@phdthesis{winnwa2018_43769,
  title = {Staging Policy Fiascoes: Unveiling the EU's Strategic Game with Policy-Making Failure},
  author = {Winnwa, Isabel},
  year = {2018},
  publisher = {opus},
  address = {Bamberg},
  doi = {10.20378/irbo-51919},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-opus4-519191},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/43769},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {How and why do legislative proposals fail in the EU policy-making process? Previous literature on EU decision-making and policy-making processes strongly focuses on the phenomenon of consensus and consensus-building and the EU advertises that 85\% of all legislative proposals end in first-reading agreements and only 15\% fail. The EU seems to succeed more often than it fails. To understand, however, what motivates actors to approve a legislative proposal, it is important to understand what incites them to let others fail. The present study investigates failed cases where the Commission presented a proposal to the Council and the Parliament that, then, became deadlocked in the process. An interesting puzzle presents itself, which suggests that there is more to policy-making failure than the previous literature can account for: proposals that failed in the first round are withdrawn by the Commission, adapted and recast and lead to agreement in the second round. Which incentives do the Commission, the Council and the Parliament have to partake in a game with such failure? After conducting four comparative, in-depth case studies in two policy areas the answer is as follows: failure enables all actors to not only achieve gains through bargaining, but also frame losses in a way that brings reputational gains. Failure of policy-making becomes a strategic, mutually beneficial game, where everybody ultimately is a winner - if not in substance or procedure, then in reputation. The Commission plays an important role as the initiator of legislation as it controls its shape and framing and can set up the game in a way that enables success after failure. The Commission can also decide to pursue its own goals within the policy process instead of playing a strategic game with the co-legislators. It can also practice symbolic blame politics with failure instead of initiating a second round and pursuing agreement. In any case, the empirical analysis shows that the role of the Commission in the process of policy-making, and its impact on the dynamics of success and failure, are greater than anticipated by previous scholarship. The present study can be the basis for further in-depth process research on the role and behavior of the Commission in EU policy-making as it provides an innovative approach to understanding the dynamics between the three institutions and opens the black box of intra-institutional and inter-institutional decision-making. Actors, conditions and mechanisms are investigated in detail by triangulating documents, media reports and expert interviews, and carefully evaluating their explanatory power with regard to the strategic failure.},
  keywords = {European Union, Europäische Union, Policy-Making, Justice and Home Affairs, Social Policy,, Rational Choice, Gesetzgebung, Justiz und Inneres, Actor-centered institutionlism, Sozialpolitik, Akteurszentrierter Institutionalismus, Rational Choice},
  school = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg}
}
