Skip to content

Read-only version: For security reasons, the Research Information System (FIS) has been temporarily replaced by this read-only version. All public content and full texts remain available; login, editing, submission and statistics are not available. Questions: fis@uni-bamberg.de

Home › Publications › Risk aversion and prudence in contests

Publication

Risk aversion and prudence in contests

Sahm, Marco (2017): Risk aversion and prudence in contests, in: Economics Bulletin, Champaign-Urbana, Ill.: Univ. of Illinois, Jg. 37, Nr. 2, S. 1122–1132.

Details

Faculty/Chair
Author
Title of the Journal
Economics Bulletin
ISSN
1545-2921
Publisher Information
Univ. of Illinois : Champaign-Urbana, Ill.
Year of publication
2017
Volume
37
Issue
2
Language
English
URL
Abstract

I examine the impact of risk preferences on efforts and winning probabilities in generalized Tullock contests between two players. The theoretical analysis yields two ma in results. First, in symmetric contests, a higher common level of the agents ́ risk aversion will lead to lower aggregate effort if it comes along with an increase in downside risk aversion. Second, in many asymmetric contests, higher risk-aversion will be a disadvantage if the agent is also more downside risk-averse

Peer Reviewed
yes
International Distribution
yes
Open Access Journal
yes
Type
Article
URI
Activation date
2018-06-28, 2018-06-28

Permalink: https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44021 · Data as JSON · Cite: BibTeX · RIS

Data as of: 2026-11-16

Restricted read-only access: login, editing and submission are temporarily disabled.