Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players
Sahm, Marco (2022): Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players, in: Games, Basel, Jg. 13, Nr. 2, doi: 10.3390/g13020024.
Details
- Fakultät/Lehrstuhl
- Autorin(nen)/Autor(en)
- Titel der Zeitschrift
- Games
- ISSN
- 2073-4336
- Herausgebende Institution
- Molecular Diversity Preservation International (MDPI)
- Erscheinungsjahr
- 2022
- Jahrgang
- 13
- Heft
- 2
- Seiten
- 6
- Sprache(n)
- Englisch
- DOI
- Abstract
I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (r≥2). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or the winner’s expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level r<2 decreases in the players’ heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum (maximum) effort will never choose a contest with a semi-mixed equilibrium.
- GND-Schlagwort(e)
- SpieltheorieAuktionstheorieWettbewerbGewinnWahrscheinlichkeit
- Freie Schlagwort(e)
- Tullock contestheterogeneous valuationsaccuracydiscriminationoptimal designall-pay auction
- DDC-Klassifikation
- 330 Wirtschaft
- RVK-Klassifikation
- QH 430
- Peer Reviewed
- ja
- Internationale Verbreitung
- ja
- Open-Access-Zeitschrift
- ja
- Dokumenttyp
- Artikel in einer Zeitschrift / Postprint
- URI
- Datum der Freischaltung
- 31.10.2022
- Projekt(e)