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Home › Publications › Rebuilding the coalition ship at sea : how uncertainty and complexity drive the reform of portfolio design in coalition cabinets

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Rebuilding the coalition ship at sea : how uncertainty and complexity drive the reform of portfolio design in coalition cabinets

Meyer, Thomas M.; Sieberer, Ulrich; Schmuck, David (2024): Rebuilding the coalition ship at sea : how uncertainty and complexity drive the reform of portfolio design in coalition cabinets, in: West European Politics, Basingstoke [u.a.]: Routledge, Taylor & Francis, Jg. 47, Nr. 1, S. 142–163, doi: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2169512.

Details

Faculty/Chair
Faculty/Professorship
Author
Meyer, Thomas M.
Title of the Journal
West European Politics
ISSN
1743-9655
0140-2382
Publisher Information
Routledge, Taylor & Francis : Basingstoke [u.a.]
Year of publication
2024
Volume
47
Issue
1
Language
English
DOI
Abstract

In the government formation process, coalition partners make decisions about the inner workings of their future government. However, whether the initial allocation of competencies has the desired effects is uncertain, and deals may therefore be subject to change when the government is in office. This study analyses the frequency of changes in portfolio design (i.e. the distribution of competencies among government ministries and office holders) for 112 coalition governments in eight West European democracies (1970–2015). Its central argument is that in uncertain and complex bargaining situations, coalition partners have greater difficulty finding mutually beneficial deals, and changes to the initial allocation of payoffs are therefore more likely. The results indicate that preference divergence and strenuous coalition negotiations make portfolio design reforms more likely, but show no consistent effect of the familiarity among government parties. These findings show how the bargaining context during government formation foreshadows coalition governance over the cabinet’s life-cycle.

GND Keywords
Westeuropa
Regierungsbildung
Koalitionsvereinbarung
Geschichte 1970–2015
Keywords
Multiparty governments
coalition governance
portfolio design
government formation
Western Europe
DDC Classification
320 Political Science
RVK Classification
MG 11620
Peer Reviewed
yes
International Distribution
yes
Open Access Journal
no
Type
Article
URI
Activation date
2023-05-17
Project(s)

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Data as of: 2026-11-16

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