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Home › Publications › Division of Labor and Rule-based Decisionmaking Within the UN Security Council : The Al-Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions Regime

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Division of Labor and Rule-based Decisionmaking Within the UN Security Council : The Al-Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions Regime

Gehring, Thomas; Dörfler, Thomas (2013): Division of Labor and Rule-based Decisionmaking Within the UN Security Council : The Al-Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions Regime, in: Global Governance : A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Boulder, Colo.: Rienner, Jg. 19, Nr. 4, S. 567–587, doi: 10.1163/19426720-01904006.

Details

Faculty/Chair
Author
Dörfler, Thomas
Title of the Journal
Global Governance : A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations
ISSN
1075-2846
Publisher Information
Rienner : Boulder, Colo.
Year of publication
2013
Volume
19
Issue
4
Language
English
DOI
URL
Abstract

Decisionmaking within the Security Council increasingly involves delegation to subsidiary bodies. Drawing on modern institutional theory, this article examines the effects of the emergent system of divided labor within the al-Qaeda/Taliban sanctions regime. The article first looks at the political economy of the process of listing individuals and private entities as sanctions targets. Second, it explores the distinct functions performed by the bodies of the sanctions regime; namely, the Security Council, the AQT Sanctions Committee, the Office of the Ombudsperson, and an expert body. Third, it analyzes the resulting incentive structures in three successive stages of regime development. The article concludes that the sanctions regime constitutes a surprisingly well-advanced model of how to commit even powerful states to rule-based governance without depriving them of their capability to adopt political decisions.

Keywords
Security Council
sanctions committee
targeted sanctions
smart sanctions
functional differentiation
Type
Article
URI
Activation date
2014-07-22, 2014-07-22
Project(s)

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