Risk aversion and prudence in contests
Sahm, Marco (2017): Risk aversion and prudence in contests, in: Economics Bulletin, Champaign-Urbana, Ill.: Univ. of Illinois, Jg. 37, Nr. 2, S. 1122–1132.
Details
- Fakultät/Lehrstuhl
- Autorin(nen)/Autor(en)
- Titel der Zeitschrift
- Economics Bulletin
- ISSN
- 1545-2921
- Verlagsangabe
- Univ. of Illinois : Champaign-Urbana, Ill.
- Erscheinungsjahr
- 2017
- Jahrgang
- 37
- Heft
- 2
- Sprache(n)
- Englisch
- URL
- Abstract
I examine the impact of risk preferences on efforts and winning probabilities in generalized Tullock contests between two players. The theoretical analysis yields two ma in results. First, in symmetric contests, a higher common level of the agents ́ risk aversion will lead to lower aggregate effort if it comes along with an increase in downside risk aversion. Second, in many asymmetric contests, higher risk-aversion will be a disadvantage if the agent is also more downside risk-averse
- Peer Reviewed
- ja
- Internationale Verbreitung
- ja
- Open-Access-Zeitschrift
- ja
- Dokumenttyp
- Artikel in einer Zeitschrift / Postprint
- URI
- Datum der Freischaltung
- 28.06.2018, 28.06.2018