Mathematical Pluralism and Indispensability
Jonas, Silvia (2024): Mathematical Pluralism and Indispensability, in: Bamberg: Otto-Friedrich-Universität, S. 2899–2923.
Details
- Faculty/Chair
- Faculty/Professorship
- Author
- Publisher Information
- Otto-Friedrich-Universität : Bamberg
- Year of publication
- 2024
- Source/Other editions
- Erkenntnis : an international journal of scientific philosophy, 89 (2024), 7, S. 2899-2923. - ISSN: 0165-0106, 1572-8420
- Year of first publication
- 2024
- Language
- English
- Licence
- URN
- Abstract
Pluralist mathematical realism, the view that there exists more than one mathematical universe, has become an influential position in the philosophy of mathematics. I argue that, if mathematical pluralism is true (and we have good reason to believe that it is), then mathematical realism cannot (easily) be justified by arguments from the indispensability of mathematics to science. This is because any justificatory chain of inferences from mathematical applications in science to the total body of mathematical theorems can cover at most one mathematical universe. Indispensability arguments may thus lose their central role in the debate about mathematical ontology.
- Keywords
- Mathematical Pluralism
- DDC Classification
- 100 Philosophy
- RVK Classification
- CC 2600
- Type
- Article
- URI
- Activation date
- 2024-10-08
- Project(s)