Efficient incentives with social preferences
Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph (2024): Efficient incentives with social preferences, in: Bamberg: Otto-Friedrich-Universität, S. 975–999.
Details
- Faculty/Chair
- Faculty/Professorship
- Author
- Daske, Thomas
- Publisher Information
- Otto-Friedrich-Universität : Bamberg
- Year of publication
- 2024
- Source/Other editions
- Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory, 19 (2024), 3, S. 975-999. - ISSN: 1555-7561, 1933-6837
- Year of first publication
- 2024
- Language
- English
- Licence
- URN
- Abstract
We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of \textit{at least three} agents: Any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient.
- GND Keywords
- AnreizSozialverhaltenPräferenzBayes-Verfahren
- Keywords
- Mechanism designsocial preferencesBayesian implementationparticipation constraintsparticipation stimulationmoney pump
- DDC Classification
- 330 Economics
- RVK Classification
- QH 233
- Type
- Article
- URI
- Activation date
- 2024-12-13
- Project(s)