Risk aversion and prudence in contests
Sahm, Marco (2017): Risk aversion and prudence in contests, in: Economics Bulletin, Champaign-Urbana, Ill.: Univ. of Illinois, Jg. 37, Nr. 2, S. 1122–1132.
Details
- Faculty/Chair
- Author
- Title of the Journal
- Economics Bulletin
- ISSN
- 1545-2921
- Publisher Information
- Univ. of Illinois : Champaign-Urbana, Ill.
- Year of publication
- 2017
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 2
- Language
- English
- URL
- Abstract
I examine the impact of risk preferences on efforts and winning probabilities in generalized Tullock contests between two players. The theoretical analysis yields two ma in results. First, in symmetric contests, a higher common level of the agents ́ risk aversion will lead to lower aggregate effort if it comes along with an increase in downside risk aversion. Second, in many asymmetric contests, higher risk-aversion will be a disadvantage if the agent is also more downside risk-averse
- Peer Reviewed
- yes
- International Distribution
- yes
- Open Access Journal
- yes
- Type
- Article
- URI
- Activation date
- 2018-06-28, 2018-06-28