. As consumers perceive the product of the awarded firm to be of superior quality, it also gives rise to vertical product differentiation. This induces market power, and thus anti-competitive effects: Rents shift from consumers to producers, and consumer surplus may decrease, particularly if marginal investment costs in green technologies are high compared to the strength of environmental damage.},
  keywords = {Bertrand Competition, Contests, Environmental Award, Green Consumer, Product Differentiation}
}

@article{deutscher2025_106894,
  title = {Strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests with heterogeneous players},
  author = {Deutscher, Christian and Sahm, Marco and Schneemann, Sandra and Sonnabend, Hendrik},
  year = {2025},
  pages = {281-317},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-1068941},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/106894},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {When heterogeneous players make strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests, they might conserve resources in a current contest to spend more in a subsequent contest, if the degree of heterogeneity in the current (subsequent) contest is sufficiently large (small). We confirm these predictions using data from German professional soccer, in which players are subject to a one-match ban if they accumulate five yellow cards. Players with four yellow cards facing the risk of being suspended for the next match are (i) less likely to be fielded when the heterogeneity in the current match increases and (ii) more likely to receive a fifth yellow card in the current match when heterogeneity in the next match increases or heterogeneity in the next match but one (when they return from their ban) decreases.},
  keywords = {Tournaments, Multi-stage contests, Heterogeneity, Anticipating behaviour, Shadow effects}
}

@techreport{lauber2025_108079,
  title = {Round-Robin Tournaments in the Lab : Lottery Contests vs. All-Pay Auctions},
  author = {Lauber, Arne and March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2025},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series on government and growth},
  isbn = {978-3-949224-22-5},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/108079},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{march2025_91892,
  title = {The perks of being in the smaller team : incentives in overlapping contests},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2025},
  journal = {Review of economic design},
  volume = {29},
  number = {3},
  pages = {585-610},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address = {Berlin ; Heidelberg},
  issn = {1434-4750},
  doi = {10.1007/s10058-023-00331-z},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91892},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We investigate overlapping contests in multi-divisional organizations in which an individual’s effort simultaneously determines the outcome of several contests on different hierarchical levels. We show that individuals in smaller units are advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important consequences for the provision of incentives in organizations and the design of sports competitions.},
  keywords = {Contest, Rent-seeking, Hierarchy, Teams, Experiment}
}

@techreport{bruckner2024_108063,
  title = {Party Politics : A Contest Perspective},
  author = {Bruckner, Dominik and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2024},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series on government and growth},
  isbn = {978-3-949224-18-8},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/108063},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{dietz2024_108057,
  title = {Fairness in Round-Robin Tournaments with Four Players and Endogenous Sequences},
  author = {Dietz, Fabian and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2024},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series on government and growth},
  isbn = {978-3-949224-14-0},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/108057},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{lauber2023_91890,
  title = {Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments : Experimental evidence},
  author = {Lauber, Arne and March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2023},
  journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
  volume = {141},
  pages = {30-51},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {1090-2473},
  doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.011},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91890},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{sahm2022_107972,
  title = {Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2022},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series on government and growth},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-96-5},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/107972},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sahm2022_56203,
  title = {Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2022},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-562031},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/56203},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (r≥2). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or the winner’s expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level r<2 decreases in the players’ heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum (maximum) effort will never choose a contest with a semi-mixed equilibrium.},
  keywords = {Tullock contest, heterogeneous valuations, accuracy, discrimination, optimal design, all-pay auction}
}

@article{sahm2022_56202,
  title = {Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2022},
  journal = {Games},
  volume = {13},
  number = {2},
  address = {Basel},
  issn = {2073-4336},
  doi = {10.3390/g13020024},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/56202},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (r≥2). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or the winner’s expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level r<2 decreases in the players’ heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum (maximum) effort will never choose a contest with a semi-mixed equilibrium.},
  keywords = {Tullock contest, heterogeneous valuations, accuracy, discrimination, optimal design, all-pay auction}
}

@article{planerfriedrich2022_53941,
  title = {Strategic CSR in Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly},
  author = {Planer-Friedrich, Lisa and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2022},
  pages = {33-42},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-539411},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/53941},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We examine the strategic use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Cournot competition between two firms that differ in their marginal costs of production. The level of CSR determines the weight a firm puts on consumer surplus in its objective function before it decides upon supply. We show that the more efficient firm chooses a higher CSR level, reinforcing its dominant position. If there are sufficiently large fixed costs of CSR, only the more efficient firm will engage in CSR.},
  keywords = {corporate social responsibility, cournot duopoly, asymmetric costs, heterogenous firms}
}

@techreport{lauber2022_54032,
  title = {Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: experimental evidence},
  author = {Lauber, Arne and March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2022},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-97-2},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54032},
  language = {deu}
}

@article{laica2021_115817,
  title = {Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes},
  author = {Laica, Christoph and Lauber, Arne and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
  volume = {129},
  pages = {421-448},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {0899-8256},
  doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.012},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/115817},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{deutscher2021_104074,
  title = {Strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests with heterogeneous players},
  author = {Deutscher, Christian and Sahm, Marco and Schneemann, Sandra and Sonnabend, Hendrik},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Theory and Decision},
  volume = {93},
  number = {2},
  pages = {281-317},
  publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
  address = {Dordrecht [u.a.]},
  issn = {1573-7187},
  doi = {10.1007/s11238-021-09845-w},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/104074},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {When heterogeneous players make strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests, they might conserve resources in a current contest to spend more in a subsequent contest, if the degree of heterogeneity in the current (subsequent) contest is sufficiently large (small). We confirm these predictions using data from German professional soccer, in which players are subject to a one-match ban if they accumulate five yellow cards. Players with four yellow cards facing the risk of being suspended for the next match are (i) less likely to be fielded when the heterogeneity in the current match increases and (ii) more likely to receive a fifth yellow card in the current match when heterogeneity in the next match increases or heterogeneity in the next match but one (when they return from their ban) decreases.},
  keywords = {Tournaments, Multi-stage contests, Heterogeneity, Anticipating behaviour, Shadow effects}
}

@article{march2021_91891,
  title = {Parochial Altruism and the Absence of the Group Size Paradox in Inter-group Conflicts},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Economics bulletin : EB},
  volume = {41},
  pages = {361-373},
  publisher = {Univ. of Illinois},
  address = {Champaign-Urbana, Ill.},
  issn = {1545-2921},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91891},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{march2021_54406,
  title = {Parochial altruism and the absence of the group size paradox in inter-group conflicts},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Economics Bulletin},
  volume = {41},
  number = {2},
  publisher = {Univ. of Illinois},
  address = {Champaign-Urbana, Ill.},
  issn = {1545-2921},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54406},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{planerfriedrich2020_53454,
  title = {Strategic CSR in Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly},
  author = {Planer-Friedrich, Lisa and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade},
  volume = {21},
  number = {1},
  pages = {33-42},
  publisher = {Springer Science + Business Media B.V},
  address = {Dordrecht [u.a.]},
  issn = {1573-7012},
  doi = {10.1007/s10842-020-00335-3},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/53454},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We examine the strategic use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Cournot competition between two firms that differ in their marginal costs of production. The level of CSR determines the weight a firm puts on consumer surplus in its objective function before it decides upon supply. We show that the more efficient firm chooses a higher CSR level, reinforcing its dominant position. If there are sufficiently large fixed costs of CSR, only the more efficient firm will engage in CSR.},
  keywords = {corporate social responsibility, cournot duopoly, asymmetric costs, heterogenous firms}
}

@article{planerfriedrich2019_112743,
  title = {Strategic corporate social responsibility, imperfect competition, and market concentration},
  author = {Planer-Friedrich, Lisa and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Journal of Economics},
  volume = {129},
  number = {1},
  pages = {79-101},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address = {Wien ; New York, NY},
  issn = {1617-7134},
  doi = {10.1007/s00712-019-00663-x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/112743},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sahm2019_53456,
  title = {Advance-Purchase Financing of Projects with Few Buyers},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Review of Industrial Organization},
  volume = {57},
  number = {4},
  pages = {909-933},
  publisher = {Springer Science + Business Media B.V.},
  address = {Dordrecht [u.a.]},
  issn = {1573-7160},
  doi = {10.1007/s11151-019-09742-1},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/53456},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{march2019_47322,
  title = {The perks of being in the smaller team : incentives in overlapping contests},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2019},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-76-7},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47322},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{march2018_44052,
  title = {Contests as selection mechanisms: The impact of risk aversion},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
  volume = {150},
  pages = {114-131},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {0167-2681},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.020},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44052},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We investigate how individual risk preferences affect the likelihood of selecting the more able contestant within a two-player Tullock contest. Our theoretical model yields two main predictions: First, an increase in the risk aversion of a player worsens her odds unless she already has a sufficiently large advantage. Second, if the prize money is sufficiently large, a less able but less risk averse contestant can achieve an equal or even higher probability of winning than a more able but more risk averse opponent. In a laboratory experiment we confirm both, the non-monotonic impact and the compensating effect of risk aversion on winning probabilities. Our results suggest a novel explanation for the gender gap and the optimality of limited monetary incentives in selection contests.},
  keywords = {Selection contest, Risk aversion, Competitive balance, Gender gap}
}

@article{sahm2018_44035,
  title = {Are sequential round‐robin tournaments discriminatory?},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address = {Oxford},
  issn = {1467-9779},
  doi = {10.1111/jpet.12308},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44035},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {I examine sequential round‐robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players. Each player is matched once with each other player and each match is organized as a Tullock contest. A single prize is allocated to the player with the most matches won. I show that, depending on the position of their matches in the sequence of the tournament, the players' ex ante winning probabilities and expected payoffs differ. Compared to tournaments with matches organized as all‐pay auctions, however, discrimination is weaker and partially reversed. Moreover, aggregate effort in tournaments with suitable Tullock contests is larger than in tournaments with all‐pay auctions. The fairness of round‐robin tournaments may be improved by an endogenous sequence of matches or the requirement that players fix their effort ex ante.}
}

@article{greiner2018_43925,
  title = {How effective are advertising bans? On the demand for quality in two-sided media markets},
  author = {Greiner, Tanja and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Information Economics and Policy},
  volume = {43},
  pages = {48-60},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam},
  issn = {0167-6245},
  doi = {10.1016/j.infoecopol.2018.01.003},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43925},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We study a two-sided markets model of two competing television broadcasters that offer content of differentiated quality to ad-averse consumers and advertising space to firms. As all consumers prefer high over low quality content, competition for viewers is vertical. By contrast, competition for advertisers is horizontal, taking into account the firms’ targeted advertising motive. Analyzing the impact of an advertising ban on the high quality medium, we derive the following results: (i) total advertising volumes decrease; (ii) the viewer market share of the high-quality broadcaster and thus the equilibrium reception of high quality content decreases; (iii) welfare decreases; (iv) the low-quality broadcaster’s profits will increase if and only if ad nuisance is small compared to ad effectiveness.},
  keywords = {Two-sided market, Advertising ban, Platform competition, Indirect network effect, Horizontal and vertical product differentiation}
}

@article{march2017_44053,
  title = {Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Economics Letters},
  volume = {151},
  pages = {23-27},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {0165-1765},
  doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.032},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44053},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We provide new experimental evidence which suggests an asymmetric discouragement effect in lottery contests with heterogeneous abilities. Compared to a symmetric contest, subjects invest less effort when facing a stronger opponent, but they invest the same when facing a weaker opponent. Our results can be explained by a simple model of disappointment aversion.},
  keywords = {Asymmetric contest, Discouragement effect, Disappointment aversion, Laboratory experiment}
}

@article{sahm2017_44021,
  title = {Risk aversion and prudence in contests},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Economics Bulletin},
  volume = {37},
  number = {2},
  pages = {1122-1132},
  publisher = {Univ. of Illinois},
  address = {Champaign-Urbana, Ill.},
  issn = {1545-2921},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44021},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {I examine the impact of risk preferences on efforts and winning probabilities in generalized Tullock contests between two players. The theoretical analysis yields two ma in results. First, in symmetric contests, a higher common level of the agents ́ risk aversion will lead to lower aggregate effort if it comes along with an increase in downside risk aversion. Second, in many asymmetric contests, higher risk-aversion will be a disadvantage if the agent is also more downside risk-averse}
}

@techreport{laica2017_43003,
  title = {Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments with Multiple Prizes},
  author = {Laica, Christoph and Lauber, Arne and Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2017},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-50-7},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43003},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{sahm2017_42520,
  title = {Are sequential round-robin tournaments discriminatory?},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2017},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-40-8},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42520},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{march2017_42517,
  title = {Contests as selection mechanisms: the impact of risk aversion},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2017},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-47-7},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42517},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{planerfriedrich2017_42514,
  title = {Strategic corporate social responsibility},
  author = {Planer-Friedrich, Lisa and Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2017},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-44-6},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42514},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{sahm2017_42501,
  title = {Risk aversion and prudence in contests},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2017},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-39-2},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42501},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{march2016_42518,
  title = {Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2016},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-36-1},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42518},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{sahm2016_42494,
  title = {Advance-purchase financing of projects with few buyers},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2016},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-37-8},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42494},
  language = {eng}
}

@techreport{planerfriedrich2016_42483,
  title = {Why firms should care for all consumers},
  author = {Planer-Friedrich, Lisa and Sahm, Marco},
  editor = {Stübben, Felix},
  year = {2016},
  publisher = {Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {BERG working paper series},
  isbn = {978-3-943153-35-4},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42483},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sahm2015_21682,
  title = {Reason, Intuition, and Time},
  author = {Sahm, Marco and Weizsäcker, Robert K. von},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Managerial and decision economics : MDE ; the international journal of research and progress in management economics},
  volume = {37},
  number = {3},
  pages = {195-207},
  publisher = {Wiley},
  address = {Chichester [u.a.]},
  issn = {1099-1468},
  doi = {10.1002/mde.2711},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/21682},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sahm2014_21708,
  title = {Corrigendum to "Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd"},
  author = {Sahm, Marco and Belleflamme, Paul and Lambert, Thomas and Schwienbacher, Armin},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Journal of Business Venturing},
  volume = {29},
  number = {5},
  pages = {610-611},
  publisher = {Elsevier Science Publ.},
  address = {New York, NY},
  issn = {0883-9026},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/21708},
  language = {eng}
}

