TY - CHAP TI - Portfolio design in Germany AU - Sieberer, Ulrich Christian AU - Schmuck, David PY - 2026 T2 - Democracy at the crossroads - challenges for governance and representation : essays in honour of Thomas Saalfeld SP - 236-257 PB - Routledge, Taylor&Francis Group CY - London SN - 978-1-003-66024-8 DO - 10.4324/9781003660248-14 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/114612 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Colleagues or adversaries : Ministerial coordination across party lines AU - Klüser, K. Jonathan AU - Schmuck, David AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2024 SP - 517-536 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/95683 LA - eng AB - In multiparty governments, policymaking is a collaborative effort among the different incumbent parties. Often hidden by public debates about broader government policy, the necessary coordination routinely happens at the ministerial level, where ministries of different parties jointly devise viable and equitable policy solutions. However, since coordination involves substantial transaction costs, governments must carefully gauge the potential benefits. We study the political rationales that motivate governments to make this investment. We argue that coordination during the process of ministerial policy design hinges on both a conducive ministerial structure and sufficient authority. Once these conditions are met, cross-party coordination is more likely in policy areas where the implementation of government policy cannot be taken for granted. We investigate these claims, drawing on two new datasets. The first contains information about ministerial collaborations on all legislative projects sponsored by German governments, while the second maps the distribution of policy responsibilities among German ministries from 1976 until 2013, based on data about the policy briefs of all individual working units within the top-level federal executive. Given that ministries imprint their own perspective on legislation, our results are beyond administrative pedantries, but have substantial implications for the type and content of policies coalition governments formulate. KW - Ministerial coordination ER - TY - JOUR TI - Rebuilding the coalition ship at sea : how uncertainty and complexity drive the reform of portfolio design in coalition cabinets AU - Meyer, Thomas M. AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Schmuck, Simon PY - 2024 SP - 142-163 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/93535 LA - eng AB - In the government formation process, coalition partners make decisions about the inner workings of their future government. However, whether the initial allocation of competencies has the desired effects is uncertain, and deals may therefore be subject to change when the government is in office. This study analyses the frequency of changes in portfolio design (i.e. the distribution of competencies among government ministries and office holders) for 112 coalition governments in eight West European democracies (1970–2015). Its central argument is that in uncertain and complex bargaining situations, coalition partners have greater difficulty finding mutually beneficial deals, and changes to the initial allocation of payoffs are therefore more likely. The results indicate that preference divergence and strenuous coalition negotiations make portfolio design reforms more likely, but show no consistent effect of the familiarity among government parties. These findings show how the bargaining context during government formation foreshadows coalition governance over the cabinet’s life-cycle. KW - Multiparty governments KW - coalition governance KW - portfolio design KW - government formation KW - Western Europe ER - TY - JOUR TI - Rebuilding the coalition ship at sea : how uncertainty and complexity drive the reform of portfolio design in coalition cabinets AU - Meyer, Thomas M. AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Schmuck, David PY - 2024 JO - West European Politics VL - 47 IS - 1 SP - 142-163 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis CY - Basingstoke [u.a.] SN - 1743-9655 DO - 10.1080/01402382.2023.2169512 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59410 LA - eng AB - In the government formation process, coalition partners make decisions about the inner workings of their future government. However, whether the initial allocation of competencies has the desired effects is uncertain, and deals may therefore be subject to change when the government is in office. This study analyses the frequency of changes in portfolio design (i.e. the distribution of competencies among government ministries and office holders) for 112 coalition governments in eight West European democracies (1970–2015). Its central argument is that in uncertain and complex bargaining situations, coalition partners have greater difficulty finding mutually beneficial deals, and changes to the initial allocation of payoffs are therefore more likely. The results indicate that preference divergence and strenuous coalition negotiations make portfolio design reforms more likely, but show no consistent effect of the familiarity among government parties. These findings show how the bargaining context during government formation foreshadows coalition governance over the cabinet’s life-cycle. KW - Multiparty governments KW - coalition governance KW - portfolio design KW - government formation KW - Western Europe ER - TY - JOUR TI - Colleagues or adversaries : Ministerial coordination across party lines AU - Klüser, K. Jonathan AU - Schmuck, David AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2024 JO - Governance : an international journal of policy and administration VL - 37 IS - 2 SP - 517-536 PB - Wiley-Blackwell CY - Oxford SN - 1468-0491 DO - 10.1111/gove.12784 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59409 LA - eng AB - In multiparty governments, policymaking is a collaborative effort among the different incumbent parties. Often hidden by public debates about broader government policy, the necessary coordination routinely happens at the ministerial level, where ministries of different parties jointly devise viable and equitable policy solutions. However, since coordination involves substantial transaction costs, governments must carefully gauge the potential benefits. We study the political rationales that motivate governments to make this investment. We argue that coordination during the process of ministerial policy design hinges on both a conducive ministerial structure and sufficient authority. Once these conditions are met, cross-party coordination is more likely in policy areas where the implementation of government policy cannot be taken for granted. We investigate these claims, drawing on two new datasets. The first contains information about ministerial collaborations on all legislative projects sponsored by German governments, while the second maps the distribution of policy responsibilities among German ministries from 1976 until 2013, based on data about the policy briefs of all individual working units within the top-level federal executive. Given that ministries imprint their own perspective on legislation, our results are beyond administrative pedantries, but have substantial implications for the type and content of policies coalition governments formulate. KW - Ministerial coordination ER - TY - JOUR TI - Loyal lists, distinctive districts: how dissent-shirking and leisure-shirking affect mixed-candidate selection AU - Schmuck, David AU - Hohendorf, Lukas PY - 2023 JO - West European politics VL - 46 IS - 7 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis CY - Basingstoke [u.a.] SN - 0140-2382 DO - 10.1080/01402382.2022.2137310 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91671 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Being Empowered or Feeling Like a Pawn? : How Ministerial Reorganization Affects the Work Motivation of Top-Level Bureaucrats AU - Dzida, Angela AU - Schmuck, David AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2022 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54604 LA - eng AB - Regierungen schneiden häufig die Zuständigkeiten und Struktur von Ministerien neu zu, um die Ämter- und Policy-Ziele der Regierungsparteien umzusetzen oder die politische Kontrolle über die Bürokratie zu erhöhen. Aber welche Auswirkungen haben derartige Reformen auf die Arbeitsmotivation und Performanz in der Ministerialbürokratie? Auf Basis der Selbstbestimmungstheorie („self-determination theory“) ist zu erwarten, dass Reformen die Möglichkeit von Bürokrat*innen reduzieren, ihre grundlegenden psychologischen Bedürfnisse nach Kompetenz, Autonomie und sozialer Eingebundenheit zu befriedigen, was ihre Arbeitsmotivation reduzieren sollte. Dieser negative Effekt sollte schwächer ausfallen, wenn Bürokrat*innen die Reform als substanziell gerechtfertigt und langfristig vorteilhaft ansehen im Vergleich zu Reformen, die als ausschließlich machtpolitisch motiviert wahrgenommen werden. Diese theoretischen Erwartungen bestätigen sich in Interviews mit deutschen Spitzenbeamt*innen in zwei Politikfeldern (Bauwesen und Verbraucherschutz), die in jüngerer Vergangenheit wiederholt zwischen Ministerien verschoben wurden. Der Aufsatz zeigt, dass organisatorischer Wandel selbst bei Spitzenbeamt*innen Auswirkungen auf die Arbeitsmotivation hat. Diese Befunde haben weiterreichende Implikationen für unser Verständnis der Motivation und Performanz von Bürokrat*innen sowie der unbeabsichtigten Nebenwirkungen von Verwaltungsreformen. KW - Institutionenreform KW - Ministerialbürokratie KW - Self-determination theory KW - Interviews ER - TY - JOUR TI - Being Empowered or Feeling Like a Pawn? : How Ministerial Reorganization Affects the Work Motivation of Top-Level Bureaucrats AU - Dzida, Angela AU - Schmuck, David AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2022 JO - Politische Vierteljahresschrift : PVS : German political science quarterly VL - 63 IS - 3 PB - Springer CY - Berlin ; Heidelberg SN - 1862-2860 DO - 10.1007/s11615-022-00394-7 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54715 LA - eng AB - Regierungen schneiden häufig die Zuständigkeiten und Struktur von Ministerien neu zu, um die Ämter- und Policy-Ziele der Regierungsparteien umzusetzen oder die politische Kontrolle über die Bürokratie zu erhöhen. Aber welche Auswirkungen haben derartige Reformen auf die Arbeitsmotivation und Performanz in der Ministerialbürokratie? Auf Basis der Selbstbestimmungstheorie („self-determination theory“) ist zu erwarten, dass Reformen die Möglichkeit von Bürokrat*innen reduzieren, ihre grundlegenden psychologischen Bedürfnisse nach Kompetenz, Autonomie und sozialer Eingebundenheit zu befriedigen, was ihre Arbeitsmotivation reduzieren sollte. Dieser negative Effekt sollte schwächer ausfallen, wenn Bürokrat*innen die Reform als substanziell gerechtfertigt und langfristig vorteilhaft ansehen im Vergleich zu Reformen, die als ausschließlich machtpolitisch motiviert wahrgenommen werden. Diese theoretischen Erwartungen bestätigen sich in Interviews mit deutschen Spitzenbeamt*innen in zwei Politikfeldern (Bauwesen und Verbraucherschutz), die in jüngerer Vergangenheit wiederholt zwischen Ministerien verschoben wurden. Der Aufsatz zeigt, dass organisatorischer Wandel selbst bei Spitzenbeamt*innen Auswirkungen auf die Arbeitsmotivation hat. Diese Befunde haben weiterreichende Implikationen für unser Verständnis der Motivation und Performanz von Bürokrat*innen sowie der unbeabsichtigten Nebenwirkungen von Verwaltungsreformen. KW - Institutionenreform KW - Ministerialbürokratie KW - Self-determination theory KW - Interviews ER -