@article{sahm2022_56203,
  title = {Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players},
  author = {Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2022},
  publisher = {Otto-Friedrich-Universität},
  address = {Bamberg},
  urn = {urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-562031},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/56203},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (r≥2). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or the winner’s expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level r<2 decreases in the players’ heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum (maximum) effort will never choose a contest with a semi-mixed equilibrium.},
  keywords = {Tullock contest, heterogeneous valuations, accuracy, discrimination, optimal design, all-pay auction}
}
