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    "value": "We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of \\textit{at least three} agents: Any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient."
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    "value": "<div class=\"csl-bib-body\">\n  <div class=\"csl-entry\">Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph (2024): Efficient incentives with social preferences, in: <i>Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory</i>, Toronto: The Econometric Society, Jg. 19, Nr. 3, S. 975–999, doi: 10.3982/te5335.</div>\n</div>"
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