TY - JOUR TI - Efficient incentives with social preferences AU - Daske, Thomas AU - March, Christoph PY - 2024 SP - 975-999 PB - Otto-Friedrich-Universität CY - Bamberg UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/105420 LA - eng AB - We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of \textit{at least three} agents: Any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient. KW - Mechanism design KW - social preferences KW - Bayesian implementation KW - participation constraints KW - participation stimulation KW - money pump ER -