Skip to content

Read-only version: For security reasons, the Research Information System (FIS) has been temporarily replaced by this read-only version. All public content and full texts remain available; login, editing, submission and statistics are not available. Questions: fis@uni-bamberg.de

Home › Publications › Analogy-based Collective Decision-making and Incremental Change in International Organizations

Publication

Analogy-based Collective Decision-making and Incremental Change in International Organizations

Dörfler, Thomas; Gehring, Thomas (2021): Analogy-based Collective Decision-making and Incremental Change in International Organizations, in: European Journal of International Relations, London [u.a.]: Sage, Jg. 27, Nr. 3, doi: 10.1177/1354066120987889.

Details

Faculty/Chair
Faculty/Professorship
Author
Dörfler, Thomas
Title of the Journal
European Journal of International Relations
ISSN
1460-3713
1354-0661
Publisher Information
Sage : London [u.a.]
Year of publication
2021
Volume
27
Issue
3
Pages
753-778
Language
English
DOI
Abstract

We examine how analogy-based collective decision-making of member states contributes to the endogenous emergence of informal rules and the incremental change of international organizations (IOs). Decision-making by analogy is an important characteristic of day-to-day decision-making in IOs. Relating current decisions to previous ones through analogies drives incremental change and simultaneously reinforces organizational resilience. Whereas the foreign policy analysis literature shows that analogies can be used as cognitive shortcuts in fuzzy and complex foreign policy situations, we focus on their use to overcome social ambiguity (indeterminacy) of coordination situations in IOs. Drawing on psychological conceptions, we develop two micro-level mechanisms that elucidate the effects of analogy-based collective decision-making in member-driven IOs. Analogy-based collective decisions emphasizing similarity between a current situation and previous ones follow an established problem schema and produce expansive and increasingly well-established informal rules. Collective decisions that are analogy-based but emphasize a crucial difference follow different problem schemas and trigger the emergence of additional informal rules that apply to new classes of cases. The result is an increasingly fine-grained web of distinct organizational solutions for a growing number of problems. Accordingly, an IO can increasingly facilitate collective decision-making and gains resilience. Empirically, we probe these propositions with a documentary analysis of decision-making in the Yugoslavia sanctions committee, established by the United Nations Security Council to deal with a stream of requests for exempting certain goods or services from the comprehensive economic embargo imposed on Yugoslavia in response to the War in the Balkans.

GND Keywords
Internationale Organisation
Entscheidungsfindung
Vereinte Nationen. Sicherheitsrat
Sanktion
Jugoslawienkriege
Keywords
Historical institutionalism
analogical reasoning
international organizations
decision-making
Security Council
sanctions
DDC Classification
320 Political Science
RVK Classification
MK 7750
Peer Reviewed
yes
International Distribution
yes
Open Access Journal
no
Type
Article
URI
Activation date
2021-08-17
Project(s)

Permalink: https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/51087 · Data as JSON · Cite: BibTeX · RIS

Data as of: 2026-11-16

Restricted read-only access: login, editing and submission are temporarily disabled.