@article{march2018_44052,
  title = {Contests as selection mechanisms: The impact of risk aversion},
  author = {March, Christoph and Sahm, Marco},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
  volume = {150},
  pages = {114-131},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam [u.a.]},
  issn = {0167-2681},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.020},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44052},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {We investigate how individual risk preferences affect the likelihood of selecting the more able contestant within a two-player Tullock contest. Our theoretical model yields two main predictions: First, an increase in the risk aversion of a player worsens her odds unless she already has a sufficiently large advantage. Second, if the prize money is sufficiently large, a less able but less risk averse contestant can achieve an equal or even higher probability of winning than a more able but more risk averse opponent. In a laboratory experiment we confirm both, the non-monotonic impact and the compensating effect of risk aversion on winning probabilities. Our results suggest a novel explanation for the gender gap and the optimality of limited monetary incentives in selection contests.},
  keywords = {Selection contest, Risk aversion, Competitive balance, Gender gap}
}
