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Publication

Are sequential round‐robin tournaments discriminatory?

Sahm, Marco (2018): Are sequential round‐robin tournaments discriminatory?, in: Journal of Public Economic Theory, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, doi: 10.1111/jpet.12308.

Details

Faculty/Chair
Author
Title of the Journal
Journal of Public Economic Theory
ISSN
1467-9779
Publisher Information
Wiley-Blackwell : Oxford
Year of publication
2018
Pages
18, Online-Ressource
Language
English
DOI
Abstract

I examine sequential round‐robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players. Each player is matched once with each other player and each match is organized as a Tullock contest. A single prize is allocated to the player with the most matches won. I show that, depending on the position of their matches in the sequence of the tournament, the players' ex ante winning probabilities and expected payoffs differ. Compared to tournaments with matches organized as all‐pay auctions, however, discrimination is weaker and partially reversed. Moreover, aggregate effort in tournaments with suitable Tullock contests is larger than in tournaments with all‐pay auctions. The fairness of round‐robin tournaments may be improved by an endogenous sequence of matches or the requirement that players fix their effort ex ante.

Peer Reviewed
yes
International Distribution
yes
Open Access Journal
no
Type
Article
URI
Activation date
2018-06-28, 2018-06-28

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