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Voting behavior under outside pressure : promoting true majorities with sequential voting?

Otto, Philipp; Bolle, Friedel (2022): Voting behavior under outside pressure : promoting true majorities with sequential voting?, in: Social Choice and Welfare, Berlin ; Heidelberg: Springer, Jg. 58, Nr. 4, S. 711–740, doi: 10.1007/s00355-021-01371-6.

Details

Faculty/Chair
Faculty/Professorship
Author
Otto, Philipp
Bolle, Friedel
Title of the Journal
Social Choice and Welfare
ISSN
1432-217X
0176-1714
Publisher Information
Springer : Berlin ; Heidelberg
Year of publication
2022
Volume
58
Issue
4
Language
English
DOI
Abstract

When including outside pressure on voters as individual costs, sequential voting (as in roll call votes) is theoretically preferable to simultaneous voting (as in recorded ballots). Under complete information, sequential voting has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with a simple equilibrium strategy guaranteeing true majority results. Simultaneous voting suffers from a plethora of equilibria, often contradicting true majorities. Experimental results, however, show severe deviations from the equilibrium strategy in sequential voting with not significantly more true majority results than in simultaneous voting. Social considerations under sequential voting—based on emotional reactions toward the behaviors of the previous players—seem to distort subgame perfect equilibria.

GND Keywords
Wahlverhalten
Keywords
Voting behavior
pressure on voters
equilibrium
DDC Classification
150 Psychology
RVK Classification
CW 9500
Peer Reviewed
yes
International Distribution
yes
Type
Article
URI
Activation date
2022-12-09

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Data as of: 2026-11-16

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