TY - JOUR TI - Specialized Committees of International Organizations an Important Source of Organizational Autonomy AU - Giesen, Michael AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Linder, Simon AU - Rixen, Thomas PY - 2026 SP - 1055-1069 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/116514 LA - eng AB - Assigning the preparation of decisions to specialized committees composed of member state representatives is a widespread response to the ‘governor's dilemma’, that is, the tension between competence and control, in international organizations (IOs). We theorize a causal mechanism referring to self-selection and agenda-setting effects and show how the resulting division of labor among IO bodies produces organizational influence beyond current accounts of committee governance. We demonstrate why specialized committees develop a distinct rationale of accommodating expertise with member state preferences, even if composed of member state representatives, and why agreed committee proposals are difficult to overcome by final decision-making bodies. We argue that the organization of IO decision processes constitutes an important source of IO autonomy beyond the activities of IO administrations and independent from socialization or predispositions of individual committee members. Empirically, we show that IO committees meet the theoretically derived prerequisites for activating the causal mechanism and trace how committee influence according to the mechanism has shaped an important IO decision. KW - agenda setting KW - autonomy KW - committee KW - international organization KW - specialization ER - TY - JOUR TI - Specialized Committees of International Organizations an Important Source of Organizational Autonomy AU - Giesen, Michael AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Linder, Simon AU - Rixen, Thomas PY - 2026 JO - Regulation & governance VL - 20 IS - 3 SP - 1055-1069 PB - Wiley-Blackwell CY - Hoboken, NJ SN - 1748-5991 DO - 10.1111/rego.70022 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/112921 LA - eng AB - Assigning the preparation of decisions to specialized committees composed of member state representatives is a widespread response to the ‘governor's dilemma’, that is, the tension between competence and control, in international organizations (IOs). We theorize a causal mechanism referring to self-selection and agenda-setting effects and show how the resulting division of labor among IO bodies produces organizational influence beyond current accounts of committee governance. We demonstrate why specialized committees develop a distinct rationale of accommodating expertise with member state preferences, even if composed of member state representatives, and why agreed committee proposals are difficult to overcome by final decision-making bodies. We argue that the organization of IO decision processes constitutes an important source of IO autonomy beyond the activities of IO administrations and independent from socialization or predispositions of individual committee members. Empirically, we show that IO committees meet the theoretically derived prerequisites for activating the causal mechanism and trace how committee influence according to the mechanism has shaped an important IO decision. KW - agenda setting KW - autonomy KW - committee KW - international organization KW - specialization ER - TY - CHAP TI - Regimekomplexe AU - Becker, Manuel AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2025 T2 - Internationale Institutionen : Typen, Theorien und Themenfelder SP - 171-205 PB - Springer VS CY - Wiesbaden, Germany SN - 9783658472696 DO - 10.1007/978-3-658-47270-2_5 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/116900 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Organizational Autonomy Beyond the Secretariat : Lessons from the Green Climate Fund AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Vizitiu, Patrick PY - 2024 JO - Global environmental politics VL - 24 IS - 4 SP - 83-104 PB - MIT Press CY - Cambridge, Mass. SN - 1536-0091 DO - 10.1162/glep_a_00764 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/108189 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - International Organizations as Group Actors : how Institutional Procedures Create Organizational Independence without Delegation to Institutional Agents AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2024 SP - 94-124 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59925 LA - eng AB - Can international organizations (IOs) gain independence from their member states, even if their decisions arise from member state bodies? While organizational independence is a precondition for the autonomy and agency of IOs, International Relations theory cannot yet grasp IO independence in the absence of institutional agents like secretariats. Drawing on collective actor theories with a strong micro-foundation from philosophy and sociology, this article demonstrates how organizational rules and procedures gradually shape organizational processes and produce collective effects that do not arise from the aggregation of member state activities. Member-dominated IOs can produce collective beliefs about relevant parts of the outside world that differ from the aggregated beliefs of member states. They can comprise institutionalized organizational goals and criteria that indicate collective intentions of organizational action and differ from the aggregate preferences of member states. They can comprise decision-making procedures that foster organizational decisions according to collective beliefs and intentions and reduce or abolish the relevance of bargaining and preference aggregation. Finally, they can act in ways that do not immediately rely on implementation action by the member states or by other lower-level actors. I conclude that analyzing the sources of independence of member-dominated IOs from their members sheds light on the nature and effects of IOs as group actors. KW - Collective actor KW - international organization KW - independence KW - autonomy KW - corporate agency KW - authority KW - pooling ER - TY - GEN TI - Collective Agency : the Emergence and Effects of Non-hierarchical Collective Agency (Special Issue) ED - Marx, Johannes ED - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2023 VL - 48 IS - 3 PB - GESIS CY - Mannheim SN - 0936-6784 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/91976 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Group Actors : Why Social Science Should Care About Collective Agency AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Marx, Johannes PY - 2023 SP - 7-39 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59924 LA - eng AB - This paper examines conceptual issues of the emer-gence and effects of collective agency. Collective agency seems to challenge the methodological individualist assumption that only individuals can act, but treating group actors, such as parliamentary committees or court cham-bers, as mere shortcuts for complex interactions among group members raises important theoretical, empirical, and normative issues. First, the paper discusses some fundamental issues of collective agency. We argue that anal-yses of collective agency must provide generative mechanisms that demon-strate how it arises from the interaction of group members. Second, the paper introduces major approaches to collective agency from analytical philosophy and sociology. They locate the source of collective agency in the formation of collective intentions through the adjustment of group members’ attitudes, in the organization of group decision processes, or in the transfer of resources to the group level, which empowers a collective actor to act in its own right. Against this backdrop, this paper offers an integrative concept of collective agency characterized in terms of the degree of autonomy and the level of re-sources controlled by a collective actor. Third, this paper introduces the con-tributions to this special issue, which tackle a broad variety of issues, includ-ing the formation and consequences of collective intentions in small and unorganized groups, collective agency issues of institutionalized groups and organizations, collective agency of large and unorganized groups without de-fined memberships, and normative issues of collective agency. KW - Collective intentions KW - collective agency KW - group actors. ER - TY - JOUR TI - Group Actors : Why Social Science Should Care About Collective Agency AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Marx, Johannes PY - 2023 JO - Historical Social Research VL - 48 IS - 3 SP - 7-39 PB - GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences CY - Mannheim SN - 0172-6404 DO - 10.12759/HSR.48.2023.23 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59970 LA - eng AB - This paper examines conceptual issues of the emer-gence and effects of collective agency. Collective agency seems to challenge the methodological individualist assumption that only individuals can act, but treating group actors, such as parliamentary committees or court cham-bers, as mere shortcuts for complex interactions among group members raises important theoretical, empirical, and normative issues. First, the paper discusses some fundamental issues of collective agency. We argue that anal-yses of collective agency must provide generative mechanisms that demon-strate how it arises from the interaction of group members. Second, the paper introduces major approaches to collective agency from analytical philosophy and sociology. They locate the source of collective agency in the formation of collective intentions through the adjustment of group members’ attitudes, in the organization of group decision processes, or in the transfer of resources to the group level, which empowers a collective actor to act in its own right. Against this backdrop, this paper offers an integrative concept of collective agency characterized in terms of the degree of autonomy and the level of re-sources controlled by a collective actor. Third, this paper introduces the con-tributions to this special issue, which tackle a broad variety of issues, includ-ing the formation and consequences of collective intentions in small and unorganized groups, collective agency issues of institutionalized groups and organizations, collective agency of large and unorganized groups without de-fined memberships, and normative issues of collective agency. KW - Collective intentions KW - collective agency KW - group actors. ER - TY - JOUR TI - The treaty management organization established under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement : an international actor in its own right? AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Spielmann, Linda PY - 2023 SP - 1-18 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59923 LA - eng AB - A peculiar treaty management organization operates under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement that does not fit established categories of international law and political science. Unlike traditional international organizations (IOs), it lacks the formal status of an IO, comprises only a limited secretariat with predominantly servicing functions, and is not even denominated as an organization. We argue that it has nevertheless become an international actor, mainly due to activities of its Conference of the Parties and several specialized organizational schemes. Theoretically, we develop an analytical framework that shows how even heavily member-dominated IOs can become international actors and what this means for global environmental governance. IOs gain the capability to influence international politics by their own action if authorized to make decisions with external effects. They gain autonomy if organizational rules and procedures shape organizational decision-making and create specific organizational rationales. Empirically, we demonstrate that the organizational component of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement has acquired both considerable action capability and autonomy. It is authorized to flesh out the skeletal provisions of the constituent treaties through far-reaching COP decisions and to decide continuously in several specialized organizational schemes, especially on climate funding, cooperation mechanisms, and compliance management. Organizational decisions are heavily influenced by autonomy-creating organizational factors, such as path dependence, fundamental organizational norms and dense sets of decision criteria. We conclude that this organization, and the organizational components of other multilateral environmental agreements, point at important organizational effects, which merit further attention. KW - International organization KW - International actor KW - Authority KW - Autonomy KW - UNFCCC KW - Paris agreement ER - TY - JOUR TI - International Organizations as Group Actors : how Institutional Procedures Create Organizational Independence without Delegation to Institutional Agents AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2023 JO - Historical Social Research : the official journal of QUANTUM and INTERQUANT ; HSR ; an international journal for the application of formal methods to history = Historische Sozialforschung VL - 48 IS - 3 SP - 94-124 PB - GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences CY - Köln SN - 0172-6404 DO - 10.12759/HSR.48.2023.27 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59963 LA - eng AB - Can international organizations (IOs) gain independence from their member states, even if their decisions arise from member state bodies? While organizational independence is a precondition for the autonomy and agency of IOs, International Relations theory cannot yet grasp IO independence in the absence of institutional agents like secretariats. Drawing on collective actor theories with a strong micro-foundation from philosophy and sociology, this article demonstrates how organizational rules and procedures gradually shape organizational processes and produce collective effects that do not arise from the aggregation of member state activities. Member-dominated IOs can produce collective beliefs about relevant parts of the outside world that differ from the aggregated beliefs of member states. They can comprise institutionalized organizational goals and criteria that indicate collective intentions of organizational action and differ from the aggregate preferences of member states. They can comprise decision-making procedures that foster organizational decisions according to collective beliefs and intentions and reduce or abolish the relevance of bargaining and preference aggregation. Finally, they can act in ways that do not immediately rely on implementation action by the member states or by other lower-level actors. I conclude that analyzing the sources of independence of member-dominated IOs from their members sheds light on the nature and effects of IOs as group actors. KW - Collective actor KW - international organization KW - independence KW - autonomy KW - corporate agency KW - authority KW - pooling ER - TY - JOUR TI - The treaty management organization established under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement : an international actor in its own right? AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Spielmann, Linda PY - 2023 JO - International Environmental Agreements : Politics, Law and Economics VL - 23 IS - 3 SP - 235-252 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht SN - 1573-1553 DO - 10.1007/s10784-023-09611-z UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59957 LA - eng AB - A peculiar treaty management organization operates under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement that does not fit established categories of international law and political science. Unlike traditional international organizations (IOs), it lacks the formal status of an IO, comprises only a limited secretariat with predominantly servicing functions, and is not even denominated as an organization. We argue that it has nevertheless become an international actor, mainly due to activities of its Conference of the Parties and several specialized organizational schemes. Theoretically, we develop an analytical framework that shows how even heavily member-dominated IOs can become international actors and what this means for global environmental governance. IOs gain the capability to influence international politics by their own action if authorized to make decisions with external effects. They gain autonomy if organizational rules and procedures shape organizational decision-making and create specific organizational rationales. Empirically, we demonstrate that the organizational component of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement has acquired both considerable action capability and autonomy. It is authorized to flesh out the skeletal provisions of the constituent treaties through far-reaching COP decisions and to decide continuously in several specialized organizational schemes, especially on climate funding, cooperation mechanisms, and compliance management. Organizational decisions are heavily influenced by autonomy-creating organizational factors, such as path dependence, fundamental organizational norms and dense sets of decision criteria. We conclude that this organization, and the organizational components of other multilateral environmental agreements, point at important organizational effects, which merit further attention. KW - International organization KW - International actor KW - Authority KW - Autonomy KW - UNFCCC KW - Paris agreement ER - TY - JOUR TI - Member-dominated international organizations as actors : a bottom-up theory of corporate agency AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Urbanski, Kevin PY - 2023 SP - 129-153 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/58240 LA - eng AB - This article introduces an innovative theoretical conception of the corporate agency of international organizations (IOs). Existing rationalist and constructivist accounts attribute IO agency to the influence of intra-organizational agents. Drawing on general conceptions of corporate agency in International Relations, sociology, and philosophy, we elucidate how IOs can develop corporate agency, even if the member states prepare and adopt all organizational decisions themselves. In line with recent studies on international political authority, we replace the IO-as-bureaucracy model with the more comprehensive concept of IOs-as-governors. To establish the micro-foundations of IO agency, we adopt a bottom-up perspective and outline how, and under which conditions, IO agency arises from the interaction of constituent actors. Irrespective of any specific institutional design, IOs become actors in their own right whenever they gain action capability and autonomy. They acquire action capability whenever their members pool governance resources like the right to regulate certain activities or to manage common funds and authorize IOs to deploy these resources. IOs gain autonomy whenever they affect organizational decisions. Both dimensions of IO agency are variable and open to empirical enquiry. To illustrate our argument, we refer to the United Nations Security Council and other IOs with member-driven decision processes. KW - International organizations KW - corporate agency KW - authority KW - autonomy KW - pooling KW - theory ER - TY - JOUR TI - Member-dominated international organizations as actors : a bottom-up theory of corporate agency AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Urbanski, Kevin PY - 2023 JO - International theory : a journal of international politics, law and philosophy VL - 15 IS - 1 SP - 129-153 PB - Cambridge Univ. Press CY - Cambridge ; New York SN - 1752-9727 DO - 10.1017/S1752971922000069 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/56872 LA - eng AB - This article introduces an innovative theoretical conception of the corporate agency of international organizations (IOs). Existing rationalist and constructivist accounts attribute IO agency to the influence of intra-organizational agents. Drawing on general conceptions of corporate agency in International Relations, sociology, and philosophy, we elucidate how IOs can develop corporate agency, even if the member states prepare and adopt all organizational decisions themselves. In line with recent studies on international political authority, we replace the IO-as-bureaucracy model with the more comprehensive concept of IOs-as-governors. To establish the micro-foundations of IO agency, we adopt a bottom-up perspective and outline how, and under which conditions, IO agency arises from the interaction of constituent actors. Irrespective of any specific institutional design, IOs become actors in their own right whenever they gain action capability and autonomy. They acquire action capability whenever their members pool governance resources like the right to regulate certain activities or to manage common funds and authorize IOs to deploy these resources. IOs gain autonomy whenever they affect organizational decisions. Both dimensions of IO agency are variable and open to empirical enquiry. To illustrate our argument, we refer to the United Nations Security Council and other IOs with member-driven decision processes. KW - International organizations KW - corporate agency KW - authority KW - autonomy KW - pooling KW - theory ER - TY - JOUR TI - HBM4EU from the Coordinator's perspective : lessons learnt from managing a large-scale EU project AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Kolossa-Gehring, Marike AU - Pack, L. Kim AU - Hülck, Kathrin PY - 2023 JO - International journal of hygiene and environmental health VL - 247 SP - 1-7 PB - Elsevier CY - München SN - 1438-4639 DO - 10.1016/j.ijheh.2022.114072 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/56871 LA - eng AB - We discuss some important management issues of the Human Biomonitoring Initiative (HBM4EU) from the perspective of the Coordinator that may be valuable for the design and management of similar projects. As a large-scale international collaborative project, HBM4EU comprised 118 institutions from 30 countries and the European Environment Agency and had a budget of about €74 million. It has set up an innovative cooperative network of national and EU authorities and scientific institutions at the science-policy interface. A project of this scale raises major management challenges and requires transparent, efficient, and well-organized administrative and scientific steering structures. We present four major points: First, prior to the beginning of the project, the Consortium Agreement needs to be well elaborated to prevent conflicts during the project lifetime. Second, a strong role for national and EU policy-making authorities in the administrative governance structure enhances the interest of recipients of project results. Third, large-scale international collaborative projects need an elaborate and well-financed scientific governance structure. Fourth, a differentiation of funding rates among project activities threatens to create conflicts. HBM4EU provides a prototype for EU funded large-scale projects targeting future policies for realizing the Green Deal and Zero Pollution Ambition in the field of chemicals, health, and environment. KW - HBM4EU KW - Large scale EU project KW - Horizon2020 KW - Project governance KW - Coordination KW - Management ER - TY - JOUR TI - HBM4EU from the Coordinator's perspective : lessons learnt from managing a large-scale EU project AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Kolossa-Gehring, Marike AU - Pack, L. Kim AU - Hülck, Kathrin PY - 2022 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/57338 LA - eng AB - We discuss some important management issues of the Human Biomonitoring Initiative (HBM4EU) from the perspective of the Coordinator that may be valuable for the design and management of similar projects. As a large-scale international collaborative project, HBM4EU comprised 118 institutions from 30 countries and the European Environment Agency and had a budget of about €74 million. It has set up an innovative cooperative network of national and EU authorities and scientific institutions at the science-policy interface. A project of this scale raises major management challenges and requires transparent, efficient, and well-organized administrative and scientific steering structures. We present four major points: First, prior to the beginning of the project, the Consortium Agreement needs to be well elaborated to prevent conflicts during the project lifetime. Second, a strong role for national and EU policy-making authorities in the administrative governance structure enhances the interest of recipients of project results. Third, large-scale international collaborative projects need an elaborate and well-financed scientific governance structure. Fourth, a differentiation of funding rates among project activities threatens to create conflicts. HBM4EU provides a prototype for EU funded large-scale projects targeting future policies for realizing the Green Deal and Zero Pollution Ambition in the field of chemicals, health, and environment. KW - HBM4EU KW - Large scale EU project KW - Horizon2020 KW - Project governance KW - Coordination KW - Management ER - TY - JOUR TI - Analogy-based Collective Decision-making and Incremental Change in International Organizations AU - Dörfler, Thomas AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2022 SP - 753-778 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/54893 LA - eng AB - We examine how analogy-based collective decision-making of member states contributes to the endogenous emergence of informal rules and the incremental change of international organizations (IOs). Decision-making by analogy is an important characteristic of day-to-day decision-making in IOs. Relating current decisions to previous ones through analogies drives incremental change and simultaneously reinforces organizational resilience. Whereas the foreign policy analysis literature shows that analogies can be used as cognitive shortcuts in fuzzy and complex foreign policy situations, we focus on their use to overcome social ambiguity (indeterminacy) of coordination situations in IOs. Drawing on psychological conceptions, we develop two micro-level mechanisms that elucidate the effects of analogy-based collective decision-making in member-driven IOs. Analogy-based collective decisions emphasizing similarity between a current situation and previous ones follow an established problem schema and produce expansive and increasingly well-established informal rules. Collective decisions that are analogy-based but emphasize a crucial difference follow different problem schemas and trigger the emergence of additional informal rules that apply to new classes of cases. The result is an increasingly fine-grained web of distinct organizational solutions for a growing number of problems. Accordingly, an IO can increasingly facilitate collective decision-making and gains resilience. Empirically, we probe these propositions with a documentary analysis of decision-making in the Yugoslavia sanctions committee, established by the United Nations Security Council to deal with a stream of requests for exempting certain goods or services from the comprehensive economic embargo imposed on Yugoslavia in response to the War in the Balkans. KW - Historical institutionalism KW - analogical reasoning KW - international organizations KW - decision-making KW - Security Council KW - sanctions ER - TY - JOUR TI - Explaining EU integration dynamics in the wake of COVID-19 : a domain of application approach AU - Becker, Manuel AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2022 JO - Journal of European Public Policy VL - 30 IS - 2 SP - 334-353 PB - Routledge CY - London SN - 1466-4429 DO - 10.1080/13501763.2022.2027000 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/53524 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Analogy-based Collective Decision-making and Incremental Change in International Organizations AU - Dörfler, Thomas AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2021 JO - European Journal of International Relations VL - 27 IS - 3 PB - Sage CY - London [u.a.] SN - 1460-3713 DO - 10.1177/1354066120987889 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/51087 LA - eng AB - We examine how analogy-based collective decision-making of member states contributes to the endogenous emergence of informal rules and the incremental change of international organizations (IOs). Decision-making by analogy is an important characteristic of day-to-day decision-making in IOs. Relating current decisions to previous ones through analogies drives incremental change and simultaneously reinforces organizational resilience. Whereas the foreign policy analysis literature shows that analogies can be used as cognitive shortcuts in fuzzy and complex foreign policy situations, we focus on their use to overcome social ambiguity (indeterminacy) of coordination situations in IOs. Drawing on psychological conceptions, we develop two micro-level mechanisms that elucidate the effects of analogy-based collective decision-making in member-driven IOs. Analogy-based collective decisions emphasizing similarity between a current situation and previous ones follow an established problem schema and produce expansive and increasingly well-established informal rules. Collective decisions that are analogy-based but emphasize a crucial difference follow different problem schemas and trigger the emergence of additional informal rules that apply to new classes of cases. The result is an increasingly fine-grained web of distinct organizational solutions for a growing number of problems. Accordingly, an IO can increasingly facilitate collective decision-making and gains resilience. Empirically, we probe these propositions with a documentary analysis of decision-making in the Yugoslavia sanctions committee, established by the United Nations Security Council to deal with a stream of requests for exempting certain goods or services from the comprehensive economic embargo imposed on Yugoslavia in response to the War in the Balkans. KW - Historical institutionalism KW - analogical reasoning KW - international organizations KW - decision-making KW - Security Council KW - sanctions ER - TY - JOUR TI - Precedent and doctrine in organisational decision-making: the power of informal institutional rules in the United Nations Security Council’s activities on terrorism AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Dorsch, Christian AU - Dörfler, Thomas PY - 2019 JO - Journal of International Relations and Development VL - 22 IS - 1 SP - 107-135 PB - Palgrave Macmillan CY - Basingstoke SN - 1581-1980 DO - 10.1057/s41268-017-0101-5 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/48269 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Constitutive Mechanisms of UN Security Council Practices. Precedent Pressure, Ratchet Effect and Council Action Regarding Intrastate Conflicts AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Dörfler, Thomas PY - 2019 JO - Review of international studies : RIS VL - 45 IS - 1 SP - 120-140 PB - Cambridge Univ. Press CY - Cambridge SN - 1469-9044 DO - 10.1017/S0260210518000268 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/48268 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Credible commitment without independent regulatory agent: Evidence from the Security Council's United Nations Compensation Commission AU - Becker, Manuel AU - Dörfler, Thomas AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2018 JO - Regulation & Governance VL - 12 IS - 3 SP - 395-412 PB - Wiley-Blackwell CY - Hoboken, NJ SN - 1748-5983 DO - 10.1111/rego.12195 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47182 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Das internationale Regime zum Schutz der Ozonschicht AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2018 PB - opus CY - Bamberg DO - 10.20378/irbo-51907 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43785 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Probleme und Prinzipien internationaler Zusammenarbeit AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2018 PB - opus CY - Bamberg DO - 10.20378/irbo-51903 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43781 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Montreal Protocol : The Copenhagen Meeting AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Oberthür, Sebastian PY - 2018 PB - opus CY - Bamberg DO - 10.20378/irbo-51897 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43776 LA - eng AB - - KW - Umweltrecht ER - TY - JOUR TI - International Environmental regimes : Dynamic sectoral legal systems AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2018 PB - opus CY - Bamberg DO - 10.20378/irbo-51904 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43765 LA - eng AB - - KW - International environmental regimes KW - sectoral legal systems ER - TY - CHAP TI - Haftung für Umweltschäden infolge des Seetransports von Öl : Ein Fall von transnationaler Verregelung AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2018 PB - opus CY - Bamberg DO - 10.20378/irbo-51899 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43763 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Private or international liability for transnational environmental damage : The precedent of conventional liability AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Doeker, Günther PY - 2018 PB - opus CY - Bamberg DO - 10.20378/irbo-51905 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43762 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Der Beitrag von Institutionen zur Förderung der internationalen Zusammenarbeit AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2018 PB - opus CY - Bamberg DO - 10.20378/irbo-51895 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43757 LA - deu AB - - KW - Zusammenarbeit ER - TY - THES TI - Dynamic International Regimes : lnstitutions for International Environmental Governance AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2018 PB - opus CY - Bamberg DO - 10.20378/irbo-51878 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43759 LA - eng AB - - KW - International regimes KW - international environmental governance ER - TY - BOOK TI - Haftung und Umwelt : Interessenkonflikte im internationalen Weltraum-, Atom- und Seerecht AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Jachtenfuchs, Markus PY - 2018 PB - opus CY - Bamberg DO - 10.20378/irbo-51894 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43761 LA - deu ER - TY - CHAP TI - Internationale Umweltregime AU - Breitmeier, Helmut AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - List, Martin AU - Zürn, Michael PY - 2018 SP - 163-191 PB - opus CY - Bamberg DO - 10.20378/irbo-51900 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43760 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Haftung für grenzüberschreitende Umweltschäden : Allgemeine Regelung des internationalen Umwelthaftungsrechts AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Jachtenfuchs, Markus PY - 2018 SP - 233-254 PB - opus CY - Bamberg DO - 10.20378/irbo-51906 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43745 LA - deu ER - TY - CHAP TI - Liability for environmental damage AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Doeker, Günther PY - 2018 PB - opus CY - Bamberg DO - 10.20378/irbo-51902 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43742 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Kaleidoscope : Liability for Transboundary Environmental Damage : Towards a General Liability Regime? AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Jachtenfuchs, Markus PY - 2018 PB - opus CY - Bamberg DO - 10.20378/irbo-51896 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43739 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - The European Union as an Inadvertent Great Power : EU Actorness and the Ukraine Crisis AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Urbanski, Kevin AU - Oberthür, Sebastian PY - 2017 JO - Journal of common market studies : JCMS VL - 55 IS - 4 SP - 727-743 SN - 1468-5965 DO - 10.1111/jcms.12530 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/51110 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - Regime Complexes as Governance Systems AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Faude, Benjamin PY - 2017 T2 - Research Handbook on the Politics of International Law SP - 176-203 PB - Elgar CY - Cheltenham SN - 978-1-78347-397-7 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43149 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Institutionelle Opportunitätsstrukturen im Weltsicherheitsrat : Wie Doktrinen und andere Vorentscheidungen das Handeln der Mitgliedstaaten und die kollektiven Entscheidungen über den Eingriff in innerstaatliche Konflikte beeinflussen AU - Dorsch, Christian AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2015 JO - Politische Vierteljahresschrift : PVS : German political science quarterly VL - 56 IS - 4 SP - 599-625 PB - Springer CY - Berlin ; Heidelberg SN - 1862-2860 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/51108 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Wie internationale Organisationen durch die Strukturierung von Entscheidungsprozessen Autonomie gewinnen. Der Weltsicherheitsrat und seine Sanktionsausschüsse als System funktionaler Ausdifferenzierung AU - Dörfler, Thomas AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2015 JO - Internationale Organisationen : Autonomie, Politisierung, interorganisationale Beziehungen und Wandel SP - 54-80 PB - Nomos CY - Baden-Baden T3 - Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonderheft UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/21838 LA - deu AB - Der Beitrag untersucht, ob und auf welche Weise internationale Organisationen durch funktionale Differenzierung auch dann Autonomie gegenüber ihren Mitgliedern gewinnen, wenn Entscheidungsbefugnisse an einen Ausschuss übertragen werden, der ausschließlich von den Mitgliedstaaten selbst besetzt ist. Dazu wird eine Konzeption von Autonomie entwickelt, die auf der Strukturierung organisatorischer Entscheidungsprozesse beruht. Es ist zu erkennen, dass die Trennung von Regelsetzung und Regelanwendung selbst dann erheblichen Einfluss auf den Entscheidungsprozess nimmt, wenn beide Funktionen von denselben Akteuren ausgeführt werden. Anschließend wird gezeigt, wie der Weltsicherheitsrat durch die Strukturierung der Entscheidungsprozesse im Al-Qaida Sanktionsregime Autonomie gewinnt. KW - Autonomie KW - Funktionale Differenzierung KW - Internationale Organisationen KW - Sicherheitsrat KW - Sanktionen ER - TY - JOUR TI - A Theory of Emerging Order within Institutional Complexes : How Competition Among Regulatory International Institutions Leads to Institutional Adaptation and a Division of Labor AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Faude, Benjamin PY - 2014 JO - Review of International Organizations VL - 9 IS - 4 SP - 471-498 PB - Springer CY - Boston, MA [u.a.] SN - 1559-7431 DO - 10.1007/s11558-014-9197-1 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/21387 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Division of Labor and Rule-based Decisionmaking Within the UN Security Council : The Al-Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions Regime AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Dörfler, Thomas PY - 2013 JO - Global Governance : A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations VL - 19 IS - 4 SP - 567-587 PB - Rienner CY - Boulder, Colo. SN - 1075-2846 DO - 10.1163/19426720-01904006 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/6339 LA - eng AB - Decisionmaking within the Security Council increasingly involves delegation to subsidiary bodies. Drawing on modern institutional theory, this article examines the effects of the emergent system of divided labor within the al-Qaeda/Taliban sanctions regime. The article first looks at the political economy of the process of listing individuals and private entities as sanctions targets. Second, it explores the distinct functions performed by the bodies of the sanctions regime; namely, the Security Council, the AQT Sanctions Committee, the Office of the Ombudsperson, and an expert body. Third, it analyzes the resulting incentive structures in three successive stages of regime development. The article concludes that the sanctions regime constitutes a surprisingly well-advanced model of how to commit even powerful states to rule-based governance without depriving them of their capability to adopt political decisions. KW - Security Council KW - sanctions committee KW - targeted sanctions KW - smart sanctions KW - functional differentiation ER - TY - JOUR TI - European Union Actorness in International Institutions: Why the EU is Recognized as an Actor in Some International Institutions, but Not in Others AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Oberthür, Sebastian AU - Mühleck, Marc PY - 2013 JO - Journal of common market studies : JCMS VL - 51 IS - 5 SP - 849-865 PB - Wiley-Blackwell CY - Oxford SN - 1468-5965 DO - 10.1111/jcms.12030 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/2503 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - The Dynamics of Regime Complexes: Microfoundations and Systemic Effects AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Faude, Benjamin PY - 2013 JO - Global governance : a review of multilateralism and international organizations VL - 19 IS - 1 SP - 119-130 PB - Rienner CY - Boulder, Colo. SN - 1075-2846 DO - 10.1163/19426720-01901010 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/2472 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - International Environmental Regimes as Decision Machines AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2012 T2 - Handbook Of Global Environmental Politics, Second Edition SP - 51-63 PB - Edward Elgar Publishing CY - Cheltenham SN - 978-1-84980-940-5 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/2479 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - Deliberative regulation through European Union agencies and other network structures? AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2012 T2 - The agency phenomenon in the European Union : emergence, institutionalisation and everyday decision-making SP - 105-127 PB - Manchester University Press CY - Manchester [u.a.] SN - 978-0-7190-8554-3 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/906 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - Institutional interaction : ten years of scholarly development AU - Oberthür, Sebastian AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2011 T2 - Managing institutional complexity : regime interplay and global environmental change SP - 25 - 58 CY - Cambridge, Mass. SN - 978-0-262-01591-2 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/4473 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - The Institutional complex of trade and environment : toward an interlocking governance structure and a division of labor AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2011 T2 - Managing institutional complexity : regime interplay and global environmental change SP - 227 - 254 CY - Cambridge, Mass. SN - 978-0-262-01591-2 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/4429 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Making an Administrative Trustee Agent Accountable. Reason-based Decision-making within the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Plocher, Isabel PY - 2009 JO - International Studies Quarterly VL - 53 IS - 3 SP - 667 - 690 SN - 0020-8833 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/20414 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - Internationale Organisationen als Organisationen : was die Organisationsforschung von der Systemtheorie lernen kann AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2009 T2 - Die organisierte Welt : internationale Beziehungen und Organisationsforschung SP - 59 - 94 CY - Baden-Baden ET - 1 SN - 978-3-8329-4934-1 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/20369 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - The Causal Mechanisms of Interaction between International Institutions AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Oberthür, Sebastian PY - 2009 JO - European journal of international relations VL - 15 IS - 2 SP - 125 - 156 SN - 1354-0661 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/20374 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - Disentangling the Interaction between the Cartagena Protocol and the World Trade Organisation AU - Oberthür, Sebastian AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2008 T2 - Institutional interplay : biosafety and trade CY - Tokyo SN - 9789280811483 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/17123 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - Interplay: Exploring Institutional Interaction AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Oberthür, Sebastian PY - 2008 T2 - Institutions and environmental change : principal findings,applications, and research frontiers SP - 187 - 223 CY - Cambridge, MA u.a. SN - 9780262240574 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/17119 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Institutional Stimulation of Deliberative Decision- Making : Division of Labour, Deliberative Legitimacy and Technical Regulation in the European Single Market AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Kerler, Michael PY - 2008 JO - Journal of common market studies VL - 46 SP - 1001 - 1023 SN - 0021-9886 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/17083 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - When arguments prevail over power : the CITES procedure for the listing of endangered species AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Ruffing, Eva PY - 2008 JO - Global Environmental Politics VL - 8 IS - 2 SP - 123 - 148 SN - 1526-3800 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/17080 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - Risikoregulierung im europäischen Binnenmarkt : Regulierungsagenturen, Normungsinstitute und Komitologieausschüsse AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Kerler, Michael AU - Krapohl, Sebastian PY - 2008 T2 - Die Europäische Union : governance and policy-making SP - 231-252 CY - Wiesbaden ET - 1 SN - 978-3-531-14979-0 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/14164 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Neue Entscheidungsverfahren in der Weltbank : wie institutionelle Strukturen zu gutem Regieren führen AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Kerler, Michael PY - 2007 JO - Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen VL - 14 IS - 2 SP - 217 - 251 SN - 0946-7165 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/17096 LA - deu ER - TY - CHAP TI - Treaty-making and treaty evolution AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2007 T2 - The Oxford handbook of international environmental law CY - Oxford SN - 9780199269709 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/14251 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Supranational regulatory agencies between independence and control : the EMEA and the authorisation of pharmaceuticals in the European Single Market AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Krapohl, Sebastian PY - 2007 JO - Journal of European Public Policy VL - 14 IS - 2 SP - 208 - 226 SN - 1350-1763 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/14163 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Warum internationale Organisationen aus dem Ruder laufen und wie sie wieder steuerbar werden : eine systemtheoretische Analyse der Weltbank AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Kerler, Michael PY - 2006 JO - Politische Vierteljahresschrift VL - 47 SN - 0032-3470 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/14259 LA - deu ER - TY - CHAP TI - Einflussbeziehungen zwischen internationalen Institutionen im Spannungsfeld von Handel und Umwelt : von gegenseitiger Störung zur institutionalisierten Arbeitsteilung AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2006 T2 - Politik und Umwelt CY - Wiesbaden ET - 1 SN - 3-531-14889-3 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/14208 LA - deu ER - TY - BOOK TI - Institutional interaction in global environmental governance : synergy and conflict among international and EU policies ED - Oberthür, Sebastian ED - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2006 PB - MIT Press CY - Cambridge, Mass. u.a. T3 - Global environmental accord SN - 026205115X UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/14161 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Institutional interaction in global environmental governance : the case of the Cartagena Protocol and the World Trade Organization AU - Oberthür, Sebastian AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2006 JO - Global Environmental Politics VL - 6 IS - 2 SP - 1 - 31 SN - 1526-3800 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/14166 LA - deu ER - TY - BOOK TI - Rationalität durch Verfahren in der Europäischen Union : europäische Arzneimittelzulassung und Normung technischer Güter AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Krapohl, Sebastian AU - Kerler, Michael AU - Stefanova, Sachka PY - 2005 PB - Nomos-Verl.-Ges. CY - Baden-Baden T3 - Regieren in Europa ET - 1 SN - 978-3-8329-1170-6 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/13951 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Internationale Institutionen : Global Governance und Steuerungsfragen AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2004 JO - Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen VL - 11 IS - 2 SP - 333 - 340 SN - 0946-7165 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/14217 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - The consequences of delegation to independent agencies : separation of powers, discursive governance and the regulation of telecommunications in Germany AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2004 JO - European journal of political research VL - 43 IS - 4 SP - 677 - 698 SN - 0176-2680 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/14212 LA - deu ER - TY - CHAP TI - Exploring regime interaction AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Oberthür, Sebastian PY - 2004 T2 - Regime consequences : methodological challenges and research strategies SP - 247 - 279 CY - Dordrecht u. a. SN - 9781402020704 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/14171 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - Methodological issues in the study of broader consequences AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2004 T2 - Regime consequences : methodological challenges and research SP - 219 - 246 CY - Dordrecht u. a. SN - 9781402020704 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/14167 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Reforming international environmental governance : an institutionalist critique of the proposal for a World Environment Organisation AU - Oberthür, Sebastian AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2004 JO - International environmental agreements : politics, law and economics VL - 4 IS - 4 SP - 359 - 381 SN - 1567-9764 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/14168 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - Reforming international environmental governance: An institutional perspective on proposals for a world environment organization AU - Oberthür, Sebastian AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2004 T2 - A world environment organization : solution or threat for effective international environmental governance? SP - 205 - 234 CY - Aldershot u.a. SN - 0754637654 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/12166 LA - eng ER - TY - CPAPER TI - Schutzstandards in der Welthandelsordnung. Die Koppelung der WTO an standardsetzende internationale Institutionen AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2004 T2 - Transnationalisierung des Rechts : eine Fachtagung aus Anlass des 20-jährigen Bestehens des ZERP SP - 89 - 114 PB - Nomos-Verl.-Ges. CY - Baden-Baden ET - 1. Aufl. SN - 978-3-8329-0661-0 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/8668 LA - deu ER - TY - CHAP TI - Communicative rationality in European governance? Interests and communicative action in functionally differentiated single market regulation AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2003 T2 - European governance, deliberation and the quest for democratisation SP - 57 - 140 CY - Oslo UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/10660 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - Schutzstandards in der WTO? : die schleichende Verknüpfung der Welthandelsordnung mit standardsetzenden internationalen Institutionen AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2002 T2 - Regieren in internationalen Institutionen : Festschrift für Beate Kohler- Koch zum 60. Geburtstag SP - 111 - 139 CY - Opladen UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/8667 LA - deu ER - TY - CPAPER TI - International and transatlantic environmental governance AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Buck, Matthias PY - 2002 T2 - International environmental policymaking : transatlantic cooperation and the World Summit on Sustainable Development ; based on an Expert Workshop on International Environmental Policymaking and Transatlantic Co-operation, Lisbon, 10 - 12 February 2000 SP - 21 - 43 CY - München UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/8363 LA - eng ER - TY - BOOK TI - Die Europäische Union als komplexe internationale Organisation : wie durch Kommunikation und Entscheidung soziale Ordnung entsteht AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2002 PB - Nomos-Verl.-Ges. CY - Baden-Baden T3 - Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert ET - 1 SN - 978-3-7890-7877-4 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/7909 LA - deu ER - TY - CHAP TI - Supranationale Steuerung durch die Europäische Union : eine steuerungstheoretische Perspektive AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2001 T2 - Politische Steuerung in Theorie und Praxis SP - 359-393 PB - Nomos CY - Baden-Baden ET - 1 SN - 978-3-7890-7446-2 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/7516 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Was bringt eine Weltumweltorganisation? Kooperationstheoretische Anmerkungen zur institutionellen Reorganisation der internationalen Umweltpolitik AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Oberthür, Sebastian PY - 2000 JO - Zeitschrift für internationale Beziehungen : ZIB VL - 7 IS - 1 SP - 185-211 SN - 0946-7165 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/10690 LA - deu ER - TY - BOOK TI - Supranationale Steuerung durch die Europäische Union : eine steuerungstheoretische Perspektive AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2000 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg T3 - Bamberger Beiträge zur Europaforschung und zur internationalen Politik UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/6934 LA - deu ER - TY - CHAP TI - Die Bedeutung spezialisierter Entscheidungsprozesse für die Problemlösungsfähigkeit der Europäischen Union AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 2000 T2 - Wie problemlösungsfähig ist die EU? : Regieren im europäischen Mehrebenensystem SP - 77-112 PB - Nomos-Verl.-Ges. CY - Baden-Baden SN - 978-3-7890-6772-3 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/6795 LA - deu ER - TY - CHAP TI - Arguing, bargaining and functional differentiation of dcision-making : the role of committees in European environmental process regulation AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 1999 T2 - EU Committees : social regulation, law and politics SP - 195 - 217 CY - Oxford SN - 190136268X UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38573 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Die Politik des koordinierten Alleingangs : Schengen und die Abschaffung der Personenkontrollen an den Binnengrenzen der Europäischen Union AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 1998 JO - Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen VL - 5 IS - 1 SP - 43 - 78 SN - 0946-7165 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38555 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Governing in nested institutions : environmental policy in the European Union and the case of packaging waste AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 1997 JO - Journal of European Public Policy VL - 4 IS - 3 SP - 337 - 354 SN - 1350-1763 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38569 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - Das internationale Regime zum Schutz der Ozonschicht: Modell für das Klimaregime AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 1996 T2 - Klimapolitik : naturwissenschaftliche Grundlagen, internationale Regimebildung und Konflikte, ökonomische Analysen sowie nationale Problemerkennung und Politikimplementation SP - 49 - 60 CY - Berlin u.a. SN - 978-3-540-60513-3 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38577 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Integrating integration theory : neofunctionalism and international regimes AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 1996 JO - Global society : journal of interdisciplinary international relations VL - 10 SP - 225 - 253 SN - 1360-0826 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38575 LA - eng ER - TY - CHAP TI - Umweltdiplomatie als EU-Entwicklungsaufgabe AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 1996 T2 - Mehr Einfluß der EU in der internationalen Umweltpolitik ? : eine Erwägung für die Regierungskonferenz ; SWP KB 2947 SP - 89 - 99 CY - Ebenhausen UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38583 LA - deu ER - TY - CHAP TI - Arguing und Bargaining in internationalen Verhandlungen zum Schutz der Umwelt : Überlegungen am Beispiel des Ozonschutzregimes AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 1996 T2 - Verhandeln und Argumentieren : Dialog, Interessen und Macht in der Umweltpolitik SP - 207-238 PB - Leske + Budrich CY - Opladen SN - 978-3-8100-1470-2 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38562 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Regieren im internationalen System : Verhandlungen, Normen und internationale Regime AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 1995 JO - Politische Vierteljahresschrift VL - 36 SP - 197 - 219 SN - 0032-3470 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38565 LA - deu ER - TY - THES TI - Dynamic international regimes : institutions for international environmental governance AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 1994 PB - Lang CY - Frankfurt am Main [u.a.] T3 - Environmental Law Network International: Studies of the Environmental Law Network International UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38570 LA - other AB - - KW - International regimes KW - international environmental governance ER - TY - JOUR TI - Der Beitrag von Institutionen zur Förderung der internationalen Zusammenarbeit : Lehren aus der institutionellen Struktur der Europäischen Gemeinschaft AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 1994 JO - Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen IS - 1 SP - 211 - 242 SN - 0946-7165 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38558 LA - deu AB - - KW - Zusammenarbeit ER - TY - CHAP TI - Haftung für Umweltschäden infolge des Seetransports von Öl : ein Fall transnationaler Verregelung AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 1993 T2 - Internationale Verrechtlichung SP - 227-247 PB - Centaurus Verlag CY - Pfaffenweiler SN - 3-89085-736-1 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38590 LA - deu ER - TY - CHAP TI - Internationale Umweltregime AU - Breitmeier, Helmut AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - List, Martin AU - Zürn, Michael PY - 1993 T2 - Umweltpolitik als Modernisierungsprozeß : politikwissenschaftliche Umweltforschung und -lehre in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland SP - 163-191 PB - Leske und Budrich CY - Opladen SN - 978-3-8100-1030-8 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38580 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Kaleidoscope : Liability for Transboundary Environmental Damage : Towards a General Liability Regime? AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Jachtenfuchs, Markus PY - 1993 JO - European journal of international law. VL - 4 SP - 92-106 SN - 0938-5428 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38571 LA - eng ER - TY - JOUR TI - Montreal Protocol: The Copenhagen Meeting AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Oberthür, Sebastian PY - 1993 JO - Environmental policy and law VL - 23 IS - 1 SP - 6-12 SN - 0378-777x UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38585 LA - eng AB - - KW - Umweltrecht ER - TY - JOUR TI - Probleme und Prinzipien der internationalen Zusammenarbeit AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 1992 JO - Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte VL - 42 IS - 46 SP - 39-46 SN - 0479-611X UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38589 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - International environmental regimes : dynamic sectoral legal systems AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 1991 JO - Yearbook of international environmental law. VL - 1.1990 SP - 35 - 56 SN - 0740-1558 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38595 LA - other AB - - KW - International environmental regimes KW - sectoral legal systems ER - TY - JOUR TI - Das internationale Regime zum Schutz der Ozonschicht AU - Gehring, Thomas PY - 1990 JO - Europa-Archiv VL - 45 SP - 703 - 712 SN - 0014-2476 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38592 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Haftung für grenzüberschreitende Umweltschäden : allgemeine Regelung des internationalen Umwelthaftungsrechts AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Jachtenfuchs, Markus PY - 1990 JO - Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik & Umweltrecht VL - 13 SP - 233 - 254 SN - 0931-0983 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38578 LA - deu ER - TY - JOUR TI - Private or international liability for transnational environmental damage : the precedent of conventional liability regimes AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Doeker, Günther PY - 1990 JO - Journal of environmental law VL - 2 SP - 1 - 16 SN - 0952-8873 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38584 LA - eng ER - TY - BOOK TI - Haftung und Umwelt : Interessenkonflikte im internationalen Weltraum-, Atom- und Seerecht AU - Gehring, Thomas AU - Jachtenfuchs, Markus PY - 1988 PB - Lang CY - Frankfurt am Main u.a. T3 - Völkerrecht und internationale Politik UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/38560 LA - deu ER -