@incollection{sieberer2026_114612,
  title = {Portfolio design in Germany},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich Christian and Schmuck, David},
  year = {2026},
  booktitle = {Democracy at the crossroads - challenges for governance and representation : essays in honour of Thomas Saalfeld},
  pages = {236-257},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor\&Francis Group},
  address = {London},
  isbn = {978-1-003-66024-8},
  doi = {10.4324/9781003660248-14},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/114612},
  language = {eng}
}

@incollection{sieberer2025_111785,
  title = {Slicing the pie : Portfolio design and coalition governments},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich Christian},
  year = {2025},
  booktitle = {Handbook on Coalition Politics},
  pages = {368-381},
  publisher = {Edward Elgar},
  address = {Cheltenham},
  edition = {1},
  isbn = {9781803929552},
  doi = {10.4337/9781803929569.00032},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/111785},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{frech2025_111518,
  title = {Einblicke in die Konsensschmiede des Parlaments : Die Präsidialkonferenz im Österreichischen Nationalrat},
  author = {Frech, Elena and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2025},
  pages = {1-14},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-111518x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/111518},
  language = {deu},
  abstract = {Parlamente sind Arenen des politischen Streits, bedürfen aber gleichzeitig eines allgemein akzeptierten Grundkonsenses und dessen konkreter Umsetzung in organisatorischen Fragen wie der Gestaltung der Tagesordnung und dem Umgang mit prozeduralen Konflikten. Zur Lösung solcher Konflikte nutzen viele Parlamente Koordinationsausschüsse bestehend aus Mitgliedern des Präsidiums und Vertreter:innen der Parlamentsfraktionen. Dieser Aufsatz untersucht die Präsidialkonferenz (PK) im österreichischen Nationalrat als ein solches Gremium auf Grundlage detaillierter Interviews mit seinen Mitgliedern. Welche Rolle spielt die PK bei der Agendasetzung im Nationalrat und über welche Mechanismen gelingt es ihr, einen prozeduralen Grundkonsens herzustellen und zu reproduzieren? Die Analyse zeigt, dass die PK und die vorbereitende informelle Runde der Klubdirektor:innen vor allem die Zeitplanagenda des Nationalrats bestimmt und als Koordinationsgremium für verschiedenste prozedurale und organisatorische Themen dient. Die hochgradig konsensuelle Interaktion in der PK erklärt sich durch sechs institutionelle, persönlichkeitsorientierte und interaktionsbasierte Mechanismen, darunter die strikte Trennung von prozeduralen und politisch-inhaltlichen Entscheidungen, die Orientierung an Präzedenzfällen, die Antizipation von Obstruktionsmöglichkeiten, ein konsensorientiertes Rollenverständnis der Mitglieder und die wiederholte Interaktion in einer kleinen, vertraulichen und hochgradig professionalisierten Gruppe. Diese theoretischen Mechanismen sind über den Nationalrat hinaus generalisierbar und zeigen, wie parlamentarische Organisation auch unter Bedingungen politischer Polarisierung einen stabilen und fairen Parlamentarismus fördern kann.},
  keywords = {Parlament, Agendasetzung, Geschäftsordnung, Konsensbildung}
}

@article{frech2025_111569,
  title = {Einblicke in die Konsensschmiede des Parlaments : Die Präsidialkonferenz im Österreichischen Nationalrat},
  author = {Frech, Elena and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2025},
  journal = {Austrian journal of political science : OZP},
  volume = {54},
  number = {2},
  pages = {1-14},
  publisher = {Innsbruck University Press},
  address = {Innsbruck},
  issn = {2313-5433},
  doi = {10.15203/4224.vol54.2025},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/111569},
  language = {deu},
  abstract = {Parlamente sind Arenen des politischen Streits, bedürfen aber gleichzeitig eines allgemein akzeptierten Grundkonsenses und dessen konkreter Umsetzung in organisatorischen Fragen wie der Gestaltung der Tagesordnung und dem Umgang mit prozeduralen Konflikten. Zur Lösung solcher Konflikte nutzen viele Parlamente Koordinationsausschüsse bestehend aus Mitgliedern des Präsidiums und Vertreter:innen der Parlamentsfraktionen. Dieser Aufsatz untersucht die Präsidialkonferenz (PK) im österreichischen Nationalrat als ein solches Gremium auf Grundlage detaillierter Interviews mit seinen Mitgliedern. Welche Rolle spielt die PK bei der Agendasetzung im Nationalrat und über welche Mechanismen gelingt es ihr, einen prozeduralen Grundkonsens herzustellen und zu reproduzieren? Die Analyse zeigt, dass die PK und die vorbereitende informelle Runde der Klubdirektor:innen vor allem die Zeitplanagenda des Nationalrats bestimmt und als Koordinationsgremium für verschiedenste prozedurale und organisatorische Themen dient. Die hochgradig konsensuelle Interaktion in der PK erklärt sich durch sechs institutionelle, persönlichkeitsorientierte und interaktionsbasierte Mechanismen, darunter die strikte Trennung von prozeduralen und politisch-inhaltlichen Entscheidungen, die Orientierung an Präzedenzfällen, die Antizipation von Obstruktionsmöglichkeiten, ein konsensorientiertes Rollenverständnis der Mitglieder und die wiederholte Interaktion in einer kleinen, vertraulichen und hochgradig professionalisierten Gruppe. Diese theoretischen Mechanismen sind über den Nationalrat hinaus generalisierbar und zeigen, wie parlamentarische Organisation auch unter Bedingungen politischer Polarisierung einen stabilen und fairen Parlamentarismus fördern kann.},
  keywords = {Parlament, Agendasetzung, Geschäftsordnung, Konsensbildung}
}

@article{sieberer2024_96197,
  title = {Die stabilisierende Wirkung politischen Wettbewerbs : warum parlamentarische Mehrheiten Minderheitenrechte kaum fundamental beschneiden und teils sogar ausbauen},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2024},
  pages = {247-252 Seiten},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-961976},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/96197},
  language = {deu},
  abstract = {Entscheidungen von politischen Akteuren „in eigener Sache“ werden in Öffentlichkeit und Wissenschaft zu Recht kritisch betrachtet. Führen diese nicht zwangsläufig dazu, dass politische Parteien eigene Interessen verfolgen und damit Gemeinwohlüberlegungen auf der Strecke bleiben? Diese Frage stellt sich besonders bei Themen wie der Parteienfinanzierung, in denen Parteien gemeinsame Interessen haben und diese im Sinne einer Kartelllogik auf Kosten der Gesamtgesellschaft durchsetzen können. Ohne die Relevanz dieser Problematik abzustreiten, argumentiert dieser Beitrag, dass Entscheidungen in eigener Sache weniger problematisch sein können, wenn sie dem politischen Wettbewerb unterworfen sind und illustriert diese Logik am Fall parlamentarischer Geschäftsordnungsreformen, die Minderheitenrechte im Parlament verändern.},
  keywords = {Parlamentarische Regeln, Minderheitenrechte, Institutionenwandel, politischer Wettbewerb}
}

@article{kluser2024_95683,
  title = {Colleagues or adversaries : Ministerial coordination across party lines},
  author = {Klüser, K. Jonathan and Schmuck, David and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2024},
  pages = {517-536},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-956836},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/95683},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {In multiparty governments, policymaking is a collaborative effort among the different incumbent parties. Often hidden by public debates about broader government policy, the necessary coordination routinely happens at the ministerial level, where ministries of different parties jointly devise viable and equitable policy solutions. However, since coordination involves substantial transaction costs, governments must carefully gauge the potential benefits. We study the political rationales that motivate governments to make this investment. We argue that coordination during the process of ministerial policy design hinges on both a conducive ministerial structure and sufficient authority. Once these conditions are met, cross-party coordination is more likely in policy areas where the implementation of government policy cannot be taken for granted. We investigate these claims, drawing on two new datasets. The first contains information about ministerial collaborations on all legislative projects sponsored by German governments, while the second maps the distribution of policy responsibilities among German ministries from 1976 until 2013, based on data about the policy briefs of all individual working units within the top-level federal executive. Given that ministries imprint their own perspective on legislation, our results are beyond administrative pedantries, but have substantial implications for the type and content of policies coalition governments formulate.},
  keywords = {Ministerial coordination}
}

@article{meyer2024_93535,
  title = {Rebuilding the coalition ship at sea : how uncertainty and complexity drive the reform of portfolio design in coalition cabinets},
  author = {Meyer, Thomas M. and Sieberer, Ulrich and Schmuck, Simon},
  year = {2024},
  pages = {142-163},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-935357},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/93535},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {In the government formation process, coalition partners make decisions about the inner workings of their future government. However, whether the initial allocation of competencies has the desired effects is uncertain, and deals may therefore be subject to change when the government is in office. This study analyses the frequency of changes in portfolio design (i.e. the distribution of competencies among government ministries and office holders) for 112 coalition governments in eight West European democracies (1970–2015). Its central argument is that in uncertain and complex bargaining situations, coalition partners have greater difficulty finding mutually beneficial deals, and changes to the initial allocation of payoffs are therefore more likely. The results indicate that preference divergence and strenuous coalition negotiations make portfolio design reforms more likely, but show no consistent effect of the familiarity among government parties. These findings show how the bargaining context during government formation foreshadows coalition governance over the cabinet’s life-cycle.},
  keywords = {Multiparty governments, coalition governance, portfolio design, government formation, Western Europe}
}

@article{hohendorf2024_92391,
  title = {Recorded votes as attention booster : how opposition parties use roll-calls and non-recorded votes for position-taking in the German Bundestag, 2017-2021},
  author = {Hohendorf, Lukas and Sieberer, Ulrich and Wenzig, Jonas},
  year = {2024},
  pages = {649-671},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-923919},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/92391},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {The article investigates roll-call request and its effects on opposition-voting behavior. It argues that parties use roll-call votes (RCVs) as a position-taking instrument to boost public attention for issues they care about. This argument implies that RCVs are requested strategically but opposition behavior should not differ systematically between recorded and nonrecorded votes. Studying all voting activities of the 19th German Bundestag (2017–21), the analysis shows that RCVs are more likely on  high-salience issues, more important motion types, and to some extent opposition motions. Voting conforms to the position-taking model as opposition parties are less likely to vote with the government on their own motions and more important motion types. However, opposition behavior does not differ systematically between recorded and nonrecorded votes suggesting that parties act consistently across all votes. Thus, RCVs provide valid measures for studying interparty competition in parliament despite their selective sampling properties.},
  keywords = {roll call votes, legislative behavior, Bundestag, Germany, Political Science}
}

@article{hohendorf2024_92466,
  title = {Recorded votes as attention booster : how opposition parties use roll calls and nonrecorded votes for position taking in the German Bundestag, 2017–21},
  author = {Hohendorf, Lukas and Sieberer, Ulrich and Wenzig, Jonas},
  year = {2024},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  volume = {49},
  number = {3},
  pages = {649-671},
  publisher = {Wiley},
  address = {Hoboken, NJ},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12442},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/92466},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {The article investigates roll-call request and its effects on opposition-voting behavior. It argues that parties use roll-call votes (RCVs) as a position-taking instrument to boost public attention for issues they care about. This argument implies that RCVs are requested strategically but opposition behavior should not differ systematically between recorded and nonrecorded votes. Studying all voting activities of the 19th German Bundestag (2017–21), the analysis shows that RCVs are more likely on  high-salience issues, more important motion types, and to some extent opposition motions. Voting conforms to the position-taking model as opposition parties are less likely to vote with the government on their own motions and more important motion types. However, opposition behavior does not differ systematically between recorded and nonrecorded votes suggesting that parties act consistently across all votes. Thus, RCVs provide valid measures for studying interparty competition in parliament despite their selective sampling properties.},
  keywords = {roll call votes, legislative behavior, Bundestag, Germany, Political Science}
}

@article{meyer2024_59410,
  title = {Rebuilding the coalition ship at sea : how uncertainty and complexity drive the reform of portfolio design in coalition cabinets},
  author = {Meyer, Thomas M. and Sieberer, Ulrich and Schmuck, David},
  year = {2024},
  journal = {West European Politics},
  volume = {47},
  number = {1},
  pages = {142-163},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis},
  address = {Basingstoke [u.a.]},
  issn = {1743-9655},
  doi = {10.1080/01402382.2023.2169512},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59410},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {In the government formation process, coalition partners make decisions about the inner workings of their future government. However, whether the initial allocation of competencies has the desired effects is uncertain, and deals may therefore be subject to change when the government is in office. This study analyses the frequency of changes in portfolio design (i.e. the distribution of competencies among government ministries and office holders) for 112 coalition governments in eight West European democracies (1970–2015). Its central argument is that in uncertain and complex bargaining situations, coalition partners have greater difficulty finding mutually beneficial deals, and changes to the initial allocation of payoffs are therefore more likely. The results indicate that preference divergence and strenuous coalition negotiations make portfolio design reforms more likely, but show no consistent effect of the familiarity among government parties. These findings show how the bargaining context during government formation foreshadows coalition governance over the cabinet’s life-cycle.},
  keywords = {Multiparty governments, coalition governance, portfolio design, government formation, Western Europe}
}

@article{kluser2024_59409,
  title = {Colleagues or adversaries : Ministerial coordination across party lines},
  author = {Klüser, K. Jonathan and Schmuck, David and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2024},
  journal = {Governance : an international journal of policy and administration},
  volume = {37},
  number = {2},
  pages = {517-536},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  address = {Oxford},
  issn = {1468-0491},
  doi = {10.1111/gove.12784},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59409},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {In multiparty governments, policymaking is a collaborative effort among the different incumbent parties. Often hidden by public debates about broader government policy, the necessary coordination routinely happens at the ministerial level, where ministries of different parties jointly devise viable and equitable policy solutions. However, since coordination involves substantial transaction costs, governments must carefully gauge the potential benefits. We study the political rationales that motivate governments to make this investment. We argue that coordination during the process of ministerial policy design hinges on both a conducive ministerial structure and sufficient authority. Once these conditions are met, cross-party coordination is more likely in policy areas where the implementation of government policy cannot be taken for granted. We investigate these claims, drawing on two new datasets. The first contains information about ministerial collaborations on all legislative projects sponsored by German governments, while the second maps the distribution of policy responsibilities among German ministries from 1976 until 2013, based on data about the policy briefs of all individual working units within the top-level federal executive. Given that ministries imprint their own perspective on legislation, our results are beyond administrative pedantries, but have substantial implications for the type and content of policies coalition governments formulate.},
  keywords = {Ministerial coordination}
}

@article{sieberer2023_96519,
  title = {Die stabilisierende Wirkung politischen Wettbewerbs : warum parlamentarische Mehrheiten Minderheitenrechte kaum fundamental beschneiden und teils sogar ausbauen},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2023},
  journal = {Zeitschrift für Parteienwissenschaften : MIP},
  volume = {2023},
  number = {2 - Sonderausgabe „Parlamentsentscheidungen in eigener Sache“ in Kooperation mit Verfassungsblog und Stiftung Wissenschaft \& Demokratie},
  pages = {247-252},
  publisher = {Institut für Deutsches und Internationales Parteienrecht und Parteienforschung},
  address = {Düsseldorf},
  issn = {2628-3778},
  doi = {10.24338/mip-2023247-252},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/96519},
  language = {deu},
  abstract = {Entscheidungen von politischen Akteuren „in eigener Sache“ werden in Öffentlichkeit und Wissenschaft zu Recht kritisch betrachtet. Führen diese nicht zwangsläufig dazu, dass politische Parteien eigene Interessen verfolgen und damit Gemeinwohlüberlegungen auf der Strecke bleiben? Diese Frage stellt sich besonders bei Themen wie der Parteienfinanzierung, in denen Parteien gemeinsame Interessen haben und diese im Sinne einer Kartelllogik auf Kosten der Gesamtgesellschaft durchsetzen können. Ohne die Relevanz dieser Problematik abzustreiten, argumentiert dieser Beitrag, dass Entscheidungen in eigener Sache weniger problematisch sein können, wenn sie dem politischen Wettbewerb unterworfen sind und illustriert diese Logik am Fall parlamentarischer Geschäftsordnungsreformen, die Minderheitenrechte im Parlament verändern.},
  keywords = {Parlamentarische Regeln, Minderheitenrechte, Institutionenwandel, politischer Wettbewerb}
}

@article{frech2023_92526,
  title = {Coordination Committees and Legislative Agenda-Setting Power in 31 European Parliaments},
  author = {Frech, Elena and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2023},
  pages = {189-208},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  series = {Historical Social Research Vol. 48, No. 3 (2023)},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-925269},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/92526},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Agenda setting determines whether and how topics are discussed and voted in parliament. Many parliaments delegate this task to a specific body charged with coordinating parliamentary business. However, we know little about the composition and powers of these “coordination committees” (CC). This paper maps the existence, composition, and institutional powers of coordination committees across 31 European parliaments. It shows that CCs exist in most parliaments and have a relatively similar composition, usually including the president of parliament, their deputies, and party group representatives, but vary strongly in their agenda-setting powers. Exploring whether this variation is related to the functional need for coordination, we find limited evidence that larger sizes of parliaments and higher ideological polarization between parties are associated with stronger coordination committees. In terms of this HSR Special Issue, we show that CCs as horizontal collective actors exist even in a hierarchical organization such as a parliament and have relevant, albeit variable, resources.},
  keywords = {agenda setting, collective actors, institutional power, European democracies}
}

@article{frech2023_92542,
  title = {Coordination Committees and Legislative Agenda-Setting Power in 31 European Parliaments},
  author = {Frech, Elena and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2023},
  journal = {Historical Social Research},
  volume = {48},
  number = {3},
  pages = {189-208},
  publisher = {GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences},
  address = {Mannheim},
  issn = {0172-6404},
  doi = {10.12759/hsr.48.2023.30},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/92542},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Agenda setting determines whether and how topics are discussed and voted in parliament. Many parliaments delegate this task to a specific body charged with coordinating parliamentary business. However, we know little about the composition and powers of these “coordination committees” (CC). This paper maps the existence, composition, and institutional powers of coordination committees across 31 European parliaments. It shows that CCs exist in most parliaments and have a relatively similar composition, usually including the president of parliament, their deputies, and party group representatives, but vary strongly in their agenda-setting powers. Exploring whether this variation is related to the functional need for coordination, we find limited evidence that larger sizes of parliaments and higher ideological polarization between parties are associated with stronger coordination committees. In terms of this HSR Special Issue, we show that CCs as horizontal collective actors exist even in a hierarchical organization such as a parliament and have relevant, albeit variable, resources.},
  keywords = {agenda setting, collective actors, institutional power, European democracies}
}

@misc{sieberer2023_58705,
  title = {Willumsen, David M., The acceptance of party unity in parliamentary democracies / David M. Willumsen. - First edition : Oxford, 2017. - xvii, 174 Seiten : Illustrationen, Diagramme},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2023},
  pages = {266-267},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-587050},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/58705},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {.},
  keywords = {book review}
}

@article{sieberer2023_58704,
  title = {The basic space of a revolutionary parliament : Scaling the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848/49},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Herrmann, Michael},
  year = {2023},
  pages = {841-853},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-587042},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/58704},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We examine whether there is a basic space in a parliament which grew out of a revolution and had no prior history of parliamentarism: the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848/49. We scale all 299 roll call votes to determine the dimensionality of voting as well as the positions of deputies and their party groups. We find two dimensions of disagreement and show that they can be interpreted in line with historical scholarship as conflict over who should govern (the people or the monarch) and conflict over state borders (inclusion or exclusion of Austria). We find that the party groups line up on the first dimension in ways consistent with historical scholarship on their political inclinations, but we also find wide variation in deputies’ positions within and across parties. Moreover, deputies’ positions turn out to be polarized on the territorial dimension but not on the government dimension. We conclude that ideological constraint was the primary structuring force in parliamentary voting. Our results underscore the pervasiveness of low dimensionality in parliamentary voting even in the absence of strong parties and agenda control.},
  keywords = {Germany, ideal point estimation, ideology, 19th century, roll call voting}
}

@misc{sieberer2022_111172,
  title = {Schindler, Daniel, Politische Führung im Fraktionenparlament: Rolle und Steuerungsmöglichkeiten der Fraktionsvorsitzenden im Deutschen Bundestag: Baden-Baden, 2019},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {31},
  number = {4},
  pages = {627-628},
  publisher = {Taylor and Francis},
  address = {London},
  issn = {1743-8993},
  doi = {10.1080/09644008.2021.1907515},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/111172},
  language = {eng}
}

@incollection{sieberer2022_59411,
  title = {Der Bundestag als Arena : Institutionelle Macht, Akteursanreize und selektive Nutzungsmuster},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2022},
  booktitle = {Politische Akteure und Institutionen in Deutschland : eine forschungsorientierte Einführung in das politische System},
  pages = {135-154},
  publisher = {Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden},
  address = {Wiesbaden},
  edition = {1},
  isbn = {978-3-658-37553-9},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-658-37553-9\_7},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59411},
  language = {deu}
}

@article{dzida2022_54604,
  title = {Being Empowered or Feeling Like a Pawn? : How Ministerial Reorganization Affects the Work Motivation of Top-Level Bureaucrats},
  author = {Dzida, Angela and Schmuck, David and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2022},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-546047},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54604},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Regierungen schneiden häufig die Zuständigkeiten und Struktur von Ministerien neu zu, um die Ämter- und Policy-Ziele der Regierungsparteien umzusetzen oder die politische Kontrolle über die Bürokratie zu erhöhen. Aber welche Auswirkungen haben derartige Reformen auf die Arbeitsmotivation und Performanz in der Ministerialbürokratie? Auf Basis der Selbstbestimmungstheorie („self-determination theory“) ist zu erwarten, dass Reformen die Möglichkeit von Bürokrat*innen reduzieren, ihre grundlegenden psychologischen Bedürfnisse nach Kompetenz, Autonomie und sozialer Eingebundenheit zu befriedigen, was ihre Arbeitsmotivation reduzieren sollte. Dieser negative Effekt sollte schwächer ausfallen, wenn Bürokrat*innen die Reform als substanziell gerechtfertigt und langfristig vorteilhaft ansehen im Vergleich zu Reformen, die als ausschließlich machtpolitisch motiviert wahrgenommen werden. Diese theoretischen Erwartungen bestätigen sich in Interviews mit deutschen Spitzenbeamt*innen in zwei Politikfeldern (Bauwesen und Verbraucherschutz), die in jüngerer Vergangenheit wiederholt zwischen Ministerien verschoben wurden. Der Aufsatz zeigt, dass organisatorischer Wandel selbst bei Spitzenbeamt*innen Auswirkungen auf die Arbeitsmotivation hat. Diese Befunde haben weiterreichende Implikationen für unser Verständnis der Motivation und Performanz von Bürokrat*innen sowie der unbeabsichtigten Nebenwirkungen von
Verwaltungsreformen.},
  keywords = {Institutionenreform, Ministerialbürokratie, Self-determination theory, Interviews}
}

@article{sieberer2022_54885,
  title = {Do party system parameters explain differences in legislative organization? : Fragmentation, polarization, and the density of regulation in European parliaments, 1945–2009},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Höhmann, Daniel},
  year = {2022},
  pages = {597-610},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-548850},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54885},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {The article studies whether the party system characteristics fragmentation and ideological polarization increase the density of institutional regulation in parliaments. It introduces a comprehensive time-series-cross-sectional dataset of standing orders in 15 Western European parliaments that allows studying how densely various fields of legislative activity such as lawmaking, controlling the government, and creating publicity were regulated over a period of more than 60 years. Descriptively, the data show increased regulation in all areas but also some variation between countries. Dynamic panel regression analyses for non-stationary time series find no systematic effect of fragmentation or polarization on the density of regulation indicating that large parts of legislative organization change for reasons unrelated to party system dynamics. We identify changes in the environment of legislatures such as increasing complexity and professionalization of politics, technological change, and Europeanization as potential drivers of such Pareto-efficient reforms.},
  keywords = {legislative organization, parliamentary rules, party systems,, polarization, Western Europe}
}

@article{dzida2022_54715,
  title = {Being Empowered or Feeling Like a Pawn? : How Ministerial Reorganization Affects the Work Motivation of Top-Level Bureaucrats},
  author = {Dzida, Angela and Schmuck, David and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2022},
  journal = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift : PVS : German political science quarterly},
  volume = {63},
  number = {3},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address = {Berlin ; Heidelberg},
  issn = {1862-2860},
  doi = {10.1007/s11615-022-00394-7},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54715},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Regierungen schneiden häufig die Zuständigkeiten und Struktur von Ministerien neu zu, um die Ämter- und Policy-Ziele der Regierungsparteien umzusetzen oder die politische Kontrolle über die Bürokratie zu erhöhen. Aber welche Auswirkungen haben derartige Reformen auf die Arbeitsmotivation und Performanz in der Ministerialbürokratie? Auf Basis der Selbstbestimmungstheorie („self-determination theory“) ist zu erwarten, dass Reformen die Möglichkeit von Bürokrat*innen reduzieren, ihre grundlegenden psychologischen Bedürfnisse nach Kompetenz, Autonomie und sozialer Eingebundenheit zu befriedigen, was ihre Arbeitsmotivation reduzieren sollte. Dieser negative Effekt sollte schwächer ausfallen, wenn Bürokrat*innen die Reform als substanziell gerechtfertigt und langfristig vorteilhaft ansehen im Vergleich zu Reformen, die als ausschließlich machtpolitisch motiviert wahrgenommen werden. Diese theoretischen Erwartungen bestätigen sich in Interviews mit deutschen Spitzenbeamt*innen in zwei Politikfeldern (Bauwesen und Verbraucherschutz), die in jüngerer Vergangenheit wiederholt zwischen Ministerien verschoben wurden. Der Aufsatz zeigt, dass organisatorischer Wandel selbst bei Spitzenbeamt*innen Auswirkungen auf die Arbeitsmotivation hat. Diese Befunde haben weiterreichende Implikationen für unser Verständnis der Motivation und Performanz von Bürokrat*innen sowie der unbeabsichtigten Nebenwirkungen von
Verwaltungsreformen.},
  keywords = {Institutionenreform, Ministerialbürokratie, Self-determination theory, Interviews}
}

@article{hohendorf2022_54602,
  title = {Parteienwettbewerb im Bundestag nach dem Einzug der AfD und während der Corona-Krise : eine Analyse namentlicher Abstimmungen},
  author = {Hohendorf, Lukas and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2022},
  journal = {Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen : ZParl},
  volume = {53},
  number = {2},
  pages = {261-286},
  publisher = {Nomos-Verl.-Ges.},
  address = {Baden-Baden},
  issn = {0340-1758},
  doi = {10.5771/0340-1758-2022-2-261},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54602},
  language = {deu}
}

@article{louwerse2021_59453,
  title = {Opposition in times of crisis : COVID-19 in parliamentary debates},
  author = {Louwerse, Tom and Sieberer, Ulrich and Tuttnauer, Or and Andeweg, Rudy B.},
  year = {2021},
  pages = {1025-1051},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-594534},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59453},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {The COVID-19 pandemic presents an exceptional crisis situation not only for governments, but also for politicians in opposition. This article analyses opposition party expressed sentiment vis-a-vis government actions and policies during the first six months of 2020. Based on an original content analysis of parliamentary debates in four established parliamentary democracies (Germany, Israel, Netherlands, United Kingdom), relatively positive opposition expressed sentiment in parliament early on during the crisis is observed, in line with a ‘rally effect’ observed in public opinion. Sentiment turned more negative as the first wave of the crisis abated. Larger opposition parties with considerable prior government experience were more positive than larger parties without such experience.},
  keywords = {opposition, government, parliament, COVID-19, legislative behaviour}
}

@article{louwerse2021_59478,
  title = {Opposition in times of crisis : COVID-19 in parliamentary debates},
  author = {Louwerse, Tom and Sieberer, Ulrich and Tuttnauer, Or and Andeweg, Rudy B.},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {West European Politics},
  volume = {44},
  number = {5-6},
  pages = {1025-1051},
  publisher = {Taylor \& Francis},
  address = {Abingdon},
  issn = {1743-9655},
  doi = {10.1080/01402382.2021.1886519},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59478},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {The COVID-19 pandemic presents an exceptional crisis situation not only for governments, but also for politicians in opposition. This article analyses opposition party expressed sentiment vis-a-vis government actions and policies during the first six months of 2020. Based on an original content analysis of parliamentary debates in four established parliamentary democracies (Germany, Israel, Netherlands, United Kingdom), relatively positive opposition expressed sentiment in parliament early on during the crisis is observed, in line with a ‘rally effect’ observed in public opinion. Sentiment turned more negative as the first wave of the crisis abated. Larger opposition parties with considerable prior government experience were more positive than larger parties without such experience.},
  keywords = {opposition, government, parliament, COVID-19, legislative behaviour}
}

@article{sieberer2021_54603,
  title = {Do party system parameters explain differences in legislative organization? : Fragmentation, polarization, and the density of regulation in European parliaments, 1945–2009},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Höhmann, Daniel},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Party politics : an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations},
  volume = {28},
  number = {4},
  pages = {597-610},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address = {London [u.a.]},
  issn = {1460-3683},
  doi = {10.1177/13540688211002490},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54603},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {The article studies whether the party system characteristics fragmentation and ideological polarization increase the density of institutional regulation in parliaments. It introduces a comprehensive time-series-cross-sectional dataset of standing orders in 15 Western European parliaments that allows studying how densely various fields of legislative activity such as lawmaking, controlling the government, and creating publicity were regulated over a period of more than 60 years. Descriptively, the data show increased regulation in all areas but also some variation between countries. Dynamic panel regression analyses for non-stationary time series find no systematic effect of fragmentation or polarization on the density of regulation indicating that large parts of legislative organization change for reasons unrelated to party system dynamics. We identify changes in the environment of legislatures such as increasing complexity and professionalization of politics, technological change, and Europeanization as potential drivers of such Pareto-efficient reforms.},
  keywords = {legislative organization, parliamentary rules, party systems,, polarization, Western Europe}
}

@incollection{sieberer2021_50077,
  title = {Party unity in parliamentary democracies: A comparative analysis},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2021},
  booktitle = {The impact of legislatures : a quarter-century of The Journal of Legislative Studies},
  pages = {141-169},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address = {London ; New York},
  isbn = {978-0-367-47144-6},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/50077},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{hohendorf2021_47749,
  title = {Veto power fosters cooperative behaviour: institutional incentives and government-opposition voting in the German Bundestag},
  author = {Hohendorf, Lukas and Saalfeld, Thomas and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {West European politics},
  volume = {44},
  number = {4},
  pages = {921-945},
  publisher = {Taylor \& Francis},
  address = {Abingdon},
  issn = {0140-2382},
  doi = {10.1080/01402382.2020.1739868},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47749},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sieberer2021_46663,
  title = {Mandate type, electoral safety, and defections from the party line: The conditional mandate divide in the German Bundestag, 1949–2013},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Ohmura, Tamaki},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Party politics : an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations},
  volume = {27},
  number = {4},
  pages = {704-715},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address = {London [u.a.]},
  issn = {1354-0688},
  doi = {10.1177/1354068819881637},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/46663},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sieberer2020_47364,
  title = {‘Going institutional’ to overcome obstruction : Explaining the suppression of minority rights in Western European parliaments, 1945−2010},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Dutkowski, Julia F. and Meißner, Peter and Müller, Wolfgang C.},
  year = {2020},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  doi = {10.20378/irb-47364},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-473644},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47364},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {When and why do parliamentary majorities in Europe suppress parliamentary minority rights? This article argues that such reforms are driven by substantive policy conflict in interaction with existing minority rights. Government parties curb minority rights if they fear minority obstruction due to increased policy conflict and a minority-friendly institutional status quo. Empirical support is found for this claim using comparative data on all reforms in 13 Western European parliaments since 1945. A curbing of minority rights is significantly more likely under conditions of heightened policy conflict and these effects are stronger the more the institutional status quo favours opposition parties. Contrary to frequent claims of consensual rule changes from single-country studies in Europe, these findings demonstrate the importance of competitive strategies in explaining institutional reform in European parliaments. The conditional impact of the status quo provides interesting theoretical links to historical institutionalist arguments on path dependence.},
  keywords = {institutional reform; parliamentary minority rights; obstruction; political competition; Western Europe}
}

@article{sieberer2020_47392,
  title = {‘Going institutional’ to overcome obstruction: Explaining the suppression of minority rights in Western European parliaments, 1945−2010},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Dutkowski, Julia F. and Meißner, Peter and Müller, Wolfgang C.},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {European Journal of Political Research},
  volume = {59},
  number = {4},
  pages = {886-909},
  publisher = {Blackwell Publ.},
  address = {Oxford},
  issn = {0304-4130},
  doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12376},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47392},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {When and why do parliamentary majorities in Europe suppress parliamentary minority rights? This article argues that such reforms are driven by substantive policy conflict in interaction with existing minority rights. Government parties curb minority rights if they fear minority obstruction due to increased policy conflict and a minority-friendly institutional status quo. Empirical support is found for this claim using comparative data on all reforms in 13 Western European parliaments since 1945. A curbing of minority rights is significantly more likely under conditions of heightened policy conflict and these effects are stronger the more the institutional status quo favours opposition parties. Contrary to frequent claims of consensual rule changes from single-country studies in Europe, these findings demonstrate the importance of competitive strategies in explaining institutional reform in European parliaments. The conditional impact of the status quo provides interesting theoretical links to historical institutionalist arguments on path dependence.},
  keywords = {institutional reform; parliamentary minority rights; obstruction; political competition; Western Europe}
}

@incollection{hohendorf2020_47342,
  title = {Oppositional Strategies Between Cooperation and Conflict: An Analysis of Opposition Party Voting in the German Bundestag, 1949–2013},
  author = {Hohendorf, Lukas and Saalfeld, Thomas and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2020},
  booktitle = {Continuity and Change of Party Democracies in Europe},
  pages = {309-342},
  publisher = {Springer VS},
  address = {Wiesbaden},
  isbn = {978-3-658-28987-4},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47342},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sieberer2020_45788,
  title = {Short-lived Parliamentarisation in 19th-century Germany: Parliamentary Government in the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848/1849},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Herrmann, Michael},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Parliamentary affairs : a journal of representative politics},
  volume = {73},
  number = {3},
  pages = {603-626},
  publisher = {Oxford Univ. Press},
  address = {London},
  issn = {0031-2290},
  doi = {10.1093/pa/gsz013},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/45788},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{hohmann2020_45770,
  title = {Parliamentary questions as a control mechanism in coalition governments},
  author = {Höhmann, Daniel and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {West European Politics},
  volume = {43},
  number = {1},
  pages = {225-249},
  publisher = {Taylor \& Francis},
  address = {Abingdon},
  issn = {0140-2382},
  doi = {10.1080/01402382.2019.1611986},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/45770},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sieberer2020_45034,
  title = {Roll-Call Votes in the German Bundestag: A New Dataset, 1949–2013},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Saalfeld, Thomas and Bergmann, Henning and Ohmura, Tamaki and Bailer, Stefanie},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
  volume = {50},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1137-1145},
  publisher = {Cambridge Univ. Press},
  address = {London},
  issn = {0007-1234},
  doi = {10.1017/S0007123418000406},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/45034},
  language = {eng}
}

@misc{sieberer2019_47391,
  title = {Willumsen, David M., The acceptance of party unity in parliamentary democracies / David M. Willumsen. - First edition : Oxford, 2017. - xvii, 174 Seiten : Illustrationen, Diagramme},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2019},
  volume = {26},
  number = {2},
  pages = {266-267},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address = {London [u.a.]},
  issn = {1354-0688},
  doi = {10.1177/1354068819894539},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47391},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {.},
  keywords = {book review}
}

@article{sieberer2019_47378,
  title = {Bonding in Pursuit of Policy Goals: How MPs Choose Political Parties in the Legislative State of Nature},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Herrmann, Michael},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
  volume = {44},
  number = {3},
  pages = {455-486},
  address = {Iowa City, Iowa},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12231},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47378},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sieberer2019_47374,
  title = {The Political Dynamics of Portfolio Design in European Democracies},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Meyer, Thomas M. and Bäck, Hanna and Ceron, Andrea and Falcó-Gimeno, Albert and Guinaudeau, Isabelle and Hansen, Martin Ejnar and Kolltveit, Kristoffer and Louwerse, Tom and Müller, Wolfgang C. and Persson, Thomas},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
  volume = {51},
  number = {2},
  pages = {1-16},
  publisher = {Cambridge Univ. Press},
  address = {London},
  issn = {0007-1234},
  doi = {10.1017/S0007123419000346},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47374},
  language = {eng}
}

@book{bernsdorff2019_46604,
  title = {Framework. Network. Career. How the framework of a Graduate School propels junior research and contributes on an international level},
  author = {Bernsdorff, Katrin and Bartels, Mareike and Christoph, Simon Moritz Friedrich Maxi and Kraj, Agata Maria and Martínez Cantó, Javier and Saalfeld, Thomas and Schmitz, Theresa and Seifert, Olaf and Sieberer, Ulrich and Siemeister, Sarah and Steger, Diana and Dos Reis Gonçalves, Madalena and Winnwa, Isabel and Zoch, Gundula},
  editor = {Bernsdorff, Katrin and Saalfeld, Thomas},
  year = {2019},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  doi = {10.20378/irb-46604},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-466046},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/46604},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {The publication covers the period of funding under the DFG Excellence Initiative 2012–2019, a timespan that the Bamberg Graduate School of Social Sciences utilised to build a solid and scalable framework to propel junior research on an international level. It contains interviews with researchers who passed through the Graduate School, whether junior academics, who just got into research or established scientists who are on-going passionate about it. Plus, the publication presents essays that give insights into research projects, thematic analyses, and collaborations.},
  keywords = {Graduate school, doctoral research, multi-disciplinary research, structured programme, careers in academia, scientific network, visualizing research}
}

@article{sieberer2019_43936,
  title = {The basic space of a revolutionary parliament : Scaling the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848/49},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Herrmann, Michael},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Party politics : an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations},
  volume = {25},
  number = {6},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address = {London [u.a.]},
  issn = {1354-0688},
  doi = {10.1177/1354068817749778},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43936},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We examine whether there is a basic space in a parliament which grew out of a revolution and had no prior history of parliamentarism: the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848/49. We scale all 299 roll call votes to determine the dimensionality of voting as well as the positions of deputies and their party groups. We find two dimensions of disagreement and show that they can be interpreted in line with historical scholarship as conflict over who should govern (the people or the monarch) and conflict over state borders (inclusion or exclusion of Austria). We find that the party groups line up on the first dimension in ways consistent with historical scholarship on their political inclinations, but we also find wide variation in deputies’ positions within and across parties. Moreover, deputies’ positions turn out to be polarized on the territorial dimension but not on the government dimension. We conclude that ideological constraint was the primary structuring force in parliamentary voting. Our results underscore the pervasiveness of low dimensionality in parliamentary voting even in the absence of strong parties and agenda control.},
  keywords = {Germany, ideal point estimation, ideology, 19th century, roll call voting}
}

@article{stoffel2018_47386,
  title = {Measuring re-election prospects across electoral systems: a general approach applied to Germany},
  author = {Stoffel, Michael F. and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {West European Politics},
  volume = {41},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1191--1207},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis},
  address = {Abingdon},
  issn = {0140-2382},
  doi = {10.1080/01402382.2017.1400273},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47386},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{stoffel2018_42977,
  title = {Measuring reelection prospects across electoral systems : A general approach applied to Germany},
  author = {Stoffel, Michael F. and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {West European Politics},
  volume = {41},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1191-1207},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis},
  address = {Basingstoke [u.a.]},
  issn = {1743-9655},
  doi = {10.1080/01402382.2017.1400273},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42977},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {This research note presents a general approach for measuring the electoral safety of individual MPs across electoral systems that is based on predicted re-election probabilities estimated from multilevel logistic regression models. In contrast to existing measures, this method yields estimates on an intuitive and readily comparable probability scale, captures the higher sensitivity of re-election prospects to electoral change in the range of close races, and can accommodate regional differences in context conditions such as volatility. The paper implements the approach for two archetypical electoral systems – first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems and closed-list proportional representation (PR) – and estimates re-election prospects for the FPTP and PR tiers of the German mixed electoral system in all Bundestag elections since 1957. While the empirical data presented here is mainly illustrative, the concluding section highlights various questions that future research can address with the new measure.},
  keywords = {Electoral safety, electoral systems, electoral competition, mixed electoral systems, Germany, dataset}
}

@article{sieberer2017_47365,
  title = {Aiming higher: The consequences of progressive ambition among MPs in European parliaments},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Müller, Wolfgang C.},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {European Political Science Review},
  volume = {9},
  number = {1},
  pages = {27--50},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press (\{CUP\})},
  doi = {10.1017/s1755773915000260},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47365},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sieberer2017_42902,
  title = {Shadow chairs as monitoring device? : A comparative analysis of committee chair powers in Western European parliaments},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Höhmann, Daniel},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Journal of Legislative Studies},
  volume = {23},
  number = {3},
  pages = {301-325},
  publisher = {Taylor \& Francis},
  address = {London},
  issn = {1743-9337},
  doi = {10.1080/13572334.2017.1358980},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42902},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Recent work on coalition governance claims that government parties use the chairs of parliamentary committees to ‘shadow’ ministers and thus to monitor coalition partners. This argument rests on the assumption that committee chairs enjoy special powers to extract information from ministries and to affect policy-making in committee. To test this assumption, the paper develops the first comparative measure of committee chair powers in fifteen Western European democracies. The analysis shows that most committee chairs have very limited formal powers and that the share of shadowing chairs does not increase when committee chairs are more powerful. Both findings cast doubt on the interpretation of shadow chairs as a monitoring device. We sketch an alternative explanation according to which coalition parties employ the shadowing strategy in order to increase public visibility and to counteract issue ownership by the minister’s party.},
  keywords = {Institutional power, Parliamentary committees, Committee chairs, Monitoring, Coalition governance}
}

@article{sieberer2017_41661,
  title = {Aiming Higher : The Consequences of Progressive Ambition among MPs in European Parliaments},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Müller, Wolfgang C},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {European political science review : EPSR ; a journal of the European Consortium for Political Research},
  volume = {9},
  number = {1},
  pages = {27-50},
  publisher = {Cambridge Univ. Press},
  address = {Cambridge},
  issn = {1755-7739},
  doi = {10.1017/S1755773915000260},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/41661},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sieberer2017_40480,
  title = {Aiming Higher : The Consequences of Progressive Ambition among MPs in European Parliaments},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Müller, Wolfgang},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {European political science review : EPSR ; a journal of the European Consortium for Political Research},
  volume = {9},
  number = {1},
  pages = {27-50},
  publisher = {Cambridge Univ. Press},
  address = {Cambridge},
  issn = {1755-7739},
  doi = {10.1017/S1755773915000260},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/40480},
  language = {eng}
}

@misc{sieberer2016_47375,
  title = {The Politics of Parliamentary Debate: Parties, Rebels and Representation},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2016},
  volume = {39},
  pages = {903--904},
  publisher = {Informa \{UK\} Limited},
  issn = {0140-2382},
  doi = {10.1080/01402382.2016.1166736},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47375},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sieberer2016_40509,
  title = {Mapping and Explaining Parliamentary Rule Changes in Europe: A Research Program},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Meißner, Peter and Keh, Julia and Müller, Wolfgang C},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Legislative studies quarterly},
  volume = {41},
  number = {1},
  pages = {61-88},
  address = {Iowa City, Iowa},
  issn = {0362-9805},
  doi = {10.1111/lsq.12106},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/40509},
  language = {eng}
}

@misc{sieberer2016_40519,
  title = {Proksch, Sven-Oliver, Slapin, Jonathan B., The politics of parliamentary debate : parties, rebels and representation: Cambridge [u.a.], 2015},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2016},
  volume = {39},
  number = {4},
  pages = {903-904},
  publisher = {Taylor \& Francis},
  address = {Abingdon},
  issn = {0140-2382},
  doi = {10.1080/01402382.2016.1166736},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/40519},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sieberer2016_40450,
  title = {Lehren aus Weimar? Die erste Geschäftsordnung des Deutschen Bundestages von 1951 zwischen Kontinuität und Wandel},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen : ZParl},
  volume = {47},
  number = {1},
  pages = {3-25},
  publisher = {Nomos-Verl.-Ges.},
  address = {Baden-Baden},
  issn = {0340-1758},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/40450},
  language = {deu}
}

@article{bergmann2016_40308,
  title = {Namentliche Abstimmungen im Bundestag 1949 bis 2013 : Befunde aus einem neuen Datensatz},
  author = {Bergmann, Henning and Bailer, Stefanie and Ohmura, Tamaki and Saalfeld, Thomas and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen},
  volume = {47},
  number = {1},
  pages = {26-50},
  publisher = {Nomos-Verl.-Ges.},
  address = {Baden-Baden},
  issn = {0340-1758},
  doi = {10.5771/0340-1758-2016-1-26},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/40308},
  language = {deu},
  abstract = {Roll call votes provide crucial data for the study of parliamentary behaviour. A novel dataset on all recorded votes in the Bundestag between 1949 and 2013 combines information on MPs’ individual voting behaviour with contextual information on the respective motions and individual characteristics of MPs. First analyses illustrate potential applications for these novel data. First, there is substantial variation in the request for recorded votes over time. The observed patterns are consistent with theoretical models that understand roll call vote request as an instrument by which parliamentary party groups signal policy positions and enforce intra-party unity. Second, differences in voting unity between parties and over time can be identified. This variation can be partly explained by established theories but also highlights the need for further analysis.},
  keywords = {Deutscher Bundestag, Namentliche Abstimmungen, Franktionsdisziplin, Recorded votes, party unity}
}

@article{sieberer2015_40525,
  title = {Explaining Reforms of Minority Rights in Parliaments : A Theoretical Framework with Case Study Application},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Müller, Wolfgang C},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {West European Politics},
  volume = {38},
  number = {5, Special Issue:   Explaining Legislative Organisation in European Democracies},
  pages = {997-1019},
  publisher = {Taylor \& Francis},
  address = {Abingdon},
  issn = {0140-2382},
  doi = {10.1080/01402382.2015.1045321},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/40525},
  language = {eng}
}

@incollection{sieberer2015_40526,
  title = {Hire or Fire? The Link between Cabinet Investiture and Removal in Parliamentary Democracies,},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Parliaments and government formation : unpacking investiture rules},
  pages = {309-330},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  address = {Oxford},
  isbn = {978-0-19-874701-7},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/40526},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sieberer2015_40514,
  title = {Die Politik des Ressortzuschnitts zwischen Koalitionsarithmetik und thematischer Profilierung : Eine koalitionspolitische Erklärung für Kompetenzänderungen der Bundesministerien},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift : PVS ; Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft},
  volume = {56},
  number = {1},
  pages = {77-103},
  publisher = {Nomos},
  address = {Baden-Baden},
  doi = {10.5771/0032-3470-2015-1-77},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/40514},
  language = {deu}
}

@article{sieberer2015_40484,
  title = {Using MP Statements to Explain Voting Behavior in the German Bundestag : An Individual-level Test of the Competing Principals Theory},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Party politics : an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations},
  volume = {21},
  number = {2},
  pages = {284-294},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address = {London [u.a.]},
  issn = {1460-3683},
  doi = {10.1177/1354068812472584},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/40484},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sieberer2014_47370,
  title = {Konzeptionalisierung und Messung formalen Institutionenwandels – Das Beispiel parlamentarische Regeln},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Meißner, Peter and Keh, Julia F. and Müller, Wolfgang C.},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft},
  volume = {8},
  number = {3-4},
  pages = {237--262},
  publisher = {Springer Nature},
  issn = {1865-2646},
  doi = {10.1007/s12286-014-0216-7},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47370},
  language = {deu}
}

@incollection{muller2014_47367,
  title = {Procedure and Rules in Legislatures},
  author = {Müller, Wolfgang C and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2014},
  booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies},
  pages = {311-331},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199653010.013.0023},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47367},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sieberer2012_47384,
  title = {Elections in Western European parliaments},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {European Journal of Political Research},
  volume = {52},
  number = {4},
  pages = {512--535},
  publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  issn = {0304-4130},
  doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12007},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47384},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sieberer2012_47383,
  title = {Checks or Toothless Tigers? Powers and Incentives of External Officeholders to Constrain the Cabinet in 25 European Democracies},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {Government and Opposition},
  volume = {47},
  number = {4},
  pages = {517--543},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press (\{CUP\})},
  issn = {0017-257X},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1477-7053.2012.01373.x},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47383},
  language = {eng}
}

@incollection{honnige2011_47390,
  title = {Germany: Limited Government Agenda Control and Strong Minority Rights},
  author = {Hönnige, Christoph and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2011},
  booktitle = {The Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting},
  pages = {21-37},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address = {London},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47390},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sieberer2011_47380,
  title = {Reforming the Rules of the Parliamentary Game: Measuring and Explaining Changes in Parliamentary Rules in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, 1945–2010},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich and Müller, Wolfgang C. and Heller, Maiko Isabelle},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {West European Politics},
  volume = {34},
  number = {5},
  pages = {948--975},
  publisher = {Informa \{UK\} Limited},
  issn = {0140-2382},
  doi = {10.1080/01402382.2011.591079},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47380},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sieberer2011_47371,
  title = {The Institutional Power of Western European Parliaments: A Multidimensional Analysis},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {West European Politics},
  volume = {34},
  number = {4},
  pages = {731--754},
  publisher = {Informa \{UK\} Limited},
  issn = {0140-2382},
  doi = {10.1080/01402382.2011.572389},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47371},
  language = {eng}
}

@book{sieberer2010_47387,
  title = {Parlamente als Wahlorgane},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2010},
  publisher = {Nomos},
  address = {Baden-Baden},
  doi = {10.5771/9783845222721},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47387},
  language = {deu}
}

@article{sieberer2010_47363,
  title = {Behavioral consequences of mixed electoral systems: Deviating voting behavior of district and list MPs in the German Bundestag},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {Electoral Studies},
  volume = {29},
  number = {3},
  pages = {484--496},
  publisher = {Elsevier \{BV\}},
  issn = {0261-3794},
  doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2010.04.012},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47363},
  language = {eng}
}

@incollection{sieberer2009_47376,
  title = {Können ja – Wollen nein? Die Anreize außerparlamentarischer Amtsträger zur Beschränkung der Regierung},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2009},
  booktitle = {Parlamentarismusforschung in Deutschland},
  pages = {301--322},
  publisher = {Nomos},
  doi = {10.5771/9783845218236-301},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47376},
  language = {deu}
}

@article{becher2008_47381,
  title = {Discipline, Electoral Rules and Defection in the Bundestag, 1983–94},
  author = {Becher, Michael and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {German Politics},
  volume = {17},
  number = {3},
  pages = {293--304},
  publisher = {Informa \{UK\} Limited},
  issn = {0964-4008},
  doi = {10.1080/09644000802300510},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47381},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sieberer2008_47372,
  title = {Prinzipal Parlament. Die Bedeutung europäischer Parlamente als Wahlorgane},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift},
  volume = {49},
  number = {2},
  pages = {251--282},
  publisher = {Nomos Verlag},
  issn = {0032-3470},
  doi = {10.1007/s11615-008-0099-9},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47372},
  language = {deu}
}

@incollection{sieberer2007_47389,
  title = {»Aber könnte es nicht auch sein dass…?« Die Auswahl unabhängiger Variablen in X-zentrierten und Y-zentrierten Forschungsdesigns},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2007},
  booktitle = {Forschungsdesign in der Politikwissenschaft. Probleme – Strategien – Anwendungen},
  pages = {253-279},
  publisher = {Campus},
  address = {Frankfurt a.M.},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47389},
  language = {deu}
}

@incollection{sieberer2007_47369,
  title = {Selecting Independent Variables: Competing Recommendations for Factor-Centric and Outcome-Centric Research Designs},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2007},
  booktitle = {Research Design in Political Science. How to Practice what they Preach},
  pages = {163--182},
  publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan \{UK\}},
  address = {Houndmills},
  isbn = {978-0-230-01947-8},
  doi = {10.1057/9780230598881\_9},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47369},
  language = {eng}
}

@incollection{muller2006_47388,
  title = {Party Law},
  author = {Müller, Wolfgang C. and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2006},
  booktitle = {Handbook of Party Politics},
  pages = {435--445},
  publisher = {\{SAGE\} Publications Ltd},
  address = {London},
  doi = {10.4135/9781848608047.n38},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47388},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sieberer2006_47379,
  title = {Party unity in parliamentary democracies: A comparative analysis},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {The Journal of Legislative Studies},
  volume = {12},
  number = {2},
  pages = {150--178},
  publisher = {Informa \{UK\} Limited},
  issn = {1357-2334},
  doi = {10.1080/13572330600739413},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47379},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sieberer2006_47377,
  title = {Agenda setting in the German Bundestag: A weak government in a consensus democracy},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {German Politics},
  volume = {15},
  number = {1},
  pages = {49--72},
  publisher = {Informa \{UK\} Limited},
  issn = {0964-4008},
  doi = {10.1080/09644000500534972},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47377},
  language = {eng}
}

@article{sieberer2006_47368,
  title = {Strategische Zurückhaltung von Verfassungsgerichten Gewaltenteilungsvorstellungen und die Grenzen der Justizialisierung},
  author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft},
  volume = {16},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1299--1323},
  publisher = {Nomos Verlag},
  issn = {1430-6387},
  doi = {10.5771/1430-6387-2006-4-1299},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47368},
  language = {deu}
}

@article{kaiser2002_47385,
  title = {The Democratic Quality of Institutional Regimes: A Conceptual Framework},
  author = {Kaiser, André and Lehnert, Matthias and Miller, Bernhard and Sieberer, Ulrich},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {Political Studies},
  volume = {50},
  number = {2},
  pages = {313-331},
  publisher = {SAGE Publications},
  issn = {0032-3217},
  doi = {10.1111/1467-9248.t01-1-00372},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47385},
  language = {eng}
}

