@article{sahm2017_44021,
  title = {Risk aversion and prudence in contests},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Economics Bulletin},
  volume = {37},
  number = {2},
  pages = {1122-1132},
  publisher = {Univ. of Illinois},
  address = {Champaign-Urbana, Ill.},
  issn = {1545-2921},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44021},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {I examine the impact of risk preferences on efforts and winning probabilities in generalized Tullock contests between two players. The theoretical analysis yields two ma in results. First, in symmetric contests, a higher common level of the agents ́ risk aversion will lead to lower aggregate effort if it comes along with an increase in downside risk aversion. Second, in many asymmetric contests, higher risk-aversion will be a disadvantage if the agent is also more downside risk-averse}
}
