Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players
Sahm, Marco (2022): Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players, in: Bamberg: Otto-Friedrich-Universität.
Details
- Fakultät/Lehrstuhl
- Autorin(nen)/Autor(en)
- Verlagsangabe
- Otto-Friedrich-Universität : Bamberg
- Erscheinungsjahr
- 2022
- Seiten
- 6
- Quelle/Weitere Ausgabe
- Games, 13 (2022), 2, 6 S. - ISSN: 2073-4336
- Jahr der Erstpublikation
- 2022
- Sprache(n)
- Englisch
- Lizenz
- URN
- Abstract
I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (r≥2). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or the winner’s expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level r<2 decreases in the players’ heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum (maximum) effort will never choose a contest with a semi-mixed equilibrium.
- GND-Schlagwort(e)
- SpieltheorieAuktionstheorieWettbewerbGewinnWahrscheinlichkeit
- Freie Schlagwort(e)
- Tullock contestheterogeneous valuationsaccuracydiscriminationoptimal designall-pay auction
- DDC-Klassifikation
- 330 Wirtschaft
- RVK-Klassifikation
- QH 430
- Dokumenttyp
- Artikel in einer Zeitschrift / Postprint
- URI
- Datum der Freischaltung
- 12.01.2023
- Projekt(e)