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Home › Publications › Veto power fosters cooperative behaviour: institutional incentives and government-opposition voting in the German Bundestag

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Veto power fosters cooperative behaviour: institutional incentives and government-opposition voting in the German Bundestag

Hohendorf, Lukas; Saalfeld, Thomas; Sieberer, Ulrich (2021): Veto power fosters cooperative behaviour: institutional incentives and government-opposition voting in the German Bundestag, in: West European politics, Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, Jg. 44, Nr. 4, S. 921–945, doi: 10.1080/01402382.2020.1739868.

Details

Faculty/Chair
Faculty/Professorship
Author
Title of the Journal
West European politics
ISSN
0140-2382
1743-9655
Publisher Information
Taylor & Francis : Abingdon
Year of publication
2021
Volume
44
Issue
4
Language
English
DOI
Peer Reviewed
yes
International Distribution
yes
Open Access Journal
no
Type
Article
URI
Activation date
2020-04-23

Permalink: https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47749 · Data as JSON · Cite: BibTeX · RIS

Data as of: 2026-11-16

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