Contests as selection mechanisms: The impact of risk aversion
March, Christoph; Sahm, Marco (2018): Contests as selection mechanisms: The impact of risk aversion, in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Amsterdam [u.a.]: Elsevier, Jg. 150, S. 114–131, doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.020.
Details
- Fakultät/Lehrstuhl
- Autorin(nen)/Autor(en)
- Titel der Zeitschrift
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- ISSN
- 0167-2681
- Verlagsangabe
- Elsevier : Amsterdam [u.a.]
- Erscheinungsjahr
- 2018
- Jahrgang
- 150
- Sprache(n)
- Englisch
- DOI
- Abstract
We investigate how individual risk preferences affect the likelihood of selecting the more able contestant within a two-player Tullock contest. Our theoretical model yields two main predictions: First, an increase in the risk aversion of a player worsens her odds unless she already has a sufficiently large advantage. Second, if the prize money is sufficiently large, a less able but less risk averse contestant can achieve an equal or even higher probability of winning than a more able but more risk averse opponent. In a laboratory experiment we confirm both, the non-monotonic impact and the compensating effect of risk aversion on winning probabilities. Our results suggest a novel explanation for the gender gap and the optimality of limited monetary incentives in selection contests.
- Freie Schlagwort(e)
- Selection contestRisk aversionCompetitive balanceGender gap
- Peer Reviewed
- ja
- Internationale Verbreitung
- ja
- Open-Access-Zeitschrift
- nein
- Dokumenttyp
- Artikel in einer Zeitschrift / Postprint
- URI
- Datum der Freischaltung
- 28.06.2018, 28.06.2018