TY - JOUR TI - Three-player round-robin tournaments in the lab : Lottery contests vs. all-pay auctions AU - Lauber, Arne AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2026 JO - Journal of behavioral and experimental economics VL - 124 IS - 102605 SP - 1-26 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam [u.a.] SN - 2214-8051 DO - 10.1016/j.socec.2026.102605 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/115973 LA - eng AB - We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare the fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players, a single prize, and two alternative match formats. Matches are either organized as lottery contests or all-pay auctions. Contrary to theory, we find no significant differences in intensity and fairness between the two match formats. The main reason is the behavior of the player acting in the final two matches in APA-tournaments. Rather than being severely discouraged when having to compete first against the loser of the first match, subjects try to exploit a perceived negative psychological momentum in such situations. This leads them into a dissipation trap: an effort-intense, final-like last match which significantly reduces their payoffs, but also levels the playing field for the other two players and thus enhances the fairness of APA-tournaments. KW - All-pay auction KW - Discouragement effect KW - Dissipation trap KW - Laboratory experiment KW - Lottery contest KW - Sequential round-robin tournament ER -