Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests
March, Christoph; Sahm, Marco (2017): Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests, in: Economics Letters, Amsterdam [u.a.]: Elsevier, Jg. 151, S. 23–27, doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.032.
Details
- Faculty/Chair
- Author
- Title of the Journal
- Economics Letters
- ISSN
- 0165-1765
- Publisher Information
- Elsevier : Amsterdam [u.a.]
- Year of publication
- 2017
- Volume
- 151
- Language
- English
- DOI
- Abstract
We provide new experimental evidence which suggests an asymmetric discouragement effect in lottery contests with heterogeneous abilities. Compared to a symmetric contest, subjects invest less effort when facing a stronger opponent, but they invest the same when facing a weaker opponent. Our results can be explained by a simple model of disappointment aversion.
- Keywords
- Asymmetric contestDiscouragement effectDisappointment aversionLaboratory experiment
- Peer Reviewed
- yes
- International Distribution
- yes
- Open Access Journal
- no
- Type
- Article
- URI
- Activation date
- 2018-06-28, 2018-06-28