@misc{tull2025_112054,
  title = {Active Inference in String Diagrams : A Categorical Account of Predictive Processing and Free Energy},
  author = {Tull, Sean and Kleiner, Johannes and Smithe, Toby St Clere},
  year = {2025},
  pages = {1-41},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-112054x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/112054},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We present a categorical formulation of the cognitive frameworks of Predictive Processing and Active Inference, expressed in terms of string diagrams interpreted in a monoidal category with copying and discarding. This includes diagrammatic accounts of generative models, Bayesian updating, perception, planning, active inference, and free energy. In particular we present a diagrammatic derivation of the formula for active inference via free energy minimisation, and establish a compositionality property for free energy, allowing free energy to be applied at all levels of an agent's generative model. Aside from aiming to provide a helpful graphical language for those familiar with active inference, we conversely hope that this article may provide a concise formulation and introduction to the framework.},
  keywords = {String Diagrams}
}

@article{kleiner2025_109957,
  title = {Towards a structural turn in consciousness science},
  author = {Kleiner, Johannes},
  year = {2025},
  pages = {1-17},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-109957x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/109957},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Recent activities in virtually all fields engaged in consciousness studies indicate early signs of a structural turn, where verbal descriptions or simple formalisations of conscious experiences are replaced by structural tools, most notably mathematical spaces. My goal here is to offer three comments that, in my opinion, are essential to avoid misunderstandings in these developments early on. These comments concern metaphysical premises of structural approaches, the viability of structure-preserving mappings, and the question of what a structure of conscious experience is in the first place. I will also explain what, in my opinion, are the great promises of structural methodologies and how they might impact consciousness science at large.},
  keywords = {Quality space, Qualia space, Phenomenal space, Theory of consciousness, Structuralism, Structure-preserving mapping, Isomorphism}
}

@misc{kleiner2025_109961,
  title = {Defining Biological Naturalism},
  author = {Kleiner, Johannes},
  year = {2025},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  doi = {10.20378/irb-109961},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-109961x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/109961},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Biological naturalism, as explicated by Seth, is indispensable for a balanced and metaphysically neutral science of AI consciousness. However, most of the properties that Seth explores might not be unique to living systems. Therefore, I argue, a biological naturalist research programme in consciousness science requires an explicit definition of Biological Naturalism. I discuss how such a definition might be obtained.},
  keywords = {Biological Naturalism, Computational Functionalism}
}

@misc{kleiner2025_109959,
  title = {Mathematical Approaches in the Scientific Study of Consciousness},
  author = {Kleiner, Johannes},
  year = {2025},
  pages = {1-41},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  doi = {10.20378/irb-109959},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-109959x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/109959},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Mathematical Approaches in the Scientific Study of Consciousness},
  keywords = {Mathematical Consciousness Science, Consciousness Science}
}

@misc{kleiner2025_109960,
  title = {On the Logic of Measuring Neural Correlates of Consciousness},
  author = {Kleiner, Johannes},
  year = {2025},
  pages = {1-50},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-109960x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/109960},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {This paper presents a mathematical analysis of the logic of measuring Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCCs). Starting from the canonical definition of NCCs provided by Crick and Koch (1990) and Chalmers (2000), a series of lemmas and theorems are provided which show how NCCs can be discovered if empirical data about the co-activation of neural states and states of consciousness is available. The result of this analysis is a new method to measure NCCs, which we preliminarily call Co-Activation Analysis (CoAA), that might complement or extend existing methods such as contrastive analysis and decoding. CoAA might be of interest for experiments because it does not require data from near-threshold conditions, is compatible with all major conceptions of states of consciousness (including, e.g., micro-phenomenological notions and global states of consciousness), can be applied to most conceptions of neural or computational states (including, e.g., those provided by Predictive Processing/Active Inference, or those attained in more ecological conditions), and helps alleviate the problem of confounders. Furthermore, we show as a theorem that as far as the logic of measurement is concerned, if applied to data from contrastive analysis studies, CoAA improves upon the result provided by contrastive analysis. The paper is a purely theoretical contribution. It is presented in the hope that the mathematics developed here can support and improve the empirical search for NCCs.},
  keywords = {Neural Correlates of Consciousness, Contrastive Analysis}
}

@misc{kleiner2025_109958,
  title = {The Newman Problem of Consciousness Science},
  author = {Kleiner, Johannes},
  year = {2025},
  pages = {1-17},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-109958x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/109958},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {The Newman problem is a fundamental problem that threatens to undermine structural assumptions and structural theories throughout philosophy and science. Here, we consider the problem in the context of consciousness science. We introduce and discuss the problem, and explain why it is detrimental not only to structuralist assumptions, but also to theories of consciousness, if left unconsidered. However, we show that if phenomenal spaces, and mathematical structures of conscious experience more generally, are understood in the right way, the Newman problem does not arise. The upshot of our paper is that consciousness science needs to be careful in which definition of structure to consider, but if it is, the Newman problem disappears.},
  keywords = {Newman Problem, Consciousness Science, Theories of Consciousness, Epistemic Phenomenal Structural Realism, Ontic Phenomenal Structural Realism}
}

@article{finster2025_109954,
  title = {Causal Fermion Systems as an Effective Collapse Theory},
  author = {Finster, Felix and Kleiner, Johannes and Paganini, Claudio F.},
  year = {2025},
  pages = {1-38},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-109954x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/109954},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {It is shown that, in the non-relativistic limit, causal fermion systems give rise to an effective collapse theory. The nonlinear and stochastic correction terms to the Schrödinger equation are derived from the causal action principle. The dynamics of the statistical operator is described by a deterministic equation of Kossakowski-Lindblad form. Moreover, the quantum state undergoes a dynamical collapse compatible with the Born rule. The effective model has similarities with the continuous spontaneous localization model, but differs from it by a conservation law for the probability integral as well as a non-locality in time on a microscopic length scale \ell\_\{\min\}.},
  keywords = {Causal fermion systems, effective collapse theory}
}

@article{kleiner2025_109956,
  title = {The case for neurons : a no-go theorem for consciousness on a chip},
  author = {Kleiner, Johannes and Ludwig, Tim},
  year = {2025},
  pages = {1-11},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-109956x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/109956},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We apply the methodology of no-go theorems as developed in physics to the question of artificial consciousness. The result is a no-go theorem which shows that under a general assumption, called dynamical relevance, Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems that run on contemporary computer chips cannot be conscious. Consciousness is dynamically relevant, simply put, if, according to a theory of consciousness, it is relevant for the temporal evolution of a system’s states. The no-go theorem rests on facts about semiconductor development: that AI systems run on central processing units, graphics processing units, tensor processing units, or other processors which have been designed and verified to adhere to computational dynamics that systematically preclude or suppress deviations. Whether our result resolves the question of AI consciousness on contemporary processors depends on the truth of the theorem’s main assumption, dynamical relevance, which this paper does not establish.},
  keywords = {Artificial Consciousness, Synthetic Phenomenology, Artificial Sentience, Machine Consciousness, No-Go Theorem, Artificial Intelligence, Large Language Model}
}

@article{kleiner2025_109955,
  title = {What is a mathematical structure of conscious experience?},
  author = {Kleiner, Johannes and Ludwig, Tim},
  year = {2025},
  pages = {1-23},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-109955x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/109955},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Several promising approaches have been developed to represent conscious experience in terms of mathematical spaces and structures. What is missing, however, is an explicit definition of what a ‘mathematical structure of conscious experience’ is. Here, we propose such a definition. This definition provides a link between the abstract formal entities of mathematics and the concreta of conscious experience; it complements recent approaches that study quality spaces, qualia spaces, or phenomenal spaces; and it provides a general method to identify and investigate structures of conscious experience. We hope that ultimately this work provides a basis for developing a common formal language to study consciousness},
  keywords = {Quality spaces, qualia spaces, phenomenal spaces, perceptual spaces, Q-spaces, structuralism}
}

@misc{kleiner2025_110033,
  title = {On the Logic of Measuring Neural Correlates of Consciousness},
  author = {Kleiner, Johannes},
  year = {2025},
  pages = {1-50},
  publisher = {Center for Open Science},
  doi = {10.31234/osf.io/p9ca3\_v1},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/110033},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {This paper presents a mathematical analysis of the logic of measuring Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCCs). Starting from the canonical definition of NCCs provided by Crick and Koch (1990) and Chalmers (2000), a series of lemmas and theorems are provided which show how NCCs can be discovered if empirical data about the co-activation of neural states and states of consciousness is available. The result of this analysis is a new method to measure NCCs, which we preliminarily call Co-Activation Analysis (CoAA), that might complement or extend existing methods such as contrastive analysis and decoding. CoAA might be of interest for experiments because it does not require data from near-threshold conditions, is compatible with all major conceptions of states of consciousness (including, e.g., micro-phenomenological notions and global states of consciousness), can be applied to most conceptions of neural or computational states (including, e.g., those provided by Predictive Processing/Active Inference, or those attained in more ecological conditions), and helps alleviate the problem of confounders. Furthermore, we show as a theorem that as far as the logic of measurement is concerned, if applied to data from contrastive analysis studies, CoAA improves upon the result provided by contrastive analysis. The paper is a purely theoretical contribution. It is presented in the hope that the mathematics developed here can support and improve the empirical search for NCCs.},
  keywords = {Neural Correlates of Consciousness, Contrastive Analysis}
}

@phdthesis{kleiner2025_110031,
  title = {Topics in mathematical consciousness science},
  author = {Kleiner, Johannes},
  year = {2025},
  pages = {iv, 123},
  publisher = {Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität},
  address = {München},
  doi = {10.5282/edoc.35420},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/110031},
  language = {eng},
  school = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg}
}

@misc{kleiner2024_110032,
  title = {The Newman Problem of Consciousness Science},
  author = {Kleiner, Johannes},
  year = {2024},
  pages = {1-17},
  publisher = {PhilArchive},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/110032},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {The Newman problem is a fundamental problem that threatens to undermine structural assumptions and structural theories throughout philosophy and science. Here, we consider the problem in the context of consciousness science. We introduce and discuss the problem, and explain why it is detrimental not only to structuralist assumptions, but also to theories of consciousness, if left unconsidered. However, we show that if phenomenal spaces, and mathematical structures of conscious experience more generally, are understood in the right way, the Newman problem does not arise. The upshot of our paper is that consciousness science needs to be careful in which definition of structure to consider, but if it is, the Newman problem disappears.},
  keywords = {Newman Problem, Consciousness Science, Theories of Consciousness, Epistemic Phenomenal Structural Realism, Ontic Phenomenal Structural Realism}
}

@misc{kleiner2024_105586,
  title = {Consciousness qua Mortal Computation},
  author = {Kleiner, Johannes},
  year = {2024},
  publisher = {arXiv},
  doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2403.03925},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/105586},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{kleiner2024_105585,
  title = {What is a mathematical structure of conscious experience?},
  author = {Kleiner, Johannes and Ludwig, Tim},
  year = {2024},
  journal = {Synthese : an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science},
  volume = {203},
  number = {3, 89},
  pages = {1-23},
  publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
  address = {Dordrecht [u.a.]},
  issn = {1573-0964},
  doi = {10.1007/s11229-024-04503-4},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/105585},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Several promising approaches have been developed to represent conscious experience in terms of mathematical spaces and structures. What is missing, however, is an explicit definition of what a ‘mathematical structure of conscious experience’ is. Here, we propose such a definition. This definition provides a link between the abstract formal entities of mathematics and the concreta of conscious experience; it complements recent approaches that study quality spaces, qualia spaces, or phenomenal spaces; and it provides a general method to identify and investigate structures of conscious experience. We hope that ultimately this work provides a basis for developing a common formal language to study consciousness},
  keywords = {Quality spaces, qualia spaces, phenomenal spaces, perceptual spaces, Q-spaces, structuralism}
}

@article{kleiner2024_105584,
  title = {Towards a structural turn in consciousness science},
  author = {Kleiner, Johannes},
  year = {2024},
  journal = {Consciousness and cognition : an international journal},
  volume = {119},
  number = {103653},
  pages = {1-17},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {1053-8100},
  doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2024.103653},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/105584},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Recent activities in virtually all fields engaged in consciousness studies indicate early signs of a structural turn, where verbal descriptions or simple formalisations of conscious experiences are replaced by structural tools, most notably mathematical spaces. My goal here is to offer three comments that, in my opinion, are essential to avoid misunderstandings in these developments early on. These comments concern metaphysical premises of structural approaches, the viability of structure-preserving mappings, and the question of what a structure of conscious experience is in the first place. I will also explain what, in my opinion, are the great promises of structural methodologies and how they might impact consciousness science at large.},
  keywords = {Quality space, Qualia space, Phenomenal space, Theory of consciousness, Structuralism, Structure-preserving mapping, Isomorphism}
}

@article{kleiner2024_105581,
  title = {The case for neurons : a no-go theorem for consciousness on a chip},
  author = {Kleiner, Johannes and Ludwig, Tim},
  year = {2024},
  journal = {Neuroscience of Consciousness},
  volume = {2024},
  number = {1, niae037},
  pages = {1-11},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  address = {Oxford},
  issn = {2057-2107},
  doi = {10.1093/nc/niae037},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/105581},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We apply the methodology of no-go theorems as developed in physics to the question of artificial consciousness. The result is a no-go theorem which shows that under a general assumption, called dynamical relevance, Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems that run on contemporary computer chips cannot be conscious. Consciousness is dynamically relevant, simply put, if, according to a theory of consciousness, it is relevant for the temporal evolution of a system’s states. The no-go theorem rests on facts about semiconductor development: that AI systems run on central processing units, graphics processing units, tensor processing units, or other processors which have been designed and verified to adhere to computational dynamics that systematically preclude or suppress deviations. Whether our result resolves the question of AI consciousness on contemporary processors depends on the truth of the theorem’s main assumption, dynamical relevance, which this paper does not establish.},
  keywords = {Artificial Consciousness, Synthetic Phenomenology, Artificial Sentience, Machine Consciousness, No-Go Theorem, Artificial Intelligence, Large Language Model}
}

@article{finster2024_105589,
  title = {Causal Fermion Systems as an Effective Collapse Theory},
  author = {Finster, Felix and Kleiner, Johannes and Paganini, Claudio F.},
  year = {2024},
  journal = {Journal of Physics A : Mathematical and Theoretical},
  volume = {57},
  number = {39, 395303},
  publisher = {IOP Publishing},
  address = {Bristol},
  issn = {1751-8113},
  doi = {10.1088/1751-8121/ad7655},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/105589},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {It is shown that, in the non-relativistic limit, causal fermion systems give rise to an effective collapse theory. The nonlinear and stochastic correction terms to the Schrödinger equation are derived from the causal action principle. The dynamics of the statistical operator is described by a deterministic equation of Kossakowski-Lindblad form. Moreover, the quantum state undergoes a dynamical collapse compatible with the Born rule. The effective model has similarities with the continuous spontaneous localization model, but differs from it by a conservation law for the probability integral as well as a non-locality in time on a microscopic length scale \ell\_\{\min\}.},
  keywords = {Causal fermion systems, effective collapse theory}
}

@misc{kleiner2023_109953,
  title = {The Closure of the Physical, Consciousness and Scientific Practice},
  author = {Kleiner, Johannes and Hartmann, Stephan},
  year = {2023},
  pages = {1-15},
  publisher = {arXiv},
  doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2110.03518},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/109953},
  language = {eng}
}

@misc{tull2023_105583,
  title = {Active Inference in String Diagrams : A Categorical Account of Predictive Processing and Free Energy},
  author = {Tull, Sean and Kleiner, Johannes and Smithe, Toby St Clere},
  year = {2023},
  pages = {1-41},
  publisher = {arXiv},
  doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2308.00861},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/105583},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We present a categorical formulation of the cognitive frameworks of Predictive Processing and Active Inference, expressed in terms of string diagrams interpreted in a monoidal category with copying and discarding. This includes diagrammatic accounts of generative models, Bayesian updating, perception, planning, active inference, and free energy. In particular we present a diagrammatic derivation of the formula for active inference via free energy minimisation, and establish a compositionality property for free energy, allowing free energy to be applied at all levels of an agent's generative model. Aside from aiming to provide a helpful graphical language for those familiar with active inference, we conversely hope that this article may provide a concise formulation and introduction to the framework.},
  keywords = {String Diagrams}
}

