TY - JOUR TI - Risk aversion and prudence in contests AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2017 JO - Economics Bulletin VL - 37 IS - 2 SP - 1122-1132 PB - Univ. of Illinois CY - Champaign-Urbana, Ill. SN - 1545-2921 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44021 LA - eng AB - I examine the impact of risk preferences on efforts and winning probabilities in generalized Tullock contests between two players. The theoretical analysis yields two ma in results. First, in symmetric contests, a higher common level of the agents ́ risk aversion will lead to lower aggregate effort if it comes along with an increase in downside risk aversion. Second, in many asymmetric contests, higher risk-aversion will be a disadvantage if the agent is also more downside risk-averse ER -