Skip to content

Read-only version: For security reasons, the Research Information System (FIS) has been temporarily replaced by this read-only version. All public content and full texts remain available; login, editing, submission and statistics are not available. Questions: fis@uni-bamberg.de

Home › Publications › Member-dominated international organizations as actors : a bottom-up theory of corporate agency

Publication

Member-dominated international organizations as actors : a bottom-up theory of corporate agency

Gehring, Thomas; Urbanski, Kevin (2023): Member-dominated international organizations as actors : a bottom-up theory of corporate agency, in: International theory : a journal of international politics, law and philosophy, Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, Jg. 15, Nr. 1, S. 129–153, doi: 10.1017/S1752971922000069.

Details

Faculty/Chair
Faculty/Professorship
Author
Urbanski, Kevin
Title of the Journal
International theory : a journal of international politics, law and philosophy
ISSN
1752-9727
1752-9719
Publisher Information
Cambridge Univ. Press : Cambridge ; New York
Year of publication
2023
Volume
15
Issue
1
Language
English
DOI
Abstract

This article introduces an innovative theoretical conception of the corporate agency of international organizations (IOs). Existing rationalist and constructivist accounts attribute IO agency to the influence of intra-organizational agents. Drawing on general conceptions of corporate agency in International Relations, sociology, and philosophy, we elucidate how IOs can develop corporate agency, even if the member states prepare and adopt all organizational decisions themselves. In line with recent studies on international political authority, we replace the IO-as-bureaucracy model with the more comprehensive concept of IOs-as-governors. To establish the micro-foundations of IO agency, we adopt a bottom-up perspective and outline how, and under which conditions, IO agency arises from the interaction of constituent actors. Irrespective of any specific institutional design, IOs become actors in their own right whenever they gain action capability and autonomy. They acquire action capability whenever their members pool governance resources like the right to regulate certain activities or to manage common funds and authorize IOs to deploy these resources. IOs gain autonomy whenever they affect organizational decisions. Both dimensions of IO agency are variable and open to empirical enquiry. To illustrate our argument, we refer to the United Nations Security Council and other IOs with member-driven decision processes.

GND Keywords
Internationale Organisation
Handlungskompetenz
Entscheidungsfindung
Keywords
International organizations
corporate agency
authority
autonomy
pooling
theory
DDC Classification
320 Political Science
RVK Classification
MK 4100
Peer Reviewed
yes
International Distribution
yes
Open Access Journal
no
Type
Article
URI
Activation date
2022-12-07
Project(s)

Permalink: https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/56872 · Data as JSON · Cite: BibTeX · RIS

Data as of: 2026-11-16

Restricted read-only access: login, editing and submission are temporarily disabled.