TY - CHAP TI - Portfolio design in Germany AU - Sieberer, Ulrich Christian AU - Schmuck, David PY - 2026 T2 - Democracy at the crossroads - challenges for governance and representation : essays in honour of Thomas Saalfeld SP - 236-257 PB - Routledge, Taylor&Francis Group CY - London SN - 978-1-003-66024-8 DO - 10.4324/9781003660248-14 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/114612 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - Slicing the pie : Portfolio design and coalition governments AU - Sieberer, Ulrich Christian PY - 2025 T2 - Handbook on Coalition Politics SP - 368-381 PB - Edward Elgar CY - Cheltenham ET - 1 SN - 9781803929552 DO - 10.4337/9781803929569.00032 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/111785 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Einblicke in die Konsensschmiede des Parlaments : Die Präsidialkonferenz im Österreichischen Nationalrat AU - Frech, Elena AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2025 SP - 1-14 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/111518 LA - deu AB - Parlamente sind Arenen des politischen Streits, bedürfen aber gleichzeitig eines allgemein akzeptierten Grundkonsenses und dessen konkreter Umsetzung in organisatorischen Fragen wie der Gestaltung der Tagesordnung und dem Umgang mit prozeduralen Konflikten. Zur Lösung solcher Konflikte nutzen viele Parlamente Koordinationsausschüsse bestehend aus Mitgliedern des Präsidiums und Vertreter:innen der Parlamentsfraktionen. Dieser Aufsatz untersucht die Präsidialkonferenz (PK) im österreichischen Nationalrat als ein solches Gremium auf Grundlage detaillierter Interviews mit seinen Mitgliedern. Welche Rolle spielt die PK bei der Agendasetzung im Nationalrat und über welche Mechanismen gelingt es ihr, einen prozeduralen Grundkonsens herzustellen und zu reproduzieren? Die Analyse zeigt, dass die PK und die vorbereitende informelle Runde der Klubdirektor:innen vor allem die Zeitplanagenda des Nationalrats bestimmt und als Koordinationsgremium für verschiedenste prozedurale und organisatorische Themen dient. Die hochgradig konsensuelle Interaktion in der PK erklärt sich durch sechs institutionelle, persönlichkeitsorientierte und interaktionsbasierte Mechanismen, darunter die strikte Trennung von prozeduralen und politisch-inhaltlichen Entscheidungen, die Orientierung an Präzedenzfällen, die Antizipation von Obstruktionsmöglichkeiten, ein konsensorientiertes Rollenverständnis der Mitglieder und die wiederholte Interaktion in einer kleinen, vertraulichen und hochgradig professionalisierten Gruppe. Diese theoretischen Mechanismen sind über den Nationalrat hinaus generalisierbar und zeigen, wie parlamentarische Organisation auch unter Bedingungen politischer Polarisierung einen stabilen und fairen Parlamentarismus fördern kann. KW - Parlament KW - Agendasetzung KW - Geschäftsordnung KW - Konsensbildung ER - TY - JOUR TI - Einblicke in die Konsensschmiede des Parlaments : Die Präsidialkonferenz im Österreichischen Nationalrat AU - Frech, Elena AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2025 JO - Austrian journal of political science : OZP VL - 54 IS - 2 SP - 1-14 PB - Innsbruck University Press CY - Innsbruck SN - 2313-5433 DO - 10.15203/4224.vol54.2025 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/111569 LA - deu AB - Parlamente sind Arenen des politischen Streits, bedürfen aber gleichzeitig eines allgemein akzeptierten Grundkonsenses und dessen konkreter Umsetzung in organisatorischen Fragen wie der Gestaltung der Tagesordnung und dem Umgang mit prozeduralen Konflikten. Zur Lösung solcher Konflikte nutzen viele Parlamente Koordinationsausschüsse bestehend aus Mitgliedern des Präsidiums und Vertreter:innen der Parlamentsfraktionen. Dieser Aufsatz untersucht die Präsidialkonferenz (PK) im österreichischen Nationalrat als ein solches Gremium auf Grundlage detaillierter Interviews mit seinen Mitgliedern. Welche Rolle spielt die PK bei der Agendasetzung im Nationalrat und über welche Mechanismen gelingt es ihr, einen prozeduralen Grundkonsens herzustellen und zu reproduzieren? Die Analyse zeigt, dass die PK und die vorbereitende informelle Runde der Klubdirektor:innen vor allem die Zeitplanagenda des Nationalrats bestimmt und als Koordinationsgremium für verschiedenste prozedurale und organisatorische Themen dient. Die hochgradig konsensuelle Interaktion in der PK erklärt sich durch sechs institutionelle, persönlichkeitsorientierte und interaktionsbasierte Mechanismen, darunter die strikte Trennung von prozeduralen und politisch-inhaltlichen Entscheidungen, die Orientierung an Präzedenzfällen, die Antizipation von Obstruktionsmöglichkeiten, ein konsensorientiertes Rollenverständnis der Mitglieder und die wiederholte Interaktion in einer kleinen, vertraulichen und hochgradig professionalisierten Gruppe. Diese theoretischen Mechanismen sind über den Nationalrat hinaus generalisierbar und zeigen, wie parlamentarische Organisation auch unter Bedingungen politischer Polarisierung einen stabilen und fairen Parlamentarismus fördern kann. KW - Parlament KW - Agendasetzung KW - Geschäftsordnung KW - Konsensbildung ER - TY - JOUR TI - Die stabilisierende Wirkung politischen Wettbewerbs : warum parlamentarische Mehrheiten Minderheitenrechte kaum fundamental beschneiden und teils sogar ausbauen AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2024 SP - 247-252 Seiten PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/96197 LA - deu AB - Entscheidungen von politischen Akteuren „in eigener Sache“ werden in Öffentlichkeit und Wissenschaft zu Recht kritisch betrachtet. Führen diese nicht zwangsläufig dazu, dass politische Parteien eigene Interessen verfolgen und damit Gemeinwohlüberlegungen auf der Strecke bleiben? Diese Frage stellt sich besonders bei Themen wie der Parteienfinanzierung, in denen Parteien gemeinsame Interessen haben und diese im Sinne einer Kartelllogik auf Kosten der Gesamtgesellschaft durchsetzen können. Ohne die Relevanz dieser Problematik abzustreiten, argumentiert dieser Beitrag, dass Entscheidungen in eigener Sache weniger problematisch sein können, wenn sie dem politischen Wettbewerb unterworfen sind und illustriert diese Logik am Fall parlamentarischer Geschäftsordnungsreformen, die Minderheitenrechte im Parlament verändern. KW - Parlamentarische Regeln KW - Minderheitenrechte KW - Institutionenwandel KW - politischer Wettbewerb ER - TY - JOUR TI - Colleagues or adversaries : Ministerial coordination across party lines AU - Klüser, K. Jonathan AU - Schmuck, David AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2024 SP - 517-536 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/95683 LA - eng AB - In multiparty governments, policymaking is a collaborative effort among the different incumbent parties. Often hidden by public debates about broader government policy, the necessary coordination routinely happens at the ministerial level, where ministries of different parties jointly devise viable and equitable policy solutions. However, since coordination involves substantial transaction costs, governments must carefully gauge the potential benefits. We study the political rationales that motivate governments to make this investment. We argue that coordination during the process of ministerial policy design hinges on both a conducive ministerial structure and sufficient authority. Once these conditions are met, cross-party coordination is more likely in policy areas where the implementation of government policy cannot be taken for granted. We investigate these claims, drawing on two new datasets. The first contains information about ministerial collaborations on all legislative projects sponsored by German governments, while the second maps the distribution of policy responsibilities among German ministries from 1976 until 2013, based on data about the policy briefs of all individual working units within the top-level federal executive. Given that ministries imprint their own perspective on legislation, our results are beyond administrative pedantries, but have substantial implications for the type and content of policies coalition governments formulate. KW - Ministerial coordination ER - TY - JOUR TI - Rebuilding the coalition ship at sea : how uncertainty and complexity drive the reform of portfolio design in coalition cabinets AU - Meyer, Thomas M. AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Schmuck, Simon PY - 2024 SP - 142-163 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/93535 LA - eng AB - In the government formation process, coalition partners make decisions about the inner workings of their future government. However, whether the initial allocation of competencies has the desired effects is uncertain, and deals may therefore be subject to change when the government is in office. This study analyses the frequency of changes in portfolio design (i.e. the distribution of competencies among government ministries and office holders) for 112 coalition governments in eight West European democracies (1970–2015). Its central argument is that in uncertain and complex bargaining situations, coalition partners have greater difficulty finding mutually beneficial deals, and changes to the initial allocation of payoffs are therefore more likely. The results indicate that preference divergence and strenuous coalition negotiations make portfolio design reforms more likely, but show no consistent effect of the familiarity among government parties. These findings show how the bargaining context during government formation foreshadows coalition governance over the cabinet’s life-cycle. KW - Multiparty governments KW - coalition governance KW - portfolio design KW - government formation KW - Western Europe ER - TY - JOUR TI - Recorded votes as attention booster : how opposition parties use roll-calls and non-recorded votes for position-taking in the German Bundestag, 2017-2021 AU - Hohendorf, Lukas AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Wenzig, Jonas PY - 2024 SP - 649-671 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/92391 LA - eng AB - The article investigates roll-call request and its effects on opposition-voting behavior. It argues that parties use roll-call votes (RCVs) as a position-taking instrument to boost public attention for issues they care about. This argument implies that RCVs are requested strategically but opposition behavior should not differ systematically between recorded and nonrecorded votes. Studying all voting activities of the 19th German Bundestag (2017–21), the analysis shows that RCVs are more likely on high-salience issues, more important motion types, and to some extent opposition motions. Voting conforms to the position-taking model as opposition parties are less likely to vote with the government on their own motions and more important motion types. However, opposition behavior does not differ systematically between recorded and nonrecorded votes suggesting that parties act consistently across all votes. Thus, RCVs provide valid measures for studying interparty competition in parliament despite their selective sampling properties. KW - roll call votes KW - legislative behavior KW - Bundestag KW - Germany KW - Political Science ER - TY - JOUR TI - Recorded votes as attention booster : how opposition parties use roll calls and nonrecorded votes for position taking in the German Bundestag, 2017–21 AU - Hohendorf, Lukas AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Wenzig, Jonas PY - 2024 JO - Legislative Studies Quarterly VL - 49 IS - 3 SP - 649-671 PB - Wiley CY - Hoboken, NJ SN - 0362-9805 DO - 10.1111/lsq.12442 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/92466 LA - eng AB - The article investigates roll-call request and its effects on opposition-voting behavior. It argues that parties use roll-call votes (RCVs) as a position-taking instrument to boost public attention for issues they care about. This argument implies that RCVs are requested strategically but opposition behavior should not differ systematically between recorded and nonrecorded votes. Studying all voting activities of the 19th German Bundestag (2017–21), the analysis shows that RCVs are more likely on high-salience issues, more important motion types, and to some extent opposition motions. Voting conforms to the position-taking model as opposition parties are less likely to vote with the government on their own motions and more important motion types. However, opposition behavior does not differ systematically between recorded and nonrecorded votes suggesting that parties act consistently across all votes. Thus, RCVs provide valid measures for studying interparty competition in parliament despite their selective sampling properties. KW - roll call votes KW - legislative behavior KW - Bundestag KW - Germany KW - Political Science ER - TY - JOUR TI - Rebuilding the coalition ship at sea : how uncertainty and complexity drive the reform of portfolio design in coalition cabinets AU - Meyer, Thomas M. AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Schmuck, David PY - 2024 JO - West European Politics VL - 47 IS - 1 SP - 142-163 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis CY - Basingstoke [u.a.] SN - 1743-9655 DO - 10.1080/01402382.2023.2169512 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59410 LA - eng AB - In the government formation process, coalition partners make decisions about the inner workings of their future government. However, whether the initial allocation of competencies has the desired effects is uncertain, and deals may therefore be subject to change when the government is in office. This study analyses the frequency of changes in portfolio design (i.e. the distribution of competencies among government ministries and office holders) for 112 coalition governments in eight West European democracies (1970–2015). Its central argument is that in uncertain and complex bargaining situations, coalition partners have greater difficulty finding mutually beneficial deals, and changes to the initial allocation of payoffs are therefore more likely. The results indicate that preference divergence and strenuous coalition negotiations make portfolio design reforms more likely, but show no consistent effect of the familiarity among government parties. These findings show how the bargaining context during government formation foreshadows coalition governance over the cabinet’s life-cycle. KW - Multiparty governments KW - coalition governance KW - portfolio design KW - government formation KW - Western Europe ER - TY - JOUR TI - Colleagues or adversaries : Ministerial coordination across party lines AU - Klüser, K. Jonathan AU - Schmuck, David AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2024 JO - Governance : an international journal of policy and administration VL - 37 IS - 2 SP - 517-536 PB - Wiley-Blackwell CY - Oxford SN - 1468-0491 DO - 10.1111/gove.12784 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59409 LA - eng AB - In multiparty governments, policymaking is a collaborative effort among the different incumbent parties. Often hidden by public debates about broader government policy, the necessary coordination routinely happens at the ministerial level, where ministries of different parties jointly devise viable and equitable policy solutions. However, since coordination involves substantial transaction costs, governments must carefully gauge the potential benefits. We study the political rationales that motivate governments to make this investment. We argue that coordination during the process of ministerial policy design hinges on both a conducive ministerial structure and sufficient authority. Once these conditions are met, cross-party coordination is more likely in policy areas where the implementation of government policy cannot be taken for granted. We investigate these claims, drawing on two new datasets. The first contains information about ministerial collaborations on all legislative projects sponsored by German governments, while the second maps the distribution of policy responsibilities among German ministries from 1976 until 2013, based on data about the policy briefs of all individual working units within the top-level federal executive. Given that ministries imprint their own perspective on legislation, our results are beyond administrative pedantries, but have substantial implications for the type and content of policies coalition governments formulate. KW - Ministerial coordination ER - TY - JOUR TI - Die stabilisierende Wirkung politischen Wettbewerbs : warum parlamentarische Mehrheiten Minderheitenrechte kaum fundamental beschneiden und teils sogar ausbauen AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2023 JO - Zeitschrift für Parteienwissenschaften : MIP VL - 2023 IS - 2 - Sonderausgabe „Parlamentsentscheidungen in eigener Sache“ in Kooperation mit Verfassungsblog und Stiftung Wissenschaft & Demokratie SP - 247-252 PB - Institut für Deutsches und Internationales Parteienrecht und Parteienforschung CY - Düsseldorf SN - 2628-3778 DO - 10.24338/mip-2023247-252 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/96519 LA - deu AB - Entscheidungen von politischen Akteuren „in eigener Sache“ werden in Öffentlichkeit und Wissenschaft zu Recht kritisch betrachtet. Führen diese nicht zwangsläufig dazu, dass politische Parteien eigene Interessen verfolgen und damit Gemeinwohlüberlegungen auf der Strecke bleiben? Diese Frage stellt sich besonders bei Themen wie der Parteienfinanzierung, in denen Parteien gemeinsame Interessen haben und diese im Sinne einer Kartelllogik auf Kosten der Gesamtgesellschaft durchsetzen können. Ohne die Relevanz dieser Problematik abzustreiten, argumentiert dieser Beitrag, dass Entscheidungen in eigener Sache weniger problematisch sein können, wenn sie dem politischen Wettbewerb unterworfen sind und illustriert diese Logik am Fall parlamentarischer Geschäftsordnungsreformen, die Minderheitenrechte im Parlament verändern. KW - Parlamentarische Regeln KW - Minderheitenrechte KW - Institutionenwandel KW - politischer Wettbewerb ER - TY - JOUR TI - Coordination Committees and Legislative Agenda-Setting Power in 31 European Parliaments AU - Frech, Elena AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2023 SP - 189-208 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg T3 - Historical Social Research Vol. 48, No. 3 (2023) UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/92526 LA - eng AB - Agenda setting determines whether and how topics are discussed and voted in parliament. Many parliaments delegate this task to a specific body charged with coordinating parliamentary business. However, we know little about the composition and powers of these “coordination committees” (CC). This paper maps the existence, composition, and institutional powers of coordination committees across 31 European parliaments. It shows that CCs exist in most parliaments and have a relatively similar composition, usually including the president of parliament, their deputies, and party group representatives, but vary strongly in their agenda-setting powers. Exploring whether this variation is related to the functional need for coordination, we find limited evidence that larger sizes of parliaments and higher ideological polarization between parties are associated with stronger coordination committees. In terms of this HSR Special Issue, we show that CCs as horizontal collective actors exist even in a hierarchical organization such as a parliament and have relevant, albeit variable, resources. KW - agenda setting KW - collective actors KW - institutional power KW - European democracies ER - TY - JOUR TI - Coordination Committees and Legislative Agenda-Setting Power in 31 European Parliaments AU - Frech, Elena AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2023 JO - Historical Social Research VL - 48 IS - 3 SP - 189-208 PB - GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences CY - Mannheim SN - 0172-6404 DO - 10.12759/hsr.48.2023.30 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/92542 LA - eng AB - Agenda setting determines whether and how topics are discussed and voted in parliament. Many parliaments delegate this task to a specific body charged with coordinating parliamentary business. However, we know little about the composition and powers of these “coordination committees” (CC). This paper maps the existence, composition, and institutional powers of coordination committees across 31 European parliaments. It shows that CCs exist in most parliaments and have a relatively similar composition, usually including the president of parliament, their deputies, and party group representatives, but vary strongly in their agenda-setting powers. Exploring whether this variation is related to the functional need for coordination, we find limited evidence that larger sizes of parliaments and higher ideological polarization between parties are associated with stronger coordination committees. In terms of this HSR Special Issue, we show that CCs as horizontal collective actors exist even in a hierarchical organization such as a parliament and have relevant, albeit variable, resources. KW - agenda setting KW - collective actors KW - institutional power KW - European democracies ER - TY - GEN TI - Willumsen, David M., The acceptance of party unity in parliamentary democracies / David M. Willumsen. - First edition : Oxford, 2017. - xvii, 174 Seiten : Illustrationen, Diagramme AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2023 SP - 266-267 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/58705 LA - eng AB - . KW - book review ER - TY - JOUR TI - The basic space of a revolutionary parliament : Scaling the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848/49 AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Herrmann, Michael PY - 2023 SP - 841-853 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/58704 LA - eng AB - We examine whether there is a basic space in a parliament which grew out of a revolution and had no prior history of parliamentarism: the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848/49. We scale all 299 roll call votes to determine the dimensionality of voting as well as the positions of deputies and their party groups. We find two dimensions of disagreement and show that they can be interpreted in line with historical scholarship as conflict over who should govern (the people or the monarch) and conflict over state borders (inclusion or exclusion of Austria). We find that the party groups line up on the first dimension in ways consistent with historical scholarship on their political inclinations, but we also find wide variation in deputies’ positions within and across parties. Moreover, deputies’ positions turn out to be polarized on the territorial dimension but not on the government dimension. We conclude that ideological constraint was the primary structuring force in parliamentary voting. Our results underscore the pervasiveness of low dimensionality in parliamentary voting even in the absence of strong parties and agenda control. KW - Germany KW - ideal point estimation KW - ideology KW - 19th century KW - roll call voting ER - TY - GEN TI - Schindler, Daniel, Politische Führung im Fraktionenparlament: Rolle und Steuerungsmöglichkeiten der Fraktionsvorsitzenden im Deutschen Bundestag: Baden-Baden, 2019 AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2022 VL - 31 IS - 4 SP - 627-628 PB - Taylor and Francis CY - London SN - 1743-8993 DO - 10.1080/09644008.2021.1907515 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/111172 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - Der Bundestag als Arena : Institutionelle Macht, Akteursanreize und selektive Nutzungsmuster AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2022 T2 - Politische Akteure und Institutionen in Deutschland : eine forschungsorientierte Einführung in das politische System SP - 135-154 PB - Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden CY - Wiesbaden ET - 1 SN - 978-3-658-37553-9 DO - 10.1007/978-3-658-37553-9_7 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59411 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Being Empowered or Feeling Like a Pawn? : How Ministerial Reorganization Affects the Work Motivation of Top-Level Bureaucrats AU - Dzida, Angela AU - Schmuck, David AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2022 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54604 LA - eng AB - Regierungen schneiden häufig die Zuständigkeiten und Struktur von Ministerien neu zu, um die Ämter- und Policy-Ziele der Regierungsparteien umzusetzen oder die politische Kontrolle über die Bürokratie zu erhöhen. Aber welche Auswirkungen haben derartige Reformen auf die Arbeitsmotivation und Performanz in der Ministerialbürokratie? Auf Basis der Selbstbestimmungstheorie („self-determination theory“) ist zu erwarten, dass Reformen die Möglichkeit von Bürokrat*innen reduzieren, ihre grundlegenden psychologischen Bedürfnisse nach Kompetenz, Autonomie und sozialer Eingebundenheit zu befriedigen, was ihre Arbeitsmotivation reduzieren sollte. Dieser negative Effekt sollte schwächer ausfallen, wenn Bürokrat*innen die Reform als substanziell gerechtfertigt und langfristig vorteilhaft ansehen im Vergleich zu Reformen, die als ausschließlich machtpolitisch motiviert wahrgenommen werden. Diese theoretischen Erwartungen bestätigen sich in Interviews mit deutschen Spitzenbeamt*innen in zwei Politikfeldern (Bauwesen und Verbraucherschutz), die in jüngerer Vergangenheit wiederholt zwischen Ministerien verschoben wurden. Der Aufsatz zeigt, dass organisatorischer Wandel selbst bei Spitzenbeamt*innen Auswirkungen auf die Arbeitsmotivation hat. Diese Befunde haben weiterreichende Implikationen für unser Verständnis der Motivation und Performanz von Bürokrat*innen sowie der unbeabsichtigten Nebenwirkungen von Verwaltungsreformen. KW - Institutionenreform KW - Ministerialbürokratie KW - Self-determination theory KW - Interviews ER - TY - JOUR TI - Do party system parameters explain differences in legislative organization? : Fragmentation, polarization, and the density of regulation in European parliaments, 1945–2009 AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Höhmann, Daniel PY - 2022 SP - 597-610 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54885 LA - eng AB - The article studies whether the party system characteristics fragmentation and ideological polarization increase the density of institutional regulation in parliaments. It introduces a comprehensive time-series-cross-sectional dataset of standing orders in 15 Western European parliaments that allows studying how densely various fields of legislative activity such as lawmaking, controlling the government, and creating publicity were regulated over a period of more than 60 years. Descriptively, the data show increased regulation in all areas but also some variation between countries. Dynamic panel regression analyses for non-stationary time series find no systematic effect of fragmentation or polarization on the density of regulation indicating that large parts of legislative organization change for reasons unrelated to party system dynamics. We identify changes in the environment of legislatures such as increasing complexity and professionalization of politics, technological change, and Europeanization as potential drivers of such Pareto-efficient reforms. KW - legislative organization KW - parliamentary rules KW - party systems, KW - polarization KW - Western Europe ER - TY - JOUR TI - Being Empowered or Feeling Like a Pawn? : How Ministerial Reorganization Affects the Work Motivation of Top-Level Bureaucrats AU - Dzida, Angela AU - Schmuck, David AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2022 JO - Politische Vierteljahresschrift : PVS : German political science quarterly VL - 63 IS - 3 PB - Springer CY - Berlin ; Heidelberg SN - 1862-2860 DO - 10.1007/s11615-022-00394-7 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54715 LA - eng AB - Regierungen schneiden häufig die Zuständigkeiten und Struktur von Ministerien neu zu, um die Ämter- und Policy-Ziele der Regierungsparteien umzusetzen oder die politische Kontrolle über die Bürokratie zu erhöhen. Aber welche Auswirkungen haben derartige Reformen auf die Arbeitsmotivation und Performanz in der Ministerialbürokratie? Auf Basis der Selbstbestimmungstheorie („self-determination theory“) ist zu erwarten, dass Reformen die Möglichkeit von Bürokrat*innen reduzieren, ihre grundlegenden psychologischen Bedürfnisse nach Kompetenz, Autonomie und sozialer Eingebundenheit zu befriedigen, was ihre Arbeitsmotivation reduzieren sollte. Dieser negative Effekt sollte schwächer ausfallen, wenn Bürokrat*innen die Reform als substanziell gerechtfertigt und langfristig vorteilhaft ansehen im Vergleich zu Reformen, die als ausschließlich machtpolitisch motiviert wahrgenommen werden. Diese theoretischen Erwartungen bestätigen sich in Interviews mit deutschen Spitzenbeamt*innen in zwei Politikfeldern (Bauwesen und Verbraucherschutz), die in jüngerer Vergangenheit wiederholt zwischen Ministerien verschoben wurden. Der Aufsatz zeigt, dass organisatorischer Wandel selbst bei Spitzenbeamt*innen Auswirkungen auf die Arbeitsmotivation hat. Diese Befunde haben weiterreichende Implikationen für unser Verständnis der Motivation und Performanz von Bürokrat*innen sowie der unbeabsichtigten Nebenwirkungen von Verwaltungsreformen. KW - Institutionenreform KW - Ministerialbürokratie KW - Self-determination theory KW - Interviews ER - TY - JOUR TI - Parteienwettbewerb im Bundestag nach dem Einzug der AfD und während der Corona-Krise : eine Analyse namentlicher Abstimmungen AU - Hohendorf, Lukas AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2022 JO - Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen : ZParl VL - 53 IS - 2 SP - 261-286 PB - Nomos-Verl.-Ges. CY - Baden-Baden SN - 0340-1758 DO - 10.5771/0340-1758-2022-2-261 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54602 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Opposition in times of crisis : COVID-19 in parliamentary debates AU - Louwerse, Tom AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Tuttnauer, Or AU - Andeweg, Rudy B. PY - 2021 SP - 1025-1051 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59453 LA - eng AB - The COVID-19 pandemic presents an exceptional crisis situation not only for governments, but also for politicians in opposition. This article analyses opposition party expressed sentiment vis-a-vis government actions and policies during the first six months of 2020. Based on an original content analysis of parliamentary debates in four established parliamentary democracies (Germany, Israel, Netherlands, United Kingdom), relatively positive opposition expressed sentiment in parliament early on during the crisis is observed, in line with a ‘rally effect’ observed in public opinion. Sentiment turned more negative as the first wave of the crisis abated. Larger opposition parties with considerable prior government experience were more positive than larger parties without such experience. KW - opposition KW - government KW - parliament KW - COVID-19 KW - legislative behaviour ER - TY - JOUR TI - Opposition in times of crisis : COVID-19 in parliamentary debates AU - Louwerse, Tom AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Tuttnauer, Or AU - Andeweg, Rudy B. PY - 2021 JO - West European Politics VL - 44 IS - 5-6 SP - 1025-1051 PB - Taylor & Francis CY - Abingdon SN - 1743-9655 DO - 10.1080/01402382.2021.1886519 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59478 LA - eng AB - The COVID-19 pandemic presents an exceptional crisis situation not only for governments, but also for politicians in opposition. This article analyses opposition party expressed sentiment vis-a-vis government actions and policies during the first six months of 2020. Based on an original content analysis of parliamentary debates in four established parliamentary democracies (Germany, Israel, Netherlands, United Kingdom), relatively positive opposition expressed sentiment in parliament early on during the crisis is observed, in line with a ‘rally effect’ observed in public opinion. Sentiment turned more negative as the first wave of the crisis abated. Larger opposition parties with considerable prior government experience were more positive than larger parties without such experience. KW - opposition KW - government KW - parliament KW - COVID-19 KW - legislative behaviour ER - TY - JOUR TI - Do party system parameters explain differences in legislative organization? : Fragmentation, polarization, and the density of regulation in European parliaments, 1945–2009 AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Höhmann, Daniel PY - 2021 JO - Party politics : an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations VL - 28 IS - 4 SP - 597-610 PB - Sage Publ. CY - London [u.a.] SN - 1460-3683 DO - 10.1177/13540688211002490 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54603 LA - eng AB - The article studies whether the party system characteristics fragmentation and ideological polarization increase the density of institutional regulation in parliaments. It introduces a comprehensive time-series-cross-sectional dataset of standing orders in 15 Western European parliaments that allows studying how densely various fields of legislative activity such as lawmaking, controlling the government, and creating publicity were regulated over a period of more than 60 years. Descriptively, the data show increased regulation in all areas but also some variation between countries. Dynamic panel regression analyses for non-stationary time series find no systematic effect of fragmentation or polarization on the density of regulation indicating that large parts of legislative organization change for reasons unrelated to party system dynamics. We identify changes in the environment of legislatures such as increasing complexity and professionalization of politics, technological change, and Europeanization as potential drivers of such Pareto-efficient reforms. KW - legislative organization KW - parliamentary rules KW - party systems, KW - polarization KW - Western Europe ER - TY - CHAP TI - Party unity in parliamentary democracies: A comparative analysis AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2021 T2 - The impact of legislatures : a quarter-century of The Journal of Legislative Studies SP - 141-169 PB - Routledge CY - London ; New York SN - 978-0-367-47144-6 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/50077 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Veto power fosters cooperative behaviour: institutional incentives and government-opposition voting in the German Bundestag AU - Hohendorf, Lukas AU - Saalfeld, Thomas AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2021 JO - West European politics VL - 44 IS - 4 SP - 921-945 PB - Taylor & Francis CY - Abingdon SN - 0140-2382 DO - 10.1080/01402382.2020.1739868 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47749 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Mandate type, electoral safety, and defections from the party line: The conditional mandate divide in the German Bundestag, 1949–2013 AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Ohmura, Tamaki PY - 2021 JO - Party politics : an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations VL - 27 IS - 4 SP - 704-715 PB - Sage Publ. CY - London [u.a.] SN - 1354-0688 DO - 10.1177/1354068819881637 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/46663 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - ‘Going institutional’ to overcome obstruction : Explaining the suppression of minority rights in Western European parliaments, 1945−2010 AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Dutkowski, Julia F. AU - Meißner, Peter AU - Müller, Wolfgang C. PY - 2020 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg DO - 10.20378/irb-47364 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47364 LA - eng AB - When and why do parliamentary majorities in Europe suppress parliamentary minority rights? This article argues that such reforms are driven by substantive policy conflict in interaction with existing minority rights. Government parties curb minority rights if they fear minority obstruction due to increased policy conflict and a minority-friendly institutional status quo. Empirical support is found for this claim using comparative data on all reforms in 13 Western European parliaments since 1945. A curbing of minority rights is significantly more likely under conditions of heightened policy conflict and these effects are stronger the more the institutional status quo favours opposition parties. Contrary to frequent claims of consensual rule changes from single-country studies in Europe, these findings demonstrate the importance of competitive strategies in explaining institutional reform in European parliaments. The conditional impact of the status quo provides interesting theoretical links to historical institutionalist arguments on path dependence. KW - institutional reform; parliamentary minority rights; obstruction; political competition; Western Europe ER - TY - JOUR TI - ‘Going institutional’ to overcome obstruction: Explaining the suppression of minority rights in Western European parliaments, 1945−2010 AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Dutkowski, Julia F. AU - Meißner, Peter AU - Müller, Wolfgang C. PY - 2020 JO - European Journal of Political Research VL - 59 IS - 4 SP - 886-909 PB - Blackwell Publ. CY - Oxford SN - 0304-4130 DO - 10.1111/1475-6765.12376 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47392 LA - eng AB - When and why do parliamentary majorities in Europe suppress parliamentary minority rights? This article argues that such reforms are driven by substantive policy conflict in interaction with existing minority rights. Government parties curb minority rights if they fear minority obstruction due to increased policy conflict and a minority-friendly institutional status quo. Empirical support is found for this claim using comparative data on all reforms in 13 Western European parliaments since 1945. A curbing of minority rights is significantly more likely under conditions of heightened policy conflict and these effects are stronger the more the institutional status quo favours opposition parties. Contrary to frequent claims of consensual rule changes from single-country studies in Europe, these findings demonstrate the importance of competitive strategies in explaining institutional reform in European parliaments. The conditional impact of the status quo provides interesting theoretical links to historical institutionalist arguments on path dependence. KW - institutional reform; parliamentary minority rights; obstruction; political competition; Western Europe ER - TY - CHAP TI - Oppositional Strategies Between Cooperation and Conflict: An Analysis of Opposition Party Voting in the German Bundestag, 1949–2013 AU - Hohendorf, Lukas AU - Saalfeld, Thomas AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2020 T2 - Continuity and Change of Party Democracies in Europe SP - 309-342 PB - Springer VS CY - Wiesbaden SN - 978-3-658-28987-4 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47342 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Short-lived Parliamentarisation in 19th-century Germany: Parliamentary Government in the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848/1849 AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Herrmann, Michael PY - 2020 JO - Parliamentary affairs : a journal of representative politics VL - 73 IS - 3 SP - 603-626 PB - Oxford Univ. Press CY - London SN - 0031-2290 DO - 10.1093/pa/gsz013 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/45788 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Parliamentary questions as a control mechanism in coalition governments AU - Höhmann, Daniel AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2020 JO - West European Politics VL - 43 IS - 1 SP - 225-249 PB - Taylor & Francis CY - Abingdon SN - 0140-2382 DO - 10.1080/01402382.2019.1611986 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/45770 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Roll-Call Votes in the German Bundestag: A New Dataset, 1949–2013 AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Saalfeld, Thomas AU - Bergmann, Henning AU - Ohmura, Tamaki AU - Bailer, Stefanie PY - 2020 JO - British Journal of Political Science VL - 50 IS - 3 SP - 1137-1145 PB - Cambridge Univ. Press CY - London SN - 0007-1234 DO - 10.1017/S0007123418000406 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/45034 LA - eng ER - TY - GEN TI - Willumsen, David M., The acceptance of party unity in parliamentary democracies / David M. Willumsen. - First edition : Oxford, 2017. - xvii, 174 Seiten : Illustrationen, Diagramme AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2019 VL - 26 IS - 2 SP - 266-267 PB - Sage Publ. CY - London [u.a.] SN - 1354-0688 DO - 10.1177/1354068819894539 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47391 LA - eng AB - . KW - book review ER - TY - JOUR TI - Bonding in Pursuit of Policy Goals: How MPs Choose Political Parties in the Legislative State of Nature AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Herrmann, Michael PY - 2019 JO - Legislative Studies Quarterly VL - 44 IS - 3 SP - 455-486 CY - Iowa City, Iowa SN - 0362-9805 DO - 10.1111/lsq.12231 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47378 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - The Political Dynamics of Portfolio Design in European Democracies AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Meyer, Thomas M. AU - Bäck, Hanna AU - Ceron, Andrea AU - Falcó-Gimeno, Albert AU - Guinaudeau, Isabelle AU - Hansen, Martin Ejnar AU - Kolltveit, Kristoffer AU - Louwerse, Tom AU - Müller, Wolfgang C. AU - Persson, Thomas PY - 2019 JO - British Journal of Political Science VL - 51 IS - 2 SP - 1-16 PB - Cambridge Univ. Press CY - London SN - 0007-1234 DO - 10.1017/S0007123419000346 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47374 LA - eng ER - TY - BOOK TI - Framework. Network. Career. How the framework of a Graduate School propels junior research and contributes on an international level AU - Bernsdorff, Katrin AU - Bartels, Mareike AU - Christoph, Simon Moritz Friedrich Maxi AU - Kraj, Agata Maria AU - Martínez Cantó, Javier AU - Saalfeld, Thomas AU - Schmitz, Theresa AU - Seifert, Olaf AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Siemeister, Sarah AU - Steger, Diana AU - Dos Reis Gonçalves, Madalena AU - Winnwa, Isabel AU - Zoch, Gundula ED - Bernsdorff, Katrin ED - Saalfeld, Thomas PY - 2019 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg DO - 10.20378/irb-46604 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/46604 LA - eng AB - The publication covers the period of funding under the DFG Excellence Initiative 2012–2019, a timespan that the Bamberg Graduate School of Social Sciences utilised to build a solid and scalable framework to propel junior research on an international level. It contains interviews with researchers who passed through the Graduate School, whether junior academics, who just got into research or established scientists who are on-going passionate about it. Plus, the publication presents essays that give insights into research projects, thematic analyses, and collaborations. KW - Graduate school, doctoral research, multi-disciplinary research, structured programme, careers in academia, scientific network, visualizing research ER - TY - JOUR TI - The basic space of a revolutionary parliament : Scaling the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848/49 AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Herrmann, Michael PY - 2019 JO - Party politics : an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations VL - 25 IS - 6 PB - Sage Publ. CY - London [u.a.] SN - 1354-0688 DO - 10.1177/1354068817749778 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43936 LA - eng AB - We examine whether there is a basic space in a parliament which grew out of a revolution and had no prior history of parliamentarism: the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848/49. We scale all 299 roll call votes to determine the dimensionality of voting as well as the positions of deputies and their party groups. We find two dimensions of disagreement and show that they can be interpreted in line with historical scholarship as conflict over who should govern (the people or the monarch) and conflict over state borders (inclusion or exclusion of Austria). We find that the party groups line up on the first dimension in ways consistent with historical scholarship on their political inclinations, but we also find wide variation in deputies’ positions within and across parties. Moreover, deputies’ positions turn out to be polarized on the territorial dimension but not on the government dimension. We conclude that ideological constraint was the primary structuring force in parliamentary voting. Our results underscore the pervasiveness of low dimensionality in parliamentary voting even in the absence of strong parties and agenda control. KW - Germany KW - ideal point estimation KW - ideology KW - 19th century KW - roll call voting ER - TY - JOUR TI - Measuring re-election prospects across electoral systems: a general approach applied to Germany AU - Stoffel, Michael F. AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2018 JO - West European Politics VL - 41 IS - 5 SP - 1191--1207 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis CY - Abingdon SN - 0140-2382 DO - 10.1080/01402382.2017.1400273 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47386 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Measuring reelection prospects across electoral systems : A general approach applied to Germany AU - Stoffel, Michael F. AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2018 JO - West European Politics VL - 41 IS - 5 SP - 1191-1207 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis CY - Basingstoke [u.a.] SN - 1743-9655 DO - 10.1080/01402382.2017.1400273 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42977 LA - eng AB - This research note presents a general approach for measuring the electoral safety of individual MPs across electoral systems that is based on predicted re-election probabilities estimated from multilevel logistic regression models. In contrast to existing measures, this method yields estimates on an intuitive and readily comparable probability scale, captures the higher sensitivity of re-election prospects to electoral change in the range of close races, and can accommodate regional differences in context conditions such as volatility. The paper implements the approach for two archetypical electoral systems – first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems and closed-list proportional representation (PR) – and estimates re-election prospects for the FPTP and PR tiers of the German mixed electoral system in all Bundestag elections since 1957. While the empirical data presented here is mainly illustrative, the concluding section highlights various questions that future research can address with the new measure. KW - Electoral safety, electoral systems, electoral competition, mixed electoral systems, Germany, dataset ER - TY - JOUR TI - Aiming higher: The consequences of progressive ambition among MPs in European parliaments AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Müller, Wolfgang C. PY - 2017 JO - European Political Science Review VL - 9 IS - 1 SP - 27--50 PB - Cambridge University Press ({CUP}) DO - 10.1017/s1755773915000260 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47365 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Shadow chairs as monitoring device? : A comparative analysis of committee chair powers in Western European parliaments AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Höhmann, Daniel PY - 2017 JO - Journal of Legislative Studies VL - 23 IS - 3 SP - 301-325 PB - Taylor & Francis CY - London SN - 1743-9337 DO - 10.1080/13572334.2017.1358980 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42902 LA - eng AB - Recent work on coalition governance claims that government parties use the chairs of parliamentary committees to ‘shadow’ ministers and thus to monitor coalition partners. This argument rests on the assumption that committee chairs enjoy special powers to extract information from ministries and to affect policy-making in committee. To test this assumption, the paper develops the first comparative measure of committee chair powers in fifteen Western European democracies. The analysis shows that most committee chairs have very limited formal powers and that the share of shadowing chairs does not increase when committee chairs are more powerful. Both findings cast doubt on the interpretation of shadow chairs as a monitoring device. We sketch an alternative explanation according to which coalition parties employ the shadowing strategy in order to increase public visibility and to counteract issue ownership by the minister’s party. KW - Institutional power KW - Parliamentary committees KW - Committee chairs KW - Monitoring KW - Coalition governance ER - TY - JOUR TI - Aiming Higher : The Consequences of Progressive Ambition among MPs in European Parliaments AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Müller, Wolfgang C PY - 2017 JO - European political science review : EPSR ; a journal of the European Consortium for Political Research VL - 9 IS - 1 SP - 27-50 PB - Cambridge Univ. Press CY - Cambridge SN - 1755-7739 DO - 10.1017/S1755773915000260 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/41661 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Aiming Higher : The Consequences of Progressive Ambition among MPs in European Parliaments AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Müller, Wolfgang PY - 2017 JO - European political science review : EPSR ; a journal of the European Consortium for Political Research VL - 9 IS - 1 SP - 27-50 PB - Cambridge Univ. Press CY - Cambridge SN - 1755-7739 DO - 10.1017/S1755773915000260 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/40480 LA - eng ER - TY - GEN TI - The Politics of Parliamentary Debate: Parties, Rebels and Representation AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2016 VL - 39 SP - 903--904 PB - Informa {UK} Limited SN - 0140-2382 DO - 10.1080/01402382.2016.1166736 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47375 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Mapping and Explaining Parliamentary Rule Changes in Europe: A Research Program AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Meißner, Peter AU - Keh, Julia AU - Müller, Wolfgang C PY - 2016 JO - Legislative studies quarterly VL - 41 IS - 1 SP - 61-88 CY - Iowa City, Iowa SN - 0362-9805 DO - 10.1111/lsq.12106 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/40509 LA - eng ER - TY - GEN TI - Proksch, Sven-Oliver, Slapin, Jonathan B., The politics of parliamentary debate : parties, rebels and representation: Cambridge [u.a.], 2015 AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2016 VL - 39 IS - 4 SP - 903-904 PB - Taylor & Francis CY - Abingdon SN - 0140-2382 DO - 10.1080/01402382.2016.1166736 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/40519 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Lehren aus Weimar? Die erste Geschäftsordnung des Deutschen Bundestages von 1951 zwischen Kontinuität und Wandel AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2016 JO - Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen : ZParl VL - 47 IS - 1 SP - 3-25 PB - Nomos-Verl.-Ges. CY - Baden-Baden SN - 0340-1758 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/40450 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Namentliche Abstimmungen im Bundestag 1949 bis 2013 : Befunde aus einem neuen Datensatz AU - Bergmann, Henning AU - Bailer, Stefanie AU - Ohmura, Tamaki AU - Saalfeld, Thomas AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2016 JO - Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen VL - 47 IS - 1 SP - 26-50 PB - Nomos-Verl.-Ges. CY - Baden-Baden SN - 0340-1758 DO - 10.5771/0340-1758-2016-1-26 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/40308 LA - deu AB - Roll call votes provide crucial data for the study of parliamentary behaviour. A novel dataset on all recorded votes in the Bundestag between 1949 and 2013 combines information on MPs’ individual voting behaviour with contextual information on the respective motions and individual characteristics of MPs. First analyses illustrate potential applications for these novel data. First, there is substantial variation in the request for recorded votes over time. The observed patterns are consistent with theoretical models that understand roll call vote request as an instrument by which parliamentary party groups signal policy positions and enforce intra-party unity. Second, differences in voting unity between parties and over time can be identified. This variation can be partly explained by established theories but also highlights the need for further analysis. KW - Deutscher Bundestag KW - Namentliche Abstimmungen KW - Franktionsdisziplin KW - Recorded votes KW - party unity ER - TY - JOUR TI - Explaining Reforms of Minority Rights in Parliaments : A Theoretical Framework with Case Study Application AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Müller, Wolfgang C PY - 2015 JO - West European Politics VL - 38 IS - 5, Special Issue: Explaining Legislative Organisation in European Democracies SP - 997-1019 PB - Taylor & Francis CY - Abingdon SN - 0140-2382 DO - 10.1080/01402382.2015.1045321 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/40525 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - Hire or Fire? The Link between Cabinet Investiture and Removal in Parliamentary Democracies, AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2015 T2 - Parliaments and government formation : unpacking investiture rules SP - 309-330 PB - Oxford University Press CY - Oxford SN - 978-0-19-874701-7 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/40526 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Die Politik des Ressortzuschnitts zwischen Koalitionsarithmetik und thematischer Profilierung : Eine koalitionspolitische Erklärung für Kompetenzänderungen der Bundesministerien AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2015 JO - Politische Vierteljahresschrift : PVS ; Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft VL - 56 IS - 1 SP - 77-103 PB - Nomos CY - Baden-Baden DO - 10.5771/0032-3470-2015-1-77 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/40514 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Using MP Statements to Explain Voting Behavior in the German Bundestag : An Individual-level Test of the Competing Principals Theory AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2015 JO - Party politics : an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations VL - 21 IS - 2 SP - 284-294 PB - Sage Publ. CY - London [u.a.] SN - 1460-3683 DO - 10.1177/1354068812472584 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/40484 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Konzeptionalisierung und Messung formalen Institutionenwandels – Das Beispiel parlamentarische Regeln AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Meißner, Peter AU - Keh, Julia F. AU - Müller, Wolfgang C. PY - 2014 JO - Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft VL - 8 IS - 3-4 SP - 237--262 PB - Springer Nature SN - 1865-2646 DO - 10.1007/s12286-014-0216-7 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47370 LA - deu ER - TY - CHAP TI - Procedure and Rules in Legislatures AU - Müller, Wolfgang C AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2014 T2 - The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies SP - 311-331 PB - Oxford University Press DO - 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199653010.013.0023 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47367 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Elections in Western European parliaments AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2012 JO - European Journal of Political Research VL - 52 IS - 4 SP - 512--535 PB - Wiley-Blackwell SN - 0304-4130 DO - 10.1111/1475-6765.12007 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47384 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Checks or Toothless Tigers? Powers and Incentives of External Officeholders to Constrain the Cabinet in 25 European Democracies AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2012 JO - Government and Opposition VL - 47 IS - 4 SP - 517--543 PB - Cambridge University Press ({CUP}) SN - 0017-257X DO - 10.1111/j.1477-7053.2012.01373.x UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47383 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - Germany: Limited Government Agenda Control and Strong Minority Rights AU - Hönnige, Christoph AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2011 T2 - The Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting SP - 21-37 PB - Routledge CY - London UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47390 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Reforming the Rules of the Parliamentary Game: Measuring and Explaining Changes in Parliamentary Rules in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, 1945–2010 AU - Sieberer, Ulrich AU - Müller, Wolfgang C. AU - Heller, Maiko Isabelle PY - 2011 JO - West European Politics VL - 34 IS - 5 SP - 948--975 PB - Informa {UK} Limited SN - 0140-2382 DO - 10.1080/01402382.2011.591079 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47380 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - The Institutional Power of Western European Parliaments: A Multidimensional Analysis AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2011 JO - West European Politics VL - 34 IS - 4 SP - 731--754 PB - Informa {UK} Limited SN - 0140-2382 DO - 10.1080/01402382.2011.572389 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47371 LA - eng ER - TY - BOOK TI - Parlamente als Wahlorgane AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2010 PB - Nomos CY - Baden-Baden DO - 10.5771/9783845222721 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47387 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Behavioral consequences of mixed electoral systems: Deviating voting behavior of district and list MPs in the German Bundestag AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2010 JO - Electoral Studies VL - 29 IS - 3 SP - 484--496 PB - Elsevier {BV} SN - 0261-3794 DO - 10.1016/j.electstud.2010.04.012 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47363 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - Können ja – Wollen nein? Die Anreize außerparlamentarischer Amtsträger zur Beschränkung der Regierung AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2009 T2 - Parlamentarismusforschung in Deutschland SP - 301--322 PB - Nomos DO - 10.5771/9783845218236-301 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47376 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Discipline, Electoral Rules and Defection in the Bundestag, 1983–94 AU - Becher, Michael AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2008 JO - German Politics VL - 17 IS - 3 SP - 293--304 PB - Informa {UK} Limited SN - 0964-4008 DO - 10.1080/09644000802300510 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47381 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Prinzipal Parlament. Die Bedeutung europäischer Parlamente als Wahlorgane AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2008 JO - Politische Vierteljahresschrift VL - 49 IS - 2 SP - 251--282 PB - Nomos Verlag SN - 0032-3470 DO - 10.1007/s11615-008-0099-9 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47372 LA - deu ER - TY - CHAP TI - »Aber könnte es nicht auch sein dass…?« Die Auswahl unabhängiger Variablen in X-zentrierten und Y-zentrierten Forschungsdesigns AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2007 T2 - Forschungsdesign in der Politikwissenschaft. Probleme – Strategien – Anwendungen SP - 253-279 PB - Campus CY - Frankfurt a.M. UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47389 LA - deu ER - TY - CHAP TI - Selecting Independent Variables: Competing Recommendations for Factor-Centric and Outcome-Centric Research Designs AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2007 T2 - Research Design in Political Science. How to Practice what they Preach SP - 163--182 PB - Palgrave Macmillan {UK} CY - Houndmills SN - 978-0-230-01947-8 DO - 10.1057/9780230598881_9 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47369 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - Party Law AU - Müller, Wolfgang C. AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2006 T2 - Handbook of Party Politics SP - 435--445 PB - {SAGE} Publications Ltd CY - London DO - 10.4135/9781848608047.n38 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47388 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Party unity in parliamentary democracies: A comparative analysis AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2006 JO - The Journal of Legislative Studies VL - 12 IS - 2 SP - 150--178 PB - Informa {UK} Limited SN - 1357-2334 DO - 10.1080/13572330600739413 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47379 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Agenda setting in the German Bundestag: A weak government in a consensus democracy AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2006 JO - German Politics VL - 15 IS - 1 SP - 49--72 PB - Informa {UK} Limited SN - 0964-4008 DO - 10.1080/09644000500534972 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47377 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Strategische Zurückhaltung von Verfassungsgerichten Gewaltenteilungsvorstellungen und die Grenzen der Justizialisierung AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2006 JO - Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft VL - 16 IS - 4 SP - 1299--1323 PB - Nomos Verlag SN - 1430-6387 DO - 10.5771/1430-6387-2006-4-1299 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47368 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - The Democratic Quality of Institutional Regimes: A Conceptual Framework AU - Kaiser, André AU - Lehnert, Matthias AU - Miller, Bernhard AU - Sieberer, Ulrich PY - 2002 JO - Political Studies VL - 50 IS - 2 SP - 313-331 PB - SAGE Publications SN - 0032-3217 DO - 10.1111/1467-9248.t01-1-00372 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47385 LA - eng ER -