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Home › Publications › Credible commitment without independent regulatory agent: Evidence from the Security Council's United Nations Compensation Commission

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Credible commitment without independent regulatory agent: Evidence from the Security Council's United Nations Compensation Commission

Becker, Manuel; Dörfler, Thomas; Gehring, Thomas (2018): Credible commitment without independent regulatory agent: Evidence from the Security Council’s United Nations Compensation Commission, in: Regulation & Governance, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, Jg. 12, Nr. 3, S. 395–412, doi: 10.1111/rego.12195.

Details

Faculty/Chair
Faculty/Professorship
Author
Becker, Manuel
Dörfler, Thomas
Title of the Journal
Regulation & Governance
ISSN
1748-5983
Publisher Information
Wiley-Blackwell : Hoboken, NJ
Year of publication
2018
Volume
12
Issue
3
Language
English
DOI
Peer Reviewed
yes
Type
Article
URI
Activation date
2020-02-05
Project(s)

Permalink: https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/47182 · Data as JSON · Cite: BibTeX · RIS

Data as of: 2026-11-16

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