TY - JOUR TI - Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2022 JO - Games VL - 13 IS - 2 CY - Basel SN - 2073-4336 DO - 10.3390/g13020024 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/56202 LA - eng AB - I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (r≥2). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or the winner’s expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level r<2 decreases in the players’ heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum (maximum) effort will never choose a contest with a semi-mixed equilibrium. KW - Tullock contest KW - heterogeneous valuations KW - accuracy KW - discrimination KW - optimal design KW - all-pay auction ER -