TY - JOUR TI - Three-player round-robin tournaments in the lab : Lottery contests vs. all-pay auctions AU - Lauber, Arne AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2026 SP - 1-26 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/115974 LA - eng AB - We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare the fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players, a single prize, and two alternative match formats. Matches are either organized as lottery contests or all-pay auctions. Contrary to theory, we find no significant differences in intensity and fairness between the two match formats. The main reason is the behavior of the player acting in the final two matches in APA-tournaments. Rather than being severely discouraged when having to compete first against the loser of the first match, subjects try to exploit a perceived negative psychological momentum in such situations. This leads them into a dissipation trap: an effort-intense, final-like last match which significantly reduces their payoffs, but also levels the playing field for the other two players and thus enhances the fairness of APA-tournaments. KW - All-pay auction KW - Discouragement effect KW - Dissipation trap KW - Laboratory experiment KW - Lottery contest KW - Sequential round-robin tournament ER - TY - JOUR TI - Three-player round-robin tournaments in the lab : Lottery contests vs. all-pay auctions AU - Lauber, Arne AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2026 JO - Journal of behavioral and experimental economics VL - 124 IS - 102605 SP - 1-26 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam [u.a.] SN - 2214-8051 DO - 10.1016/j.socec.2026.102605 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/115973 LA - eng AB - We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare the fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players, a single prize, and two alternative match formats. Matches are either organized as lottery contests or all-pay auctions. Contrary to theory, we find no significant differences in intensity and fairness between the two match formats. The main reason is the behavior of the player acting in the final two matches in APA-tournaments. Rather than being severely discouraged when having to compete first against the loser of the first match, subjects try to exploit a perceived negative psychological momentum in such situations. This leads them into a dissipation trap: an effort-intense, final-like last match which significantly reduces their payoffs, but also levels the playing field for the other two players and thus enhances the fairness of APA-tournaments. KW - All-pay auction KW - Discouragement effect KW - Dissipation trap KW - Laboratory experiment KW - Lottery contest KW - Sequential round-robin tournament ER - TY - JOUR TI - The perks of being in the smaller team : incentives in overlapping contests AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2025 SP - 585-610 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/110508 LA - eng AB - We investigate overlapping contests in multi-divisional organizations in which an individual’s effort simultaneously determines the outcome of several contests on different hierarchical levels. We show that individuals in smaller units are advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important consequences for the provision of incentives in organizations and the design of sports competitions. KW - Contest KW - Rent-seeking KW - Hierarchy KW - Teams KW - Experiment ER - TY - RPRT TI - Environmental Awards in a Duopoly with Green Consumers AU - Heidelmeier, Lisa Isabel AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2025 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series on government and growth DO - 10.20378/irb-108373 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/108373 LA - eng AB - We investigate the impact of an environmental award in a Bertrand duopoly with green consumers considering a three-stage game. First, the regulator designs the environmental contest. Second, firms choose their green investments, and the winner of the contest is awarded. Third, firms compete in prices, and consumption takes place. We illustrate that the award not only incentivizes green investments and may thus reduce environmental externalities. As consumers perceive the product of the awarded firm to be of superior quality, it also gives rise to vertical product differentiation. This induces market power, and thus anti-competitive effects: Rents shift from consumers to producers, and consumer surplus may decrease, particularly if marginal investment costs in green technologies are high compared to the strength of environmental damage. KW - Bertrand Competition KW - Contests KW - Environmental Award KW - Green Consumer KW - Product Differentiation ER - TY - JOUR TI - Strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests with heterogeneous players AU - Deutscher, Christian AU - Sahm, Marco AU - Schneemann, Sandra AU - Sonnabend, Hendrik PY - 2025 SP - 281-317 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/106894 LA - eng AB - When heterogeneous players make strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests, they might conserve resources in a current contest to spend more in a subsequent contest, if the degree of heterogeneity in the current (subsequent) contest is sufficiently large (small). We confirm these predictions using data from German professional soccer, in which players are subject to a one-match ban if they accumulate five yellow cards. Players with four yellow cards facing the risk of being suspended for the next match are (i) less likely to be fielded when the heterogeneity in the current match increases and (ii) more likely to receive a fifth yellow card in the current match when heterogeneity in the next match increases or heterogeneity in the next match but one (when they return from their ban) decreases. KW - Tournaments KW - Multi-stage contests KW - Heterogeneity KW - Anticipating behaviour KW - Shadow effects ER - TY - RPRT TI - Round-Robin Tournaments in the Lab : Lottery Contests vs. All-Pay Auctions AU - Lauber, Arne AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2025 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series on government and growth SN - 978-3-949224-22-5 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/108079 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - The perks of being in the smaller team : incentives in overlapping contests AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2025 JO - Review of economic design VL - 29 IS - 3 SP - 585-610 PB - Springer CY - Berlin ; Heidelberg SN - 1434-4750 DO - 10.1007/s10058-023-00331-z UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91892 LA - eng AB - We investigate overlapping contests in multi-divisional organizations in which an individual’s effort simultaneously determines the outcome of several contests on different hierarchical levels. We show that individuals in smaller units are advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important consequences for the provision of incentives in organizations and the design of sports competitions. KW - Contest KW - Rent-seeking KW - Hierarchy KW - Teams KW - Experiment ER - TY - RPRT TI - Party Politics : A Contest Perspective AU - Bruckner, Dominik AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2024 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series on government and growth SN - 978-3-949224-18-8 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/108063 LA - eng ER - TY - RPRT TI - Fairness in Round-Robin Tournaments with Four Players and Endogenous Sequences AU - Dietz, Fabian AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2024 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series on government and growth SN - 978-3-949224-14-0 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/108057 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments : Experimental evidence AU - Lauber, Arne AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2023 JO - Games and Economic Behavior VL - 141 SP - 30-51 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam [u.a.] SN - 1090-2473 DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.011 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91890 LA - eng ER - TY - RPRT TI - Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2022 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series on government and growth SN - 978-3-943153-96-5 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/107972 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2022 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/56203 LA - eng AB - I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (r≥2). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or the winner’s expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level r<2 decreases in the players’ heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum (maximum) effort will never choose a contest with a semi-mixed equilibrium. KW - Tullock contest KW - heterogeneous valuations KW - accuracy KW - discrimination KW - optimal design KW - all-pay auction ER - TY - JOUR TI - Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2022 JO - Games VL - 13 IS - 2 CY - Basel SN - 2073-4336 DO - 10.3390/g13020024 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/56202 LA - eng AB - I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (r≥2). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or the winner’s expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level r<2 decreases in the players’ heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum (maximum) effort will never choose a contest with a semi-mixed equilibrium. KW - Tullock contest KW - heterogeneous valuations KW - accuracy KW - discrimination KW - optimal design KW - all-pay auction ER - TY - JOUR TI - Strategic CSR in Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly AU - Planer-Friedrich, Lisa AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2022 SP - 33-42 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/53941 LA - eng AB - We examine the strategic use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Cournot competition between two firms that differ in their marginal costs of production. The level of CSR determines the weight a firm puts on consumer surplus in its objective function before it decides upon supply. We show that the more efficient firm chooses a higher CSR level, reinforcing its dominant position. If there are sufficiently large fixed costs of CSR, only the more efficient firm will engage in CSR. KW - corporate social responsibility KW - cournot duopoly KW - asymmetric costs KW - heterogenous firms ER - TY - RPRT TI - Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: experimental evidence AU - Lauber, Arne AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2022 PB - Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series SN - 978-3-943153-97-2 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54032 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes AU - Laica, Christoph AU - Lauber, Arne AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2021 JO - Games and Economic Behavior VL - 129 SP - 421-448 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam [u.a.] SN - 0899-8256 DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.012 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/115817 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests with heterogeneous players AU - Deutscher, Christian AU - Sahm, Marco AU - Schneemann, Sandra AU - Sonnabend, Hendrik PY - 2021 JO - Theory and Decision VL - 93 IS - 2 SP - 281-317 PB - Springer Science and Business Media LLC CY - Dordrecht [u.a.] SN - 1573-7187 DO - 10.1007/s11238-021-09845-w UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/104074 LA - eng AB - When heterogeneous players make strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests, they might conserve resources in a current contest to spend more in a subsequent contest, if the degree of heterogeneity in the current (subsequent) contest is sufficiently large (small). We confirm these predictions using data from German professional soccer, in which players are subject to a one-match ban if they accumulate five yellow cards. Players with four yellow cards facing the risk of being suspended for the next match are (i) less likely to be fielded when the heterogeneity in the current match increases and (ii) more likely to receive a fifth yellow card in the current match when heterogeneity in the next match increases or heterogeneity in the next match but one (when they return from their ban) decreases. KW - Tournaments KW - Multi-stage contests KW - Heterogeneity KW - Anticipating behaviour KW - Shadow effects ER - TY - JOUR TI - Parochial Altruism and the Absence of the Group Size Paradox in Inter-group Conflicts AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2021 JO - Economics bulletin : EB VL - 41 SP - 361-373 PB - Univ. of Illinois CY - Champaign-Urbana, Ill. SN - 1545-2921 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91891 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Parochial altruism and the absence of the group size paradox in inter-group conflicts AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2021 JO - Economics Bulletin VL - 41 IS - 2 PB - Univ. of Illinois CY - Champaign-Urbana, Ill. SN - 1545-2921 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54406 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Strategic CSR in Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly AU - Planer-Friedrich, Lisa AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2020 JO - Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade VL - 21 IS - 1 SP - 33-42 PB - Springer Science + Business Media B.V CY - Dordrecht [u.a.] SN - 1573-7012 DO - 10.1007/s10842-020-00335-3 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/53454 LA - eng AB - We examine the strategic use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Cournot competition between two firms that differ in their marginal costs of production. The level of CSR determines the weight a firm puts on consumer surplus in its objective function before it decides upon supply. We show that the more efficient firm chooses a higher CSR level, reinforcing its dominant position. If there are sufficiently large fixed costs of CSR, only the more efficient firm will engage in CSR. KW - corporate social responsibility KW - cournot duopoly KW - asymmetric costs KW - heterogenous firms ER - TY - JOUR TI - Strategic corporate social responsibility, imperfect competition, and market concentration AU - Planer-Friedrich, Lisa AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2019 JO - Journal of Economics VL - 129 IS - 1 SP - 79-101 PB - Springer CY - Wien ; New York, NY SN - 1617-7134 DO - 10.1007/s00712-019-00663-x UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/112743 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Advance-Purchase Financing of Projects with Few Buyers AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2019 JO - Review of Industrial Organization VL - 57 IS - 4 SP - 909-933 PB - Springer Science + Business Media B.V. CY - Dordrecht [u.a.] SN - 1573-7160 DO - 10.1007/s11151-019-09742-1 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/53456 LA - eng ER - TY - RPRT TI - The perks of being in the smaller team : incentives in overlapping contests AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco ED - Stübben, Felix PY - 2019 PB - Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series SN - 978-3-943153-76-7 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47322 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Contests as selection mechanisms: The impact of risk aversion AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2018 JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization VL - 150 SP - 114-131 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam [u.a.] SN - 0167-2681 DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.020 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44052 LA - eng AB - We investigate how individual risk preferences affect the likelihood of selecting the more able contestant within a two-player Tullock contest. Our theoretical model yields two main predictions: First, an increase in the risk aversion of a player worsens her odds unless she already has a sufficiently large advantage. Second, if the prize money is sufficiently large, a less able but less risk averse contestant can achieve an equal or even higher probability of winning than a more able but more risk averse opponent. In a laboratory experiment we confirm both, the non-monotonic impact and the compensating effect of risk aversion on winning probabilities. Our results suggest a novel explanation for the gender gap and the optimality of limited monetary incentives in selection contests. KW - Selection contest KW - Risk aversion KW - Competitive balance KW - Gender gap ER - TY - JOUR TI - Are sequential round‐robin tournaments discriminatory? AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2018 JO - Journal of Public Economic Theory PB - Wiley-Blackwell CY - Oxford SN - 1467-9779 DO - 10.1111/jpet.12308 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44035 LA - eng AB - I examine sequential round‐robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players. Each player is matched once with each other player and each match is organized as a Tullock contest. A single prize is allocated to the player with the most matches won. I show that, depending on the position of their matches in the sequence of the tournament, the players' ex ante winning probabilities and expected payoffs differ. Compared to tournaments with matches organized as all‐pay auctions, however, discrimination is weaker and partially reversed. Moreover, aggregate effort in tournaments with suitable Tullock contests is larger than in tournaments with all‐pay auctions. The fairness of round‐robin tournaments may be improved by an endogenous sequence of matches or the requirement that players fix their effort ex ante. ER - TY - JOUR TI - How effective are advertising bans? On the demand for quality in two-sided media markets AU - Greiner, Tanja AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2018 JO - Information Economics and Policy VL - 43 SP - 48-60 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam SN - 0167-6245 DO - 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2018.01.003 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43925 LA - eng AB - We study a two-sided markets model of two competing television broadcasters that offer content of differentiated quality to ad-averse consumers and advertising space to firms. As all consumers prefer high over low quality content, competition for viewers is vertical. By contrast, competition for advertisers is horizontal, taking into account the firms’ targeted advertising motive. Analyzing the impact of an advertising ban on the high quality medium, we derive the following results: (i) total advertising volumes decrease; (ii) the viewer market share of the high-quality broadcaster and thus the equilibrium reception of high quality content decreases; (iii) welfare decreases; (iv) the low-quality broadcaster’s profits will increase if and only if ad nuisance is small compared to ad effectiveness. KW - Two-sided market KW - Advertising ban KW - Platform competition KW - Indirect network effect KW - Horizontal and vertical product differentiation ER - TY - JOUR TI - Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2017 JO - Economics Letters VL - 151 SP - 23-27 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam [u.a.] SN - 0165-1765 DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.032 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44053 LA - eng AB - We provide new experimental evidence which suggests an asymmetric discouragement effect in lottery contests with heterogeneous abilities. Compared to a symmetric contest, subjects invest less effort when facing a stronger opponent, but they invest the same when facing a weaker opponent. Our results can be explained by a simple model of disappointment aversion. KW - Asymmetric contest KW - Discouragement effect KW - Disappointment aversion KW - Laboratory experiment ER - TY - JOUR TI - Risk aversion and prudence in contests AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2017 JO - Economics Bulletin VL - 37 IS - 2 SP - 1122-1132 PB - Univ. of Illinois CY - Champaign-Urbana, Ill. SN - 1545-2921 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44021 LA - eng AB - I examine the impact of risk preferences on efforts and winning probabilities in generalized Tullock contests between two players. The theoretical analysis yields two ma in results. First, in symmetric contests, a higher common level of the agents ́ risk aversion will lead to lower aggregate effort if it comes along with an increase in downside risk aversion. Second, in many asymmetric contests, higher risk-aversion will be a disadvantage if the agent is also more downside risk-averse ER - TY - RPRT TI - Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments with Multiple Prizes AU - Laica, Christoph AU - Lauber, Arne AU - Sahm, Marco ED - Stübben, Felix PY - 2017 PB - Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series SN - 978-3-943153-50-7 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43003 LA - eng ER - TY - RPRT TI - Are sequential round-robin tournaments discriminatory? AU - Sahm, Marco ED - Stübben, Felix PY - 2017 PB - Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series SN - 978-3-943153-40-8 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42520 LA - eng ER - TY - RPRT TI - Contests as selection mechanisms: the impact of risk aversion AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco ED - Stübben, Felix PY - 2017 PB - Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series SN - 978-3-943153-47-7 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42517 LA - eng ER - TY - RPRT TI - Strategic corporate social responsibility AU - Planer-Friedrich, Lisa AU - Sahm, Marco ED - Stübben, Felix PY - 2017 PB - Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series SN - 978-3-943153-44-6 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42514 LA - eng ER - TY - RPRT TI - Risk aversion and prudence in contests AU - Sahm, Marco ED - Stübben, Felix PY - 2017 PB - Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series SN - 978-3-943153-39-2 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42501 LA - eng ER - TY - RPRT TI - Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco ED - Stübben, Felix PY - 2016 PB - Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series SN - 978-3-943153-36-1 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42518 LA - eng ER - TY - RPRT TI - Advance-purchase financing of projects with few buyers AU - Sahm, Marco ED - Stübben, Felix PY - 2016 PB - Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series SN - 978-3-943153-37-8 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42494 LA - eng ER - TY - RPRT TI - Why firms should care for all consumers AU - Planer-Friedrich, Lisa AU - Sahm, Marco ED - Stübben, Felix PY - 2016 PB - Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University CY - Bamberg T3 - BERG working paper series SN - 978-3-943153-35-4 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42483 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Reason, Intuition, and Time AU - Sahm, Marco AU - Weizsäcker, Robert K. von PY - 2015 JO - Managerial and decision economics : MDE ; the international journal of research and progress in management economics VL - 37 IS - 3 SP - 195-207 PB - Wiley CY - Chichester [u.a.] SN - 1099-1468 DO - 10.1002/mde.2711 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/21682 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Corrigendum to "Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd" AU - Sahm, Marco AU - Belleflamme, Paul AU - Lambert, Thomas AU - Schwienbacher, Armin PY - 2014 JO - Journal of Business Venturing VL - 29 IS - 5 SP - 610-611 PB - Elsevier Science Publ. CY - New York, NY SN - 0883-9026 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/21708 LA - eng ER -