TY - JOUR TI - Social sampling, self-anchoring and redistribution AU - Schulz, Jan AU - Mayerhoffer, Daniel PY - 2024 JO - Economics Letters VL - 244 IS - 111942 SP - 1-3 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam [u.a.] SN - 0165-1765 DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111942 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/97948 LA - eng AB - We examine the effect that agents anchor their perceptions of societal mean incomes on their own incomes. As we show analytically and verify by means of numerical simulation, this self-anchoring implies that even if the sampling of agents is unbiased and fully random, including their own income into their estimate of the average can lead to substantial misperceptions, especially, if the sampling ratio is small. Within a Meltzer–Richard framework, we then demonstrate that self-anchoring leads to a decrease in implemented redistribution. KW - Self-anchoring KW - Social sampling KW - Redistribution KW - Inequality KW - Voting ER -