@article{march2020_53447,
  title = {Coordinating intergenerational redistribution and the repayment of public debt: an experimental test of Tabellini (1991)},
  author = {March, Christoph and Weizsäcker, Robert K. von},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Social Choice and Welfare},
  volume = {55},
  number = {2},
  pages = {301-323},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address = {Berlin ; Heidelberg},
  issn = {1432-217X},
  doi = {10.1007/s00355-020-01242-6},
  url = {https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/53447},
  language = {eng},
  abstract = {Is there a link between public debt and wealth inequality? Could government bondholders use intra-generational redistribution strategically to make the repayment of debt politically viable? We reconsider the model of Tabellini (J Polit Econ 99:335–357, 1991) and expose the role of coordination and divide-and-conquer. By coordinating their bond investments, the old generation splits up the young generation and secures a majority favoring debt repayment. Coordination therefore mediates the impact of wealth inequality on public debt. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and find that subjects often coordinate to exploit the link between inter- and intragenerational redistribution. Hence, coordination plays an important role in the strategic creation and exploitation of minorities, and thus in the accumulation of public debt.},
  keywords = {public debt, wealth inequality, generation split, bond investment, redistribution}
}
