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Start › Publikationen › International Organizations as Group Actors : how Institutional Procedures Create Organizational Independence without Delegation to Institutional Agents

Publikation

International Organizations as Group Actors : how Institutional Procedures Create Organizational Independence without Delegation to Institutional Agents

Gehring, Thomas (2023): International Organizations as Group Actors : how Institutional Procedures Create Organizational Independence without Delegation to Institutional Agents, in: Historical Social Research : the official journal of QUANTUM and INTERQUANT ; HSR ; an international journal for the application of formal methods to history = Historische Sozialforschung, Köln: GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Jg. 48, Nr. 3, S. 94–124, doi: 10.12759/HSR.48.2023.27.

Details

Fakultät/Lehrstuhl
Autorin(nen)/Autor(en)
Titel der Zeitschrift
Historical Social Research : the official journal of QUANTUM and INTERQUANT ; HSR ; an international journal for the application of formal methods to history = Historische Sozialforschung
ISSN
0172-6404
Verlagsangabe
GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences : Köln
Erscheinungsjahr
2023
Jahrgang
48
Heft
3
Sprache(n)
Englisch
DOI
Abstract

Can international organizations (IOs) gain independence from their member states, even if their decisions arise from member state bodies? While organizational independence is a precondition for the autonomy and agency of IOs, International Relations theory cannot yet grasp IO independence in the absence of institutional agents like secretariats. Drawing on collective actor theories with a strong micro-foundation from philosophy and sociology, this article demonstrates how organizational rules and procedures gradually shape organizational processes and produce collective effects that do not arise from the aggregation of member state activities. Member-dominated IOs can produce collective beliefs about relevant parts of the outside world that differ from the aggregated beliefs of member states. They can comprise institutionalized organizational goals and criteria that indicate collective intentions of organizational action and differ from the aggregate preferences of member states. They can comprise decision-making procedures that foster organizational decisions according to collective beliefs and intentions and reduce or abolish the relevance of bargaining and preference aggregation. Finally, they can act in ways that do not immediately rely on implementation action by the member states or by other lower-level actors. I conclude that analyzing the sources of independence of member-dominated IOs from their members sheds light on the nature and effects of IOs as group actors.

GND-Schlagwort(e)
Internationale Organisation
Akteur
Unabhängigkeit
Freie Schlagwort(e)
Collective actor
international organization
independence
autonomy
corporate agency
authority
pooling
DDC-Klassifikation
320 Politik
RVK-Klassifikation
MK 4100
Dokumenttyp
Artikel in einer Zeitschrift / Postprint
URI
Datum der Freischaltung
03.07.2023

Permalink: https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/59963 · Daten als JSON · Zitieren: BibTeX · RIS

Datenstand: 15.11.2026

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