TY - JOUR TI - Mitigating the Problem of Manipulation in the ‘Adjusted Winner’ Procedure AU - Scheller, Simon PY - 2017 JO - Jahrbuch für Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie VL - 10 SP - 111-140 PB - Springer VS CY - Wiesbaden SN - 2627-3268 DO - 10.1007/978-3-658-16714-1 UR - https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42900 LA - eng AB - The ‘Adjusted Winner’ procedure (AW) is a mechanism to reach fair agreements in bargaining situations over a fixed set of objects. A major shortfall of AW for both mediators and participants is that it relies on participants’ honesty, which makes it open for manipulation. In a general model of AW for two objects and continuous manipulation strategies, I show that (a) manipulation is always risky since potential losses are always larger than potential gains; and (b) there exists an equilibrium of symmetric manipulation and with equal threat of potential losses that leads to exactly the same outcome like truthful behavior. These findings imply that the problem of manipulation in AW is mitigated. KW - Adjusted winner KW - Manipulation KW - Bargaining KW - Negotiation KW - Fairness ER -