The case for neurons : a no-go theorem for consciousness on a chip
Kleiner, Johannes; Ludwig, Tim (2024): The case for neurons : a no-go theorem for consciousness on a chip, in: Neuroscience of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Jg. 2024, Nr. 1, niae037, S. 1–11, doi: 10.1093/nc/niae037.
Details
- Faculty/Chair
- Faculty/Professorship
- Author
- Ludwig, Tim
- Title of the Journal
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- ISSN
- 2057-2107
- Publisher Information
- Oxford University Press : Oxford
- Year of publication
- 2024
- Volume
- 2024
- Issue
- 1, niae037
- Language
- English
- DOI
- URL
- Abstract
We apply the methodology of no-go theorems as developed in physics to the question of artificial consciousness. The result is a no-go theorem which shows that under a general assumption, called dynamical relevance, Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems that run on contemporary computer chips cannot be conscious. Consciousness is dynamically relevant, simply put, if, according to a theory of consciousness, it is relevant for the temporal evolution of a system’s states. The no-go theorem rests on facts about semiconductor development: that AI systems run on central processing units, graphics processing units, tensor processing units, or other processors which have been designed and verified to adhere to computational dynamics that systematically preclude or suppress deviations. Whether our result resolves the question of AI consciousness on contemporary processors depends on the truth of the theorem’s main assumption, dynamical relevance, which this paper does not establish.
- GND Keywords
- Künstliche IntelligenzGroßes SprachmodellBewusstsein
- Keywords
- Artificial ConsciousnessSynthetic PhenomenologyArtificial SentienceMachine ConsciousnessNo-Go TheoremArtificial IntelligenceLarge Language Model
- DDC Classification
- 150 Psychology
- RVK Classification
- CP 4600
- Peer Reviewed
- yes
- International Distribution
- yes
- Open Access Journal
- yes
- Type
- Article
- URI
- Activation date
- 2025-01-07