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Mitigating the Problem of Manipulation in the ‘Adjusted Winner’ Procedure

Scheller, Simon (2017): Mitigating the Problem of Manipulation in the ‘Adjusted Winner’ Procedure, in: Jahrbuch für Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, Jg. 10, S. 111–140, doi: 10.1007/978-3-658-16714-1.

Details

Faculty/Chair
Author
Title of the Journal
Jahrbuch für Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie
ISSN
2627-3268
Publisher Information
Springer VS : Wiesbaden
Year of publication
2017
Volume
10
Language
English
DOI
Abstract

The ‘Adjusted Winner’ procedure (AW) is a mechanism to reach fair agreements in bargaining situations over a fixed set of objects. A major shortfall of AW for both mediators and participants is that it relies on participants’ honesty, which makes it open for manipulation. In a general model of AW for two objects and continuous manipulation strategies, I show that (a) manipulation is always risky since potential losses are always larger than potential gains; and (b) there exists an equilibrium of symmetric manipulation and with equal threat of potential losses that leads to exactly the same outcome like truthful behavior. These findings imply that the problem of manipulation in AW is mitigated.

Keywords
Adjusted winner
Manipulation
Bargaining
Negotiation
Fairness
Type
Article
URI
Activation date
2017-11-23, 2017-11-23
Awards

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