Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players
Sahm, Marco (2022): Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players, in: Bamberg: Otto-Friedrich-Universität.
Details
- Faculty/Chair
- Faculty/Professorship
- Author
- Publisher Information
- Otto-Friedrich-Universität : Bamberg
- Year of publication
- 2022
- Pages
- 6
- Source/Other editions
- Games, 13 (2022), 2, 6 S. - ISSN: 2073-4336
- Year of first publication
- 2022
- Language
- English
- Licence
- URN
- Abstract
I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (r≥2). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or the winner’s expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level r<2 decreases in the players’ heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum (maximum) effort will never choose a contest with a semi-mixed equilibrium.
- GND Keywords
- SpieltheorieAuktionstheorieWettbewerbGewinnWahrscheinlichkeit
- Keywords
- Tullock contestheterogeneous valuationsaccuracydiscriminationoptimal designall-pay auction
- DDC Classification
- 330 Economics
- RVK Classification
- QH 430
- Type
- Article
- URI
- Activation date
- 2023-01-12
- Project(s)