Efficient incentives with social preferences
Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph (2024): Efficient incentives with social preferences, in: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory, Toronto: The Econometric Society, Jg. 19, Nr. 3, S. 975–999, doi: 10.3982/te5335.
Details
- Faculty/Chair
- Faculty/Professorship
- Author
- Daske, Thomas
- Title of the Journal
- Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory
- ISSN
- 1555-75611933-6837
- Publisher Information
- The Econometric Society : Toronto
- Year of publication
- 2024
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 3
- Language
- English
- DOI
- Abstract
We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of \textit{at least three} agents: Any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient.
- GND Keywords
- AnreizSozialverhaltenPräferenzBayes-Verfahren
- Keywords
- Mechanism designsocial preferencesBayesian implementationparticipation constraintsparticipation stimulationmoney pump
- DDC Classification
- 330 Economics
- RVK Classification
- QH 233
- Type
- Article
- URI
- Activation date
- 2024-12-12
- Project(s)