Expressivism, Anti-Archimedeanism and Supervenience
Tiefensee, Christine (2015): Expressivism, Anti-Archimedeanism and Supervenience, in: Bamberg: opus.
Details
- Faculty/Chair
- Author
- Tiefensee, Christine
- Publisher Information
- opus : Bamberg
- Year of publication
- 2015
- Pages
- 15
- Source/Other editions
- Ursprünglich in: Res Publica. - 20 (2014), 2. - S. 163 - 181
- Year of first publication
- 2014
- Language
- English
- Licence
- URN
- Abstract
Metaethics is traditionally understood as a non-moral discipline that examines moral judgements from a standpoint outside of ethics. This orthodox understanding has recently come under pressure from anti-Archimedeans, such as Ronald Dworkin and Matthew Kramer, who proclaim that rather than assessing morality from an external perspective, metaethical theses are themselves substantive moral claims. In this paper, I scrutinise this anti-Archimedean challenge as applied to the metaethical position of expressivism. More precisely, I examine the claim that expressivists do not avoid moral commitments when accounting for moral thought, but instead presuppose them; they do not look at ethics from the outside, but operate from within ethics. This paper defends the non-moral status of expressivism against anti-Archimedeanism by rejecting a new anti-Archimedean challenge which, on the basis of Hume’s Law, aims to exploit expressivist explanations of supervenience in order to show that expressivism is a substantive moral position.
- Keywords
- Expressivism, Minimalism, Anti-Archimedeanism, Supervenience, Metaethics
- Type
- Article
- URI
- Activation date
- 2015-03-23, 2015-03-23