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Home › Publications › Can You Keep a Secret? : The dissemination of false rumors and the evolution of bubbles in perceived predatory trading games

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Can You Keep a Secret? : The dissemination of false rumors and the evolution of bubbles in perceived predatory trading games

Herzing, Tobias J.; Muck, Matthias (2024): Can You Keep a Secret? : The dissemination of false rumors and the evolution of bubbles in perceived predatory trading games, in: International Review of Financial Analysis, Amsterdam: Elsevier, Jg. 96, Nr. A, 103592, S. 1–18, doi: 10.1016/j.irfa.2024.103592.

Details

Faculty/Chair
Faculty/Professorship
Author
Herzing, Tobias J.
Title of the Journal
International Review of Financial Analysis
ISSN
1057-5219
Publisher Information
Elsevier : Amsterdam
Year of publication
2024
Volume
96
Issue
A, 103592
Language
English
DOI
Abstract

This research addresses the impact of fake rumors on the evolution of bubbles in stock prices in a perceived predatory trading game. In line with intuition, we find that the development of these bubbles is significantly different from the formation and progression of bubbles based on true rumors. Particularly, the first increase in stock prices may be followed by a crash when the rumor is not true. More volatility is observed when there are many players or when there is a lot of pressure to act on the victim. In contrast, the dissemination of the rumor has a dampening effect on the inflation of the bubble when the rumor is true. Moreover, it is more difficult to detect false rumors from stock prices when there are many predators. This observation makes herding among predators a particular challenging problem for regulators and policymakers.

Keywords
Predatory trading
Stock market bubbles
Rumors
DDC Classification
330 Economics
650 Management & public relations
RVK Classification
QK 650
Peer Reviewed
yes
International Distribution
yes
Type
Article
URI
Activation date
2024-09-27
Project(s)

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Data as of: 2026-11-16

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