@article{daske2024_105419,
  title = {Efficient incentives with social preferences},
  author = {Daske, Thomas and March, Christoph},
  year = {2024},
  journal = {Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory},
  volume = {19},
  number = {3},
  pages = {975-999},
  publisher = {The Econometric Society},
  address = {Toronto},
  issn = {1555-7561},
  doi = {10.3982/te5335},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/105419},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of \textit\{at least three\} agents: Any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient.},
  keywords = {Mechanism design, social preferences, Bayesian implementation, participation constraints, participation stimulation, money pump}
}
