Skip to content

Read-only version: For security reasons, the Research Information System (FIS) has been temporarily replaced by this read-only version. All public content and full texts remain available; login, editing, submission and statistics are not available. Questions: fis@uni-bamberg.de

Home › Publications › Efficient incentives with social preferences

Publication

Efficient incentives with social preferences

Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph (2024): Efficient incentives with social preferences, in: Bamberg: Otto-Friedrich-Universität, S. 975–999.

Details

Faculty/Chair
Faculty/Professorship
Author
Daske, Thomas
Publisher Information
Otto-Friedrich-Universität : Bamberg
Year of publication
2024
Source/Other editions
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory, 19 (2024), 3, S. 975-999. - ISSN: 1555-7561, 1933-6837
Year of first publication
2024
Language
English
Licence
URN
Abstract

We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of \textit{at least three} agents: Any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient.

GND Keywords
Anreiz
Sozialverhalten
Präferenz
Bayes-Verfahren
Keywords
Mechanism design
social preferences
Bayesian implementation
participation constraints
participation stimulation
money pump
DDC Classification
330 Economics
RVK Classification
QH 233
Type
Article
URI
Activation date
2024-12-13
Project(s)

Permalink: https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/105420 · Data as JSON · Cite: BibTeX · RIS

Data as of: 2026-11-16

Restricted read-only access: login, editing and submission are temporarily disabled.