Mitigating the Problem of Manipulation in the ‘Adjusted Winner’ Procedure
Scheller, Simon (2017): Mitigating the Problem of Manipulation in the ‘Adjusted Winner’ Procedure, in: Jahrbuch für Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, Jg. 10, S. 111–140, doi: 10.1007/978-3-658-16714-1.
Details
- Faculty/Chair
- Author
- Title of the Journal
- Jahrbuch für Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie
- ISSN
- 2627-3268
- Publisher Information
- Springer VS : Wiesbaden
- Year of publication
- 2017
- Volume
- 10
- Language
- English
- DOI
- Abstract
The ‘Adjusted Winner’ procedure (AW) is a mechanism to reach fair agreements in bargaining situations over a fixed set of objects. A major shortfall of AW for both mediators and participants is that it relies on participants’ honesty, which makes it open for manipulation. In a general model of AW for two objects and continuous manipulation strategies, I show that (a) manipulation is always risky since potential losses are always larger than potential gains; and (b) there exists an equilibrium of symmetric manipulation and with equal threat of potential losses that leads to exactly the same outcome like truthful behavior. These findings imply that the problem of manipulation in AW is mitigated.
- Keywords
- Adjusted winnerManipulationBargainingNegotiationFairness
- Type
- Article
- URI
- Activation date
- 2017-11-23, 2017-11-23
- Awards