TY - JOUR TI - Contests as selection mechanisms: The impact of risk aversion AU - March, Christoph AU - Sahm, Marco PY - 2018 JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization VL - 150 SP - 114-131 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam [u.a.] SN - 0167-2681 DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.020 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44052 LA - eng AB - We investigate how individual risk preferences affect the likelihood of selecting the more able contestant within a two-player Tullock contest. Our theoretical model yields two main predictions: First, an increase in the risk aversion of a player worsens her odds unless she already has a sufficiently large advantage. Second, if the prize money is sufficiently large, a less able but less risk averse contestant can achieve an equal or even higher probability of winning than a more able but more risk averse opponent. In a laboratory experiment we confirm both, the non-monotonic impact and the compensating effect of risk aversion on winning probabilities. Our results suggest a novel explanation for the gender gap and the optimality of limited monetary incentives in selection contests. KW - Selection contest KW - Risk aversion KW - Competitive balance KW - Gender gap ER -